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Preface
Credit constraints are one of the most important obstacles to international trade.
Economists have devoted a lot of attention to the question how nancial frictions af-
fect cross-border goods ows. However, the increasing availability of micro data has
shifted the focus of research in international trade from a country and industry per-
spective to the rm and product level. While moving towards a more disaggregated
analysis, the literature has emphasized dierent sources of gains from globalization,
as well as various channels through which credit frictions aect international trade.
At the country level, Beck (2002) shows that nancial development is positively
related to export ows. Moving towards a more disaggregated perspective, empiri-
cal papers exploit dierences in the exposure to credit constraints across industries.
Countries with better nancial development export more in industries that highly
depend on external nance and have fewer tangible assets (Beck, 2003; Svaleryd
and Vlachos, 2005). These empirical ndings are consistent with traditional theory
that highlights specialization gains from trade liberalization, driven by technologi-
cal dierences across countries (Ricardo) or dierences in factor endowments across
industries (Heckscher-Ohlin). If credit market imperfections are present, the qual-
ity of nancial institutions shapes trade ows between countries and represents a
source of comparative advantage in sectors that rely on external nance (Kletzer
and Bardhan, 1987; Matsuyama, 2005; Ju and Wei, 2011).
Motivated by the phenomenon of intra-industry trade (Grubel and Lloyd, 1975), the
new trade theory emphasizes economies of scale and increased product variety as
additional gains from globalization (Krugman, 1979, 1980; Helpman, 1981; Ethier,
1982). However, evidence from micro data has challenged the representative-rm
view of this literature. Exporters are larger, more productive, and pay higher wages
than non-exporters within the same industry (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Bernard
et al., 2007). Theories of rm heterogeneity explain the selection of the most pro-
ductive rms into exporting in the presence of additional trade costs, and highlight
1
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intra-industry reallocations of resources towards high-productivity rms as a new
channel of gains from trade (Melitz, 2003; Bernard et al., 2003).
This thesis is inspired by the fact that research on credit frictions in international
trade has followed the shift of focus from a country and industry perspective to the
rm level. Empirical studies exploit the availability of micro data and show that
credit constraints lead to negative eects on rm-level exports. For Italian rms,
Minetti and Zhu (2011) nd that credit-rationing reduces the probability of exporting
by 39% and lowers foreign sales by 38%. A growing number of studies conrms the
negative eects of nancial frictions on foreign market entry and export performance
of existing suppliers (Berman and Hericourt, 2010; Manova, 2013; Muu^ls, 2015).
Whereas exporters show better ex-ante nancial health, such as higher liquidity
or lower leverage (Greenaway et al., 2007), credit frictions have stronger negative
eects on trade ows compared to domestic sales (Manova, 2013; Feenstra et al.,
2014). These results point to the importance of additional trade costs and up-front
investments related to international activity. Besides that, nancially constrained
rms export less products to fewer destinations (Muu^ls, 2015). This evidence is
complemented by studies that nd positive eects of credit guarantees on exports
(Egger and Url, 2006; Felbermayr et al., 2012; Felbermayr and Yalcin, 2013).
Motivated by new empirical evidence from micro data, theoretical models combine
rm heterogeneity with credit frictions at the industry or country level. If external
nance is needed for trade related up-front costs, nancial frictions reduce the prob-
ability of exporting (Manova, 2013; Chaney, 2013). If variable trade costs have to
be nanced by external funds, credit constraints lower the volume of foreign sales as
well. Especially less productive rms are aected by credit frictions, as low prots
limit their potential repayment to investors (Manova, 2013) or their internal liquidity
(Chaney, 2013). Hence, these models explain negative eects of nancial frictions
both at the rm level and on dierent margins of bilateral trade ows.
This thesis aims to contribute to the theoretical literature on credit frictions in
international trade in two main aspects. The three chapters of the thesis (i) highlight
new heterogeneous eects of credit constraints at the rm level, and (ii) analyze how
these adjustments change the aggregate implications of nancial shocks and trade
liberalization in the presence of credit frictions. The theoretical analysis throughout
this thesis takes into account general equilibrium adjustments. This is especially
relevant for an evaluation of welfare eects and policy implications, but has received
limited attention in the recent literature on nancial frictions in international trade.
PREFACE 3
Existing trade models with credit constraints typically focus on partial equilibrium
results. The main idea of the general equilibrium analysis in this thesis is as follows:
if nancial shocks lead to dierent responses of heterogeneous rms, this will change
the degree of competition and will aect the selection of producers into exporting,
as well as aggregate outcomes, such as product variety, average productivity, and
welfare. Hence from a welfare and policy perspective, a general equilibrium analysis
is crucial to account for selection eects of rms.
Building on the existing literature, this thesis combines rm heterogeneity with -
nancial frictions. Producers require external credit for up-front investments or to
nance production costs before revenues are realized. This assumption is based on
a growing literature that documents negative eects of nancial frictions on inno-
vation activity and R&D expenditures (Hall and Lerner, 2010; Maskus et al., 2012;
Aghion et al., 2012; Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer, 2013). Related work highlights
the importance of investments in international trade, such as technology upgrading
(Lileeva and Treer, 2010; Bustos, 2011), foreign direct investment (Helpman et al.,
2004) or quality innovations (Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012). To motivate credit fric-
tions, theoretical models in international trade build on dierent approaches such
as imperfect nancial contractibility (Manova, 2013), liquidity constraints (Chaney,
2013) or information asymmetry (Feenstra et al., 2014). In this thesis, credit fric-
tions emerge from moral hazard based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), whereas the
success of investment projects depends on a managerial action which is non-veriable
for external lenders and thus prone to moral hazard. This agency problem reduces
the pledgeability of rm prots and introduces access barriers to external nance.
Combined with rm heterogeneity, the moral hazard approach allows to analyze the
eects of credit frictions on individual producers, as well as on aggregate outcomes,
in an intuitive and highly tractable way.
The three chapters of this thesis focus on dierent channels how credit constraints
inuence international trade, and derive new aggregate implications, which have
attained no or limited attention in the existing literature. Chapter 1 analyzes the
eects of credit frictions on within-rm adjustments and selection into exporting,
when both cost-based productivity and product quality matter for the success of a
producer. The main idea is that the scope for vertical product dierentiation in a
sector determines how nancial shocks aect investment and price setting. Empirical
studies nd opposing eects of credit frictions and trade costs on free on board (fob)
prices (Secchi et al., 2015; Fan et al., 2014, 2015). Consistent with this evidence, the
PREFACE 4
model shows that prices decrease in credit and trade costs if the scope for vertical
product dierentiation is high, and vice versa. Furthermore, the analysis highlights
that eects of nancial shocks on the margins of international trade depend on
sectoral technology characteristics. Credit tightening leads to rm exit, ineciently
high innovation activity among existing suppliers, and welfare losses that are larger
in sectors with low investment intensity.
Chapter 2 shows that substitution eects between two types of external nance rep-
resent an additional channel of adjustment to credit shocks and trade liberalization.
Consistent with empirical evidence, there is selection of the largest rms into ex-
porting and unmonitored nance, such as corporate bonds or public debt. Smaller
producers serve only the domestic market and have to rely on more expensive nan-
cial intermediation. Producers respond to nancial shocks by switching the type of
nance. These selection eects lead to reallocations of market shares across rms
and additional adjustments on the margins of international trade. Furthermore, the
model highlights a new source of gains from trade: average productivity increases as
lower trade costs allow some exporters to select into cheaper unmonitored nance.
Chapter 3 develops a new international trade model, in which both the share of
nancially constrained rms, as well as the borrowing rate, is endogenously deter-
mined. A key element is that rm heterogeneity arises from the interaction of credit
constraints at the rm level with nancial frictions at the country level. Producers
dier in their pledgeability of sales which results in rm heterogeneity if nancial
institutions are imperfect. The main result of this chapter is that endogenous ad-
justments of capital costs lead to an additional negative welfare channel that reduces
common gains from globalization. Trade liberalization increases the borrowing rate,
leads to a reallocation of market shares towards unconstrained producers, and a
larger fraction of credit-rationed rms. This increases the within-industry variance
of sales and reduces welfare gains as consumers dislike price heterogeneity. The im-
plications of the model are consistent with new empirical patterns from World Bank
Enterprise Surveys: credit frictions are positively related to the degree of product
market competition, and to the variance of sales across rms.
In the following, I describe the main results of each chapter in more detail, and briey
discuss the contributions in relation to the existing literature. Chapter 1, which is
based on joint work with Carsten Eckel, introduces credit frictions in a model of
international trade with horizontal and vertical product dierentiation. Besides
productivity sorting suggested by Melitz (2003), empirical evidence emphasizes the
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importance of quality sorting in international trade. Firm-level studies document a
positive relation of fob prices with rm size, which points to vertical dierentiation
(Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012). This chapter analyzes
the eects of credit frictions on innovation, price setting and selection into exporting,
when both cost-based productivity and product quality matter for the competitive-
ness of a producer. The literature on credit frictions in international trade usually
focuses on one of the two determinants. We allow for both cost-based and quality-
based sorting in a unied framework as rms dier in capabilities to conduct process
and quality innovations. Investments are associated with endogenous sunk costs and
innovation choices endogenously determine marginal production costs. The model
explains positive as well as negative correlations of fob prices with credit frictions
and variable trade costs. Consistent with empirical studies (Secchi et al., 2015; Fan
et al., 2014, 2015), prices decrease in credit and trade costs if the scope for vertical
product dierentiation is high, and vice versa. This measure is determined by exoge-
nous technology parameters in the theoretical model and closely related to proxies
of quality dierentiation as used in empirical work (Khandelwal, 2010; Kugler and
Verhoogen, 2012). The price reactions are driven by opposing quality and cost eects
on marginal production costs as rms adjust process and quality innovations.
Whereas the existing literature is typically based on partial equilibrium, we show that
the eects of credit frictions crucially depend on general equilibrium adjustments. In
general equilibrium, credit frictions reduce the number of producers and the degree
of competition for existing suppliers. In contrast to partial equilibrium, the negative
eect of credit frictions on the extensive margin leads to an equilibrium with larger
rms and higher investment. There is an ongoing discussion in both the theoretical
and empirical literature to which extent credit frictions aect the extensive and
intensive margins of international trade (Berman and Hericourt, 2010; Minetti and
Zhu, 2011; Manova, 2013; Muu^ls, 2015). This chapter contributes to this discussion
by showing that the aggregate eects of nancial shocks depend on the investment
intensity. In sectors with low investment intensity, stronger credit frictions have a
large impact on the extensive margin and result in high welfare losses. Furthermore,
an increase in credit costs leads to strong negative reactions at the intensive margin
and thus larger welfare losses in sectors with high investment intensity.
Chapter 2 is motivated by evidence from the corporate nance literature showing
that rm size is an important determinant of access to dierent types of external
credit. Large rms are more likely to use cheap nance provided with low-intensity
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monitoring, such as the issuance of public debt or corporate bonds. Smaller produc-
ers suer more from credit-rationing (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Beck et al., 2006),
and rely heavily on bank nance with intensive monitoring and higher borrowing
rates (Cantillo and Wright, 2000; Denis and Mihov, 2003). Existing theoretical
trade models typically abstract from selection into dierent types of external debt.
The second chapter of this thesis develops a model that accounts for the selection of
producers into exporting and two types of nance. Combining productivity sorting
a la Melitz (2003) with credit frictions based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), the
largest rms export and use unmonitored nance. Smaller producers serve only the
domestic market and have to rely on more expensive bank nance. Selection eects
depend on trade costs, borrowing rates and access barriers to external funds due to
credit frictions. This model highlights that producers respond to nancial shocks and
trade liberalization by switching the type of nance. Accounting for these selection
eects is important for any assessment of welfare implications.
The main message of this chapter is that substitution between the two types of -
nance leads to a reallocation of market shares across producers and new eects on
the margins of international trade. The model is consistent with empirical evidence
that documents the important role of substitution eects. Credit tightening leads
to large adverse impacts on small, bank-dependent rms, and induces selection into
other types of external debt (Kashyap et al., 1993; Faulkender and Petersen, 2006;
Leary, 2009). During the nancial crisis of 2008-2009, producers responded to con-
traction in credit supply by switching to public bonds and trade credit (Adrian et al.,
2012; Coulibaly et al., 2013; Becker and Ivashina, 2014). Furthermore, the model
highlights a new source of gains from trade: average productivity increases as falling
trade costs allow some exporters to select into cheaper unmonitored nance.
To analyze the role of these selection eects, this chapter extends a Melitz (2003)-
type model by endogenous investments and credit frictions. Heterogeneous rms
decide on innovations that reduce marginal production costs, but have to be -
nanced externally. This assumption is based on a large literature that shows the
important role of external nance for innovation activity (Hall and Lerner, 2010;
Maskus et al., 2012; Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer, 2013). Credit frictions emerge
from moral hazard based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Following this, the suc-
cess of investments depends on a managerial project choice, which is non-veriable
for external lenders and thus prone to moral hazard. This agency problem reduces
the pledgeability of rm prots and introduces access barriers to credit.
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The key feature of the model is to allow for two types of external nance that dier
in credit costs and accessibility. Passive lenders provide funds without monitoring,
whereas nancial intermediaries are able to imperfectly control the project choice of
rms. On the one hand, access barriers to monitored funds are lower as nancial
intermediation alleviates moral hazard. On the other hand, monitoring is associated
with additional costs resulting in higher borrowing rates relative to unmonitored -
nance. This approach is consistent with empirical evidence that shows the important
role of banks in reducing agency costs (Gorton and Winton, 2003; Tirole, 2006). The
selection mechanism stressed in this chapter is dierent from models with technology
choice, in which the payment of additional xed costs reduces marginal production
costs (Lileeva and Treer, 2010; Bustos, 2011). Unmonitored nance is associated
with a lower borrowing rate, both for xed and variable investments, but credit
frictions impose an access barrier for smaller rms with low pledgeable income.
The framework nests a model with one type of nance as a special case, which
allows to disentangle direct eects of shocks from substitution eects. Thus, the
model features intra-industry reallocation and common gains of trade liberalization
(Melitz, 2003), as well as negative eects of credit frictions as stressed in the existing
literature (Manova, 2013; Muu^ls, 2015). However, new welfare implications arise
because rms switch the type of nance. These additional selection eects change
the degree of competition in general equilibrium and thus inuence the margins
of international trade. Compared to a model with only one type of credit, lower
nancial development leads to additional welfare losses, because rms select into
more expensive nancial intermediation. While this shock aggravates moral hazard
and increases access barriers to both types of nance, monitoring of intermediaries
reduces the negative impact compared to unmonitored funds. Consequently, there
is selection into nancial intermediation and a reallocation of market shares away
from rms that rely on passive investors. As now a larger fraction of producers faces
higher borrowing rates, the competitive pressure in general equilibrium is reduced.
This selection eect mitigates the negative reaction at the extensive margin, but
amplies welfare losses due to lower average productivity.
From a welfare perspective, this chapter shows that policy measures, which are aimed
at easing access to external funds, will induce reallocations of market shares across
rms, and thus generate losers and winners. As a result, substitution eects be-
tween the two types of nance will change average productivity and welfare, besides
the intended direct eect. Likewise, additional gains from trade liberalization arise
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because of selection eects. Falling trade costs increase the pledgeable income of
exporters and facilitate access to cheaper unmonitored funds. This leads to two new
adjustments that further increase average productivity compared to a model with
only one type of credit. First, some exporters gain access to cheaper unmonitored
nance and reduce prices. Second, increased competitive pressure leads to even
stronger exit of low productivity rms that rely on more expensive bank nance.
The third chapter, which is based on joint work with Michael Irlacher, analyzes the
eects of globalization on rm performance and welfare, when producers dier in
their exposure to nancial frictions and borrowing costs are endogenous. As the
rst two chapters of this thesis, existing theoretical work builds on the interaction of
credit constraints at the industry or country level with ex-ante rm heterogeneity a
la Melitz (2003). A novel feature of the third chapter is that rm heterogeneity re-
sults from the interaction between capital market imperfections at the country level
and credit constraints at the rm level. Producers require external capital to cover
production costs and dier in their incentive to divert external funds, while being
homogenous in other respects. This rm-specic moral hazard problem reduces the
pledgeability of sales and causes credit-rationing for some producers. Firm hetero-
geneity arises if nancial institutions are imperfect, as only a fraction of rms can
overcome credit frictions and behaves optimally. Producers with high incentives to
misbehave face credit-rationing and have to restrict production. Hence, the share of
nancially constrained rms is an endogenous outcome in our model.
As a second departure from previous theoretical work, we explicitly model a capi-
tal market equilibrium which determines the interest rate. We analyze the eects
of globalization and show that adjustments of capital costs represent an additional
channel which reduces common gains from trade. Trade liberalization increases the
market size as well as competition through entry of foreign rms. A positive market
size eect induces output expansion of all rms, raises capital demand, and thus leads
to upward pressure on the interest rate. Higher borrowing costs lead to a larger frac-
tion of nancially constrained producers. Hence, some initially unconstrained rms
face credit-rationing and have to set higher prices. Further, existing constrained
suppliers are hurt more by higher capital costs, leading to a reallocation of prof-
its towards unconstrained rms. These adjustments increase the within-industry
variance of prices. We consider the indirect utility associated with quadratic pref-
erences as welfare measure. As consumers dislike heterogeneity in prices, a higher
within-industry variance represents a negative welfare channel of globalization.
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To motivate our theoretical model, we exploit enterprise survey data from the World
Bank and highlight three novel empirical patterns. First, we use the ratio of tangible
assets over total assets as a proxy for access to external nance, and show that the
majority of variation in this measure is across rms within industries rather than
between industries. This pattern is consistent with empirical studies, showing that
nancial health and access to external nance are important determinants of export
and innovation activity, even after controlling for rm characteristics, such as size and
productivity (Berman and Hericourt, 2010; Minetti and Zhu, 2011; Gorodnichenko
and Schnitzer, 2013; Muu^ls, 2015). The high within-industry heterogeneity with re-
spect to credit constraints motivates the analysis of rm-specic nancial frictions
in our theoretical model. Second, we show that, in industries with a higher degree
of product market competition, a larger fraction of rms is nancially constrained.
Third, more nancially constrained industries and countries with lower nancial de-
velopment show a larger variance of rm sales and a higher share of credit-rationed
producers. All relationships hold after controlling for rm characteristics, such as
productivity or size. Our theoretical model provides a rationale for these patterns.
A higher degree of competition captures that consumers react more sensitive to price
increases. This competition eect reduces rm sales and thus the pledgeable income
such that more producers become nancially constrained. Lower nancial devel-
opment corresponds to weaker contract enforcement which leads to stronger credit
frictions. Hence, a higher fraction of producers faces nancial constraints and rm-
level dierences in pledgeability translate into larger within-industry heterogeneity
in prices and sales.
From a policy perspective, the analysis suggests that trade liberalization should be
accompanied by nancial reforms that aim to mitigate the increased within-industry
heterogeneity. The negative welfare channel of globalization is especially relevant if
nancial development is low and credit frictions are signicant. Consistent with our
theoretical model, empirical studies suggest that the link between credit frictions
and international trade is particularly important in developing countries where the
quality of nancial institutions is low (Banerjee and Duo, 2005, 2014).
All three chapters of this dissertation are self-contained and include their own intro-
ductions and appendices such that they can be read separately. To facilitate reading,
footnotes and equations are numbered independently in each chapter.
Chapter 1
Credit Constraints, Endogenous
Innovations, and Price Setting in
International Trade
This chapter analyzes the eects of credit frictions on within-rm adjustments and
selection into exporting, when both cost-based productivity and product quality
matter for the success of a producer. We show that the scope for vertical product
dierentiation in a sector determines how nancial shocks aect investment and price
setting. Our model explains positive as well as negative correlations of rm-level free
on board prices with nancial frictions and variable trade costs. Consistent with
empirical evidence, prices decrease in credit and trade costs, if the scope for vertical
product dierentiation is high. Further, we show that eects of nancial shocks
on the margins of international trade depend on sectoral technology characteristics.
Credit tightening leads to rm exit, ineciently high innovation activity among
existing suppliers, and welfare losses that are larger in sectors with low investment
intensity. To analyze the eects of credit frictions, we allow for both cost-based and
quality-based sorting in a unied framework. Firms dier in capabilities to conduct
process and quality innovations, and external nance is needed for investments.
This chapter is based on joint work with Carsten Eckel. We are grateful to Daniel Baumgarten,
Peter Egger, Lisandra Flach, Anna Gumpert, Andreas Moxnes, Peter Neary, Banu Demir Pakel,
Monika Schnitzer and Erdal Yalcin, as well as participations of the 7th FIW-Research Conference
\International Economics" in Vienna, 16th Annual Conference of the European Trade Study Group
(ETSG) in Munich, \Mainz Workshop in Trade and Macroeconomics" 2014, 18th Conference of
the SFB/TR 15 in Mannheim, 16th Gottingen Workshop \Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen",
8th SFB/TR15 Workshop for Young Researchers at the University of Munich, and the Munich \IO
and Trade seminar" for helpful comments and suggestions.
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1.1 Introduction
A growing empirical literature documents negative eects of credit constraints on
international trade. Exporting usually requires additional up-front costs for in-
vestments in marketing, capacity, product customization or distribution networks.
Transportation leads to longer time lags between investment outlays and prot re-
alization.1 Empirical studies nd that credit rationing decreases rm-level exports
and reduces the probability of serving foreign markets (Berman and Hericourt, 2010;
Minetti and Zhu, 2011; Muu^ls, 2015). Theoretical work, based on xed up-front costs
and rm heterogeneity a la Melitz (2003), shows that nancial frictions prevent for-
eign market entry of low productivity rms (e.g. Manova, 2013). Besides intensi-
ed productivity sorting, credit constraints and leverage negatively aect exporters'
choice of product quality (Bernini et al., 2013; Ciani and Bartoli, 2014; Fan et al.,
2015). In contrast to cost-based productivity sorting a la Melitz (2003), empirical
studies document a positive relation of prices with rm size, which points to the im-
portant role of vertical product dierentiation in international trade (Baldwin and
Harrigan, 2011; Johnson, 2012; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012; Crozet et al., 2012).2
This chapter analyzes the eects of credit frictions on within-rm adjustments and
selection into exporting, when both cost-based productivity and product quality
matter for the competitiveness of a producer. We show that the scope for vertical
product dierentiation in a sector determines how dierent nancial shocks aect
innovation choices and price setting at the rm level. Our model explains positive
as well as negative correlations of free on board (fob) prices with credit frictions
and variable trade costs. Consistent with empirical studies (Secchi et al., 2015; Fan
et al., 2014, 2015), prices decrease in credit and trade costs, if the scope for vertical
product dierentiation is high, and vice versa. Furthermore, the chapter contributes
to the discussion how credit frictions aect the intensive and extensive margins of
trade. We show that the aggregate eects of nancial shocks depend on the sectoral
investment intensity. Stronger credit frictions intensify quality-based sorting of rms
if the scope for vertical product dierentiation is high. In particular, credit tightening
leads to rm exit, ineciently high innovation activity among existing suppliers, and
welfare losses that are larger in sectors with low investment intensity.
1See Amiti and Weinstein (2011), Chor and Manova (2012), as well as Feenstra et al. (2014).
Foley and Manova (2015) provide a review of the trade and nance literature.
2A negative relationship between rm size and prices is found by Roberts and Supina (1996)
and Foster et al. (2008), which points to cost-based sorting.
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To analyze the eects of trade and nancial shocks, we develop a general equilibrium
model of international trade with credit constraints, two sources of rm heterogene-
ity and endogenous sunk costs. We allow for both cost-based and quality-based
sorting in a unied framework as producers dier in capabilities to conduct process
and quality innovations. Investments are associated with endogenous sunk costs
that decrease in rm-specic capabilities and innovation choices determine marginal
production costs. Depending on their capabilities, rms choose dierent investment
levels and prices. Process innovations decrease marginal costs and hence increase
the cost-based productivity of a rm for any given quality level. Whereas this chan-
nel is closely related to productivity sorting in Melitz (2003), the second type of
investment is motivated by the important role of vertical dierentiation. Quality
innovations shift demand up and increase marginal production costs.
Firms have to raise external capital for investment outlays, whereas labor is used
for xed and variable production costs. Based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we
motivate credit constraints by moral hazard between borrowing rms and outside
lenders. In equilibrium, only the most capable rms overcome nancial frictions and
become exporters, whereas some low capability producers with protable investment
projects fail to borrow external capital and exit the market.
Our model is consistent with empirical studies that nd opposing eects of credit
frictions and trade costs on price setting. For Italian rm-level data, Secchi et al.
(2015) show that nancially constrained exporters charge higher prices than uncon-
strained rms within the same product-destination market. This positive relation-
ship is reduced for product categories with high vertical dierentiation. The authors
follow Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) and measure the scope for vertical product
dierentiation as the ratio of advertising and R&D expenditures to total sales in
U.S. industries. Using Chinese rm-level data, Fan et al. (2015) nd negative ef-
fects of nancial frictions on fob prices. Furthermore, Fan et al. (2014) show that
tari reductions induce quality upgrading associated with higher prices in highly
dierentiated sectors and lower prices in non-dierentiated sectors.
In our model, an increase in the borrowing rate negatively aects both types of
innovation and triggers opposing quality and cost eects on marginal production
costs and prices. If the scope for vertical product dierentiation is high, the quality
eect dominates and tighter credit conditions lead to lower rm-level prices. The
scope for quality dierentiation is dened as the ratio of expenditures associated
with product upgrades relative to investment outlays for processes. This measure
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is determined by exogenous technology parameters in the theoretical model, and
is closely related to sectoral proxies of vertical dierentiation as used in empirical
studies.3 Analogously, changes in variable trade costs lead to opposing quality and
cost eects as well.
We analyze the impact of nancial frictions in partial and general equilibrium. In
partial equilibrium, which could be interpreted as a short-term scenario, the number
of suppliers is xed. In general equilibrium, stronger credit frictions reduce the mass
of active producers, and in contrast to partial equilibrium, innovation activity as well
as rm size of existing suppliers increases. Intuitively, the negative eect of credit
frictions on the extensive margin decreases competition and enhances the benets
of investments for active rms. This results in an equilibrium with an ineciently
low number of producers that are larger on average. Furthermore, we show that
credit tightening leads to welfare losses that dier across sectors, depending on the
investment intensity (either quality or cost-based). In sectors with low investment
intensity, credit frictions induce stronger reactions at the extensive margin, which
results in larger welfare losses. An increase in the borrowing rate leads to nega-
tive reactions at the intensive margin. This cost shock causes stronger within-rm
adjustments and larger welfare losses in sectors with high investment intensity.
Our model diers from the theoretical trade and nance literature in several impor-
tant aspects. First, we analyze the impact of credit frictions in a framework with
both cost-based and quality-based sorting. The scope for vertical product dierenti-
ation in a sector determines the selection pattern of rms and how nancial shocks
aect optimal investment and pricing behavior. Second, we consider external nanc-
ing of investment outlays, instead of trade related up-front costs. Third, we allow
for credit constraints among both exporters and non-exporters. Fourth, we do not
restrict our analysis to partial equilibrium, but rather show that general equilibrium
eects change rm responses to credit tightening. Finally, we investigate the welfare
implications of nancial shocks.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section reviews related theoretical lit-
erature. Section 1.3 sets up the model and derives optimal rm behavior. In section
1.4, we analyze the eects of nancial shocks and of trade liberalization on invest-
ment and price setting in partial equilibrium. The following two sections discuss the
role of credit frictions in general equilibrium. Finally, section 1.7 concludes.
3See Sutton (2001) and Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), as well as the discussion in section 1.4.
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1.2 Related theoretical literature
Most closely related to our theoretical setup with two dimensions of heterogeneity,
Hallak and Sivadasan (2013) and Sutton (2007) develop two-attribute rm models
of international trade with endogenous sunk costs. Besides Melitz-type productivity,
Hallak and Sivadasan (2013) allow producers to dier in their ability to develop high-
quality products at low xed outlays. We additionally consider endogenous process
investments and introduce credit frictions. Whereas our framework is based on mo-
nopolistic competition, Sutton (2007) considers Cournot competition and non-CES
preferences and thus allows only for vertical product dierentiation, but neglects
horizontal dierentiation. Similar to these papers, cost-based and quality-based ca-
pabilities jointly determine rms' competitiveness in our model and are summarized
in a one-dimensional productivity measure related to Melitz (2003). Whereas we fo-
cus on single product manufacturers, Bernard et al. (2011) introduce heterogeneity in
product attributes within the boundaries of multi-product rms that dier in produc-
tivity as in Melitz (2003). In a multi-product rm model with exible manufacturing
and quality investment, Eckel et al. (2015) show that prices fall with distance from
the core product (quality-based competence) in dierentiated-good sectors, but the
opposite holds in non-dierentiated sectors (cost-based competence).
Closely related to our analysis, Fan et al. (2014) extend a Melitz-type partial equilib-
rium model by endogenous quality choice to rationalize positive as well as negative
relations of rm-level fob prices with trade costs, depending on the sectoral scope for
vertical product dierentiation. Fan et al. (2015) build on Arkolakis (2010) as well
as Manova (2013) and dierentiate between exogenous and endogenous quality. The
authors show that nancially constrained rms sell at higher prices when quality
is exogenous, whereas the opposite holds in case of endogenous quality choice. In
contrast, our model explains the prevalence of quality and cost eects, when rms
endogenously choose two innovation types that aect marginal production costs and
thus prices in opposite ways. Furthermore, we analyze the eects of nancial shocks
in general equilibrium.
Additionally, this chapter is related to work that considers investment decisions of
heterogeneous rms. Bustos (2011), Lileeva and Treer (2010) as well as Yeaple
(2005) allow for process innovations that reduce marginal production costs. Con-
sistent with our framework, these models predict that trade liberalization increases
the incentives of technology upgrading. With respect to vertical dierentiation, we
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build on papers that extend international trade models by quality sorting (Baldwin
and Harrigan, 2011; Johnson, 2012), as well as endogenous quality and input choices
(Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012; Antoniades, 2015).
Furthermore, this chapter is related to a growing literature on nancial frictions
and international trade with heterogeneous rms. These models are mainly based
on productivity sorting a la Melitz (2003) and focus on nancial constraints of ex-
porters. In contrast, we assume that domestic as well as international sellers face
credit frictions concerning endogenous innovation choices. Manova (2013) considers
external nancing of xed and variable export costs and motivates credit constraints
by imperfect nancial contractibility. By introducing liquidity as a second source
of heterogeneity, Chaney (2013) and Suwantaradon (2012) break up the one-to-one
relationship between productivity and rm success in the presence of credit con-
straints. While we assume that endogenous innovations have to be nanced by
external capital, these models stress the role of internal funds for nancing of xed
export costs (Chaney, 2013) and capital inputs (Suwantaradon, 2012). Feenstra
et al. (2014) introduce nancial frictions by information asymmetry between rms
and a monopolistic bank. Instead, we assume perfect competition in the nancial
sector and symmetric information with respect to rm characteristics, but moral
hazard, motivated by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), introduces nancial frictions.
In a dynamic model of trade and nance, Felbermayr and Spiegel (2014) introduce
heterogeneity in default probabilities which results in rm-specic borrowing rates.
Closely related to our notion of credit constraints, four other papers introduce im-
perfect capital markets motivated by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) in international
trade settings. First, Ehrlich and Seidel (2015) analyze the impact of nancial fric-
tions on agglomeration of industries in a new economic geography model based on
Krugman (1991). Second, Egger and Keuschnigg (2015) show how discrete R&D
investment choices generate endogenous nancial constraints. Third, the last chap-
ter of this thesis, based on joint work with Michael Irlacher, introduces rm-specic
credit frictions and endogenous borrowing costs in a model of international trade.
Fourth, in the framework of Antras et al. (2009), rms engage in foreign direct invest-
ment as a response to imperfect nancial contracting and weak investor protection
in the host country. Related to that, (Buch et al., 2010, 2014) analyze the impact
of nancial frictions on foreign direct investment based on Helpman et al. (2004).
Other work considers credit frictions in the model of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
with varying markups (Mayneris, 2011; Peters and Schnitzer, 2015).
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1.3 Setup of the model
To analyze the impact of credit conditions on innovation and optimal price setting,
this section presents a model of international trade with two sources of rm hetero-
geneity. We consider two symmetric countries with population of size L and capital
endowment K, trading in dierentiated varieties. Producers dier in their capabili-
ties to introduce process and quality innovations at low costs. Motivated by a time
lag between innovation activity and prot realization, we assume that investment
outlays have to be nanced by external capital, whereas labor is used for xed and
variable production costs. Capital costs are denoted by the gross interest rate r > 1,
and the nominal wage is chosen as numeraire (w = 1). Following Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997), we introduce a non-veriable project choice of rms which leads to
moral hazard and credit frictions. The following subsections discuss the optimal
behavior of consumers and producers.
1.3.1 Consumers
Preferences of a representative consumer in one country are characterized by a CES
utility function over a continuum of goods indexed by i 2 
:
X =
Z
i2

(qixi)
 1
 di
 
 1
; (1.1)
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution and qi denotes the quality of a product.
The quality-adjusted price index is dened as:
P =
"Z
i2


pi
qi
1 
di
# 1
1 
: (1.2)
From the consumer's maximization problem follows that demand for one dierenti-
ated variety i increases in the quality level qi and decreases in the price pi:
xi = q
 1
i X
pi
P
 
: (1.3)
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By introducing a quality component in the utility function of the representative
consumer (1.1), we follow the quality and trade literature.4 Product quality qi
is endogenously chosen by producers and shifts demand outwards for any given
price. Additionally, rms decide on the level of process innovations. The next two
subsections describe optimal rm behavior in the presence of credit frictions.
1.3.2 Production and investment with credit constraints
The production sector of the economy is characterized by monopolistic competition.
Each rm manufactures one dierentiated variety i and decides on process and qual-
ity innovations that are both associated with endogenous sunk costs increasing in
investment levels:
f(qi) =
1
i
qi ; g(ei) =
1
'i
ei : (1.4)
Parameters  and  determine the convexity of the investment cost functions and are
exogenously given for producers in one sector. Hence, 1

and 1

reect the elasticities
of quality and processes to innovation outlays. Low values of  and  imply that one
additional unit of investment spending is very eective.5 Producers dier in their
capabilities to invest in process innovations 'i and quality upgrades i:
6 Higher
values of these rm-specic draws scale down investment costs and hence increase
incentives to innovate. The two types of innovation aect marginal production costs
mc in opposite directions:
mc(q; e) =
q
e
with 0 <  < 1: (1.5)
The benet of process innovations e is a reduction of marginal production costs
which is closely related to the productivity draw in Melitz (2003). Quality innova-
tions q increase demand for one variety (1.3), but are associated with higher labor
requirements, where  describes the sensitivity of marginal costs to changes in qual-
ity. The positive relation between product quality and marginal production costs can
be motivated by advertising expenditures or marketing. Related to our approach,
other papers endogenize rm's quality choice and consider additional product-specic
4See e.g. Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), and Hallak and
Sivadasan (2013).
5See Sutton (2012), section 1.10, for a comparable specication of quality outlays. In subsection
1.3.3 of this chapter, we impose a convexity assumption for technology parameters  and :
6For notational simplicity we drop the rm's index i in what follows.
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outlays or the use of higher-quality inputs.7 As we allow for both cost-based and
quality-based sorting with endogenous sunk costs, our model is closely related to
Sutton (2007, 2012) and Hallak and Sivadasan (2013). Compared to previous work,
we analyze the impact of credit conditions on two types of investment. Therefore,
we assume that rms have to cover expenditures associated with endogenous innova-
tions (1.4) by external capital before revenues are realized, whereas labor is used for
variable and xed production costs. The decision problem of a single rm consists
of four stages:
1. Entry stage. A potential producer of a dierentiated variety decides to enter
the market and pays a xed entry cost fe. After entry, the rm draws both
investment capabilities ' and  from a joint probability distribution h('; )
with positive support over ['; '] [; ] :
2. Financial contracting and investment. Producers choose the optimal lev-
els of process and quality innovations and sign a contract with an outside
investor to cover the investment costs. Optimal prices are set.
3. Moral hazard. After nancial contracting, the agent in the rm chooses to
conduct the project diligently or to misbehave and reap a private benet which
is non-veriable for external lenders.
4. Production and prot realization. Production and prots are realized and
the loan is repaid to the lender.
Stages 2 and 3 introduce endogenous investment choices and nancial frictions.
Based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we motivate credit constraints by a project
choice which is non-veriable for external investors and thus prone to moral hazard.
The optimal contract between a rm and an outside investor species the loan size
dl > 0, at a gross interest rate r > 1, and the credit repayment kl, whereas the in-
dex l 2 d; x denotes non-exporters (d) and exporters (x) respectively. We solve the
model by backward induction. The next subsection describes optimal rm behavior
after entry.
7See Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) or Johnson (2012), among others.
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1.3.3 Optimal rm behavior
After entry, rms choose the optimal levels of process el and quality innovations
ql, and set prices at home and possibly in the foreign market. Exporters sell their
product to consumers in an identical foreign country, but face higher xed costs
fx > fd, and iceberg-type transportation costs such that  > 1 units of a good
have to be shipped for 1 unit to arrive. Whereas domestic and export prices of
a rm dier because of transportation costs, we do not allow for market-specic
investments. Hence, if a rm exports, the benets of process and quality innovations
are spread across sales in both destinations. Total sales of producers are dened as
sl = plxl + 1fxx>0gp

xx

x, whereas demand is given by equation (1.3) and the dummy
variable 1fxx>0g takes a value of 1 if the rm exports and is zero otherwise. Firms
choose optimal investment levels and prices to maximize expected prots:
max
pl;px;el;ql
l = 

sl  mc(ql; el)
 
xl + 1fxx>0gx

x
  kl  fl: (1.6)
Variable prots net of loan repayment kl realize with success probability 0 <  < 1.
Firms use labor input for xed and variable production costs, but have to nance
innovation outlays by external capital. This assumption can be motivated by a time
lag between investment activity and prot realization. Depending on their export
status l 2 d; x, rms face the following constraints:
dl  1

ql +
1
'
el ; (1.7)
kl  rdl; (1.8)
l  0: (1.9)
The budget constraint (1.7) states that the received credit amount has to be su-
ciently high to cover endogenous investment costs. Participation constraints (1.8)
and (1.9) ensure that external investors do not incur losses from lending and rms
make at least zero prots. We assume perfect competition in the nancial sector
such that equation (1.8) holds with equality.
Based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we motivate credit frictions by moral haz-
ard. After nancial contracting and loan provision, the success of the investment
depends on a non-veriable project choice within the rm. On the one hand, the
agent can decide to behave diligently and conduct the project properly which implies
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that prots realize with high success probability . On the other hand, if the agent
chooses to misbehave, the probability of success is lower b < , but the borrower
can reap a share of xed investments as a non-veriable private benet bfl > 0: The
manager faces incentives to implement the project in a more pleasant way or pursue
own advantages at the expense of investment success. Following Tirole (2006), the
private benet can be interpreted as a disutility of eort.8 Hence, both investment
and entrepreneurial eort are inputs in the production process. There are no infor-
mation asymmetries with respect to rm characteristics, but the project choice is
non-contractible for external investors which leads to moral hazard. Shirking can be
ruled out if the following incentive compatibility constraint holds:
l  bl + bfl: (1.10)
We assume that the success probability b is suciently low such that the net present
value of the marginal rm, which just meets incentive compatibility (1.10), is nega-
tive in case of shirking. Thus, the optimal nancial contract has to satisfy incentive
compatibility to rule out misbehavior and potential losses from lending. As long as
the private benet is positive, equation (1.10) is more restrictive than the zero-prot
requirement (1.9). Hence, only rms that generate suciently high prots overcome
moral hazard and have access to external nance. As private benets are related to
xed costs, exporters face a trade-o between additional prots from selling abroad
in case of diligent behavior and the prospect of higher perks in case of shirking. To
describe the optimal behavior of rms, we proceed in two steps. First, conditional
on access to nance, rms maximize expected prots (1.6) by taking into account
constraints (1.7) and (1.8). Second, incentive compatibility (1.10) determines access
to external capital and selection into exporting. Solving the rm's maximization
problem leads to the following optimal choices of process and quality innovations:9
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8See Tirole (2006), section 3.2, for a disussion of moral hazard in a simple model of credit
rationing.
9See Appendix A.1 for a detailed derivation of rm's maximization problem.
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whereby   +(1  ) [+ (1  ) ], and Ad  XP 
 
 1


, Ax  (1+ 1 )Ad
are measures of market size for domestic sellers and exporters respectively. Consis-
tent with theoretical and empirical work on investment activity in international
trade, our model suggests a positive relationship between innovation and market
size.10 As exporters spread investment costs across both markets, they face larger
incentives to engage in quality and process innovations, (Ax > Ad), whereas iceberg
transportation costs  and the borrowing rate r reduce investment activity. We as-
sume that investment costs are suciently convex: ;  > (   1) (2  ) ; such that
 > 0. The convexity assumption implies that quality and process innovations are
complements and increase in both capabilities ' and : A higher capability draw for
one type of innovation has a direct positive impact on the corresponding investment
level due to lower endogenous sunk costs, and additionally increases the marginal
benet of the other innovation type. This complementary structure relates to the
literature on simultaneous process and product R&D choices and is driven by the
fact that both types of innovation increase the price-adjusted quality, and hence the
success of a rm in the market.11 Consequently, producers will always engage in
both types of innovation, whereas the relative investment in processes compared to
quality improvements is given by:
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: (1.13)
The convexity assumption regarding endogenous sunk costs implies further that
investments in process innovations relative to quality upgrades increase in the cost-
based capability and decrease in the quality-based capability:
@( eq )
@'
> 0,
@( eq )
@
< 0:
Additionally, the relative investment increases in  and decreases in  as rms
react to changes in the relative eectiveness of innovations. A higher sensitivity of
marginal production costs with respect to quality (larger ) reduces the marginal
benet of vertical product dierentiation and increases the relative investment in
processes. In the extreme case, if  = 1; higher quality leads to a one-to-one increase
in marginal costs (1.5), such that marginal benets of product upgrades and thus
innovation choices (1.11) and (1.12) are driven down to zero.
10See Bustos (2011) as well as Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), among others.
11Theoretical papers discuss complementarities between product and process innovations under
dierent modes of competition (Athey and Schmutzler, 1995; Lin and Saggi, 2002; Rosenkranz,
2003), and over the product life cycle (Klepper, 1996; Lambertini and Mantovani, 2010).
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Analogous to standard models with monopolistic competition and CES demand
structure, rms set the optimal price as a constant markup over marginal costs. In
contrast to Melitz (2003), marginal production costs are endogenously determined by
the two innovation choices, whereas pl denotes domestic prices of rms with export
status l 2 d; x:
pl('; ) =

   1
ql
el
=

   1

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 
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+1 


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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; (1.14)
and px('; ) = px('; ) stands for the export price of internationally active pro-
ducers. The pricing rule captures two opposing eects of investment behavior. A
higher level of process innovations enhances cost-based productivity, whereas quality
innovations increase marginal costs according to equation (1.5). Consequently, the
optimal price decreases in the cost-based capability ', but increases in the quality-
based capability .12 Hence, the setup with two innovation choices captures both
a negative relation between prices and rm size based on cost-based sorting a la
Melitz (2003) and a positive correlation between prices and rm size as suggested
by the quality and trade literature (e.g. Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012). The success
of a producer in the market results from the ability to invest in processes as well
as product quality at low costs. Therefore, we dene rm's overall eciency as a
combination of both capabilities: z = '(1 ). Figure 1.1 depicts an example
for an iso-eciency curve in the two-dimensional space, whereas the vertical axis
shows the quality-based capability  and the horizontal axis shows the cost-based
capability ': The curve represents a non-linear trade-o between the two attributes:
@
@'
< 0 and @
2
@'2
> 0: If a rm possesses a low ability to invest in processes (low ');
it requires a relatively high quality-based capability  to achieve the same overall
eciency level. Firms located along a particular iso-eciency curve earn the same
expected revenues and prots, since the latter can be expressed as monotone and
increasing functions of eciency z:
sl(z) =

   1 (Al)
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; (1.15)
12Elasticities of prices with respect to capabilities are given by: @pl@'
'
pl
=  1  < 0 and
@pl
@

pl
=  +1 > 0, if  >
 1
 . Note that this condition for the technology parameter  is more
restrictive than the convexity assumption discussed earlier in this section.
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l(z) =
(   1) v

sl(z)  fl; (1.16)
where v = 1
 1  

1

+ 1 


> 0: Comparable to single-attribute rm models, e-
ciency z is a one-dimensional measure of prots and rm size. However, producers
with the same size or eciency z choose dierent levels of quality and process in-
novations and thus set dierent prices, depending on their rm-specic capabilities.
Revenues and prots depend positively on market size Al, but negatively on the
borrowing rate r and investment cost parameters  and . Equations (1.11)-(1.16)
characterize the optimal behavior of rms that have access to external nance. The
next subsection takes into account incentive compatibility (1.10), which determines
the selection of rms into exporting.
k
j1=j
1
2
Figure 1.1: Iso-eciency curve for low (1) and high (2) vertical dierentiation
1.3.4 Selection of rms
Only rms that meet incentive compatibility (1.10) receive credit from outside in-
vestors. As prots (1.16) are a function of eciency z, the binding nancial con-
straint (1.10) determines a cuto eciency level that is necessary to obtain external
nance:
zl =
 r

+(1 )



1  
(1 )
A
 
 1
l

fl
v
 
 1
; (1.17)
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whereas  = 1 + b
 b reects agency costs from moral hazard. Independent of
export status, this measure captures nancial frictions and determines the dierence
between the zero-prot condition (1.9) and incentive compatibility (1.10):
zICC
zZPC
= 

 1 : (1.18)
If the private benet b is equal to zero, nancial frictions disappear and incentive
compatibility collapses to a zero-prot condition ( = 1). Whenever the private
benet is positive ( > 1), moral hazard prevents external nancing of protable
investment projects as some lower eciency rms satisfy the zero-prot condition
(1.9), but not incentive compatibility (1.10). Thus, nancial imperfections impede
market access of small producers which is consistent with existing heterogeneous rm
models that allow for credit constraints (e.g. Manova, 2013). Note that Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997) consider dierences in wealth, whereas in our model rm-specic
innovation capabilities determine access to external capital. Hence, we neglect the
role of internal liquidity to overcome credit frictions as analyzed by Chaney (2013).
If xed fx and variable trade costs  are suciently high, only the most capable
rms select into exporting:
zx > zd if
fx
fd
 
1 +  1 
 
 > 1: (1.19)
This condition diers from Melitz (2003) because exporters spread expenditures
associated with endogenous investments across sales in both markets.13
Proposition 1.1 If Condition (1.19) holds, the most ecient rms with z  zx
export. Producers in the middle range of the eciency distribution (zd  z < zx)
sell only domestically, while the least ecient rms (z < zd) have no access to
external nance and exit.
Graphically, equation (1.17) species the location of a marginal-access curve in the
two-dimensional capability space ('; ). Figure 1.2 depicts the selection pattern
of rms under Proposition 1.1, whereby the marginal-access curve for exporting lies
above the one for domestic activity.14 Marginal rms, characterized by cuto ecien-
cies zd and zx, just meet incentive compatibility (1.10) and are indierent between
13In Melitz (2003), a similar condition requires that fxfd 
 1 > 1:
14The two-dimensional selection pattern is closely related to Sutton (2007).
CHAPTER 1. CREDIT CONSTRAINTS, INNOVATIONS, AND PRICES 25
k
j1=j
z x
zd
Exit
Export
No export
Figure 1.2: Selection pattern in open economy
diligent behavior and shirking, such that prots are equal to the probability-weighted
private benet:  (zl) =
bfl
 b . Sales and investment expenditures of marginal pro-
ducers are independent of capabilities and depend on xed parameters only:
sl(zl) =
fl
(   1) v , (1.20)
1
'
el (zl) =
fl
cvr
;
1

ql (zl) =
(1  )fl
vr
: (1.21)
These expressions for marginal rms are obtained by combining optimal innovation
choices (1.11) and (1.12) with the cuto eciency levels (1.17). An increase in the
private benet b aggravates moral hazard and requires a higher cuto eciency level
(1.17) to meet incentive compatibility (1.10), resulting in exit of low capability rms.
Graphically, marginal-access curves in Figure 1.2 shift upwards. Similar selection ef-
fects occur if xed production costs go up. Furthermore, the cuto level (1.17)
increases in technology cost parameters  and ; and decreases in market size Al.
Whereas the private benet imposes an access barrier to external nance and aects
the extensive margin, a change in credit costs induces within-rm adjustments. The
impact of credit conditions can be interpreted in a slightly dierent way: capital
market imperfections impose minimum quality requirements. To see this, we follow
Sutton (2012) and derive the quality-price ratio that reects the eective competi-
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tiveness of a rm:15
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Like revenues and prots, the quality-price ratio is an increasing function of both
innovation choices and thus of rm's eciency z, as depicted in Figure 1.3. Whereas
process innovations decrease prices for any given quality, product upgrades increase
quality for any given price. Faced with higher borrowing rates, rms scale down both
types of innovation resulting in a lower quality-price ratio. Graphically, within-rm
adjustments correspond to a downward shift of the quality-price prole depicted in
Figure 1.3 for two dierent borrowing rates: r1 < r2. While this eect negatively
inuences the intensive margin of international trade, credit frictions aect the ex-
tensive margin. The horizontal line represents a minimum quality requirement that
is necessary to obtain external capital. This threshold is derived by inserting the
cuto eciency level (1.17) in equation (1.22). An increase in the private benet
)( 1rp
qp
q
z
rr < 21
z2z1
)( 2rp
q
Figure 1.3: Financial frictions and quality sorting
raises the cuto eciency level and hence the minimum quality requirement reected
in an upward shift of the horizontal line in Figure 1.3, whereas within-rm adjust-
ments and hence changes in the individual price-adjusted quality are not present.
15Compare Sutton (2012), chapter 1.6.
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The remainder of the chapter discusses the implications of within-rm adjustments
and selection eects in partial and general equilibrium. Consistent with empirical
evidence, the following section shows that reoptimizations of innovation choices can
explain positive as well as negative correlations of credit costs with export prices,
depending on the scope for vertical product dierentiation. In sections 1.5 and 1.6,
we analyze the general equilibrium eects of credit tightening.
1.4 Quality and cost eects in partial equilibrium
This section analyzes how rms respond to changes of credit conditions in partial
equilibrium, whereby the number of rms and the cuto eciency level remain un-
changed. Hence, results of this analysis could be interpreted as short-term eects of
credit tightening. Furthermore, the interest rate r is treated as exogenous, whereas
section 1.5 takes into account general equilibrium eects and endogenizes the bor-
rowing rate by capital market clearing. An increase in the borrowing rate r leads to
negative eects on both process innovations (1.11) and quality investments (1.12):
@el('; )
@r
r
el('; )
=  

< 0 ;
@ql('; )
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r
ql('; )
=  

< 0 : (1.23)
A reduction in the success probability  leads to the same within-rm adjustments
as it increases the rate of return demanded by external investors. Reductions in both
types of investment inuence marginal costs (1.5) and hence optimal price setting in
opposite ways. On the one hand, rms scale down process innovations resulting in
lower production eciency and increased marginal costs. As equation (1.14) shows,
this cost eect pushes optimal prices up. On the other hand, producers reduce
product investments which leads to an opposing quality eect and dampens prices.
The relative importance of quality and cost eects depends on the scope for vertical
product dierentiation in the production sector.
The scope for vertical product dierentiation. Following Sutton (2001) as
well as Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), we dene this measure as the ratio of expen-
ditures for quality innovations relative to rm revenues:
1

ql (z)
sl(z)
=
(   1) (1  )
r
: (1.24)
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As equation (1.24) shows, the scope for product dierentiation is independent of rm-
specic capabilities, but increases in the elasticity of substitution  and decreases in
the borrowing rate r. Furthermore, quality dierentiation is lower if investment costs
become more convex (higher ), and if the sensitivity of marginal costs to quality
increases (higher ). A similar measure expresses the scope for process innovations
relative to rm size:
1
'
el (z)
sl(z)
=
   1
r
: (1.25)
Increased product market competition (higher ) has a positive eect on process
intensity, whereas the borrowing rate r and the convexity of investment costs  lower
innovation expenditures relative to rm revenues. The combination of equations
(1.24) and (1.25) describes the relative scope for vertical product dierentiation,
compared to process innovations, as a constant ratio of technology parameters:
1

ql (z)
1
'
el (z)
=
(1  ) 

: (1.26)
Increases in  and  make quality innovations less eective and reduce the relative
expenditures for this investment type. Conversely, the ratio increases in , which
changes investment in favor of product upgrades. Hence, expression (1.26) reects
the relative eectiveness of quality innovations compared to process innovations and
is closely related to the estimation of quality ladders proposed by Khandelwal (2010).
In sectors with higher relative eectiveness, rms engage more in vertical product
dierentiation resulting in a larger demand shifter q. Following Khandelwal (2010),
a higher consumer's valuation for quality, conditional on prices, translates into larger
market volumes and represents a proxy for a market's quality ladder. The relative
scope for vertical product dierentiation (1.26) determines how relative investment
(1.13) and prices (1.14) respond to an increase in the borrowing rate:
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Proposition 1.2 If the scope for vertical product dierentiation is relatively high
and hence  < , rms respond to higher credit costs by decreasing the (relative)
investment in product quality, and set lower prices:
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> 0, @pl
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< 0.
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Consistent with empirical evidence, our model rationalizes positive as well as nega-
tive relations of rm-level fob prices with credit costs, depending on the role of qual-
ity dierentiation in a sector. Secchi et al. (2015) exploit Italian rm-level data and
nd that nancially constrained exporters charge higher prices than unconstrained
rms within the same product-destination market. This positive relationship be-
tween credit frictions and prices points to cost eects, but is reduced for product
categories with high quality dierentiation. Following Kugler and Verhoogen (2012),
Secchi et al. (2015) use the ratio of advertising and R&D expenditures to total sales
in U.S. industries as a proxy for vertical product dierentiation. Hence, the mea-
sure is comparable to expression (1.24) in our theoretical model. Closely related,
Fan et al. (2015) analyze Chinese rm-level data and nd evidence for a negative
relationship between credit frictions and prices. The authors rationalize this result
by a partial equilibrium model based on Arkolakis (2010) and Manova (2013), and
dierentiate between exogenous and endogenous quality. Fan et al. (2015) show that
constrained rms sell at higher prices when quality is exogenous, whereas the op-
posite holds in case of endogenous quality choice. In contrast, our model explains
the prevalence of quality and cost eects when rms endogenously choose two in-
novation types that aect marginal production costs in opposite ways. Thus, we
reconcile empirical evidence and stress the role of vertical product dierentiation for
counteracting cost and quality eects on prices.
Trade liberalization. Comparable to changes in credit costs, trade liberalization
leads to opposing quality and costs eects on fob prices of exporters. A reduction in
variable trade costs  induces exporters to invest more, both in process and quality
innovations, shown by the following elasticities:16
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< 0: (1.28)
Analogous to credit shocks, the relative scope for vertical product dierentiation
determines the adjustment of the relative investment and hence the direction of
price changes:17
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 1 
1 +  1 
, (1.29)
16The derivatives follow immediately from equations (1.11) and (1.12).
17Compare the expression for relative investment (1.13) and optimal price setting (1.14).
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Proposition 1.3 If the scope for vertical product dierentiation is relatively high,
such that  < , trade liberalization leads to an increase of the (relative) investment
in product quality, and rms set higher fob prices:
@( exqx )
@
> 0, @px
@
< 0.
If the degree of vertical dierentiation is high, product quality increases more than
cost-based productivity leading to upward pressure on marginal costs and prices.
Conversely, if the industry is characterized by low product dierentiation, increases
in process innovations and thus the cost reducing eect dominate and lead to negative
price reactions. Consistent with these predictions, Fan et al. (2014) show for Chinese
rm-level data that tari reductions induce quality upgrading of exporters resulting
in positive or negative price reactions, depending on whether the degree of vertical
product dierentiation is high or low. To rationalize this result, the authors extend
a Melitz-type partial equilibrium model by endogenous quality choice. Faced with
trade liberalization, rms readjust product quality by solving a trade-o between
increases in demand due to higher quality and decreases in sales due to higher prices.
In contrast, our model shows that trade and credit costs inuence prices at the rm-
level through endogenous adjustments of quality and process innovations.
In addition to this partial equilibrium scenario, we analyze the general equilibrium
eects of credit tightening. Considering the selection of rms, the scope for vertical
product dierentiation does not only determine the direction of within-rm adjust-
ments, but also inuences the role of quality sorting and cost-based productivity
sorting in our model with two sources of rm heterogeneity. Graphically, the slope
of the marginal-access curve in the two-dimensional capability space is the negative
inverse of measure (1.26): d ln
d ln'
=   
(1 ) : Hence, sectors with higher quality dier-
entiation are characterized by atter marginal-access curves (see Figure 1.1) and a
negative relationship between credit costs and prices. In this case, access to nance
is mainly determined by a minimum requirement on the quality-based capability
and our model is closely related to single-attribute frameworks that focus on quality
sorting (e.g. Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012). Consistent
with empirical evidence, prices and rm size are positively correlated if the scope for
vertical product dierentiation is high (e.g. Manova and Zhang, 2012). Larger rms
with higher quality-based capability  invest more in quality upgrades resulting in
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higher prices: @pl
@

pl
=  +1

> 0.18 In contrast, if the scope for vertical dierentia-
tion is low, marginal-access curves become steeper and the model resembles a Melitz
(2003) - type economy with cost-based sorting. In sectors with low quality dieren-
tiation, empirical studies point to a negative relation of rm size and productivity
with unit values (Roberts and Supina, 1996; Foster et al., 2008). Accordingly, larger
rms with higher cost-based capability ' invest more in process innovations that
reduce marginal costs and prices: @pl
@'
'
pl
=  1 

< 0: In this case, nancial shocks
induce mainly cost eects resulting in a positive relationship between credit costs
and optimal prices. To analyze the eects of credit tightening on aggregate export
performance and rm selection, the next section presents the general equilibrium.
1.5 Equilibrium in the open economy
At the entry stage, rms draw both investment capabilities ' and  from a joint
probability distribution h('; ) with positive support over ['; '][; ] : As described
in section 1.3, we summarize these two capabilities in a single measure of rm's
eciency: z = '(1 ). The marginal-access cuto levels (1.17) dene regions in
the two-dimensional capability space ('; ), as depicted in Figure 1.2:
D =

('; ) 2 ['; '] [; ] : z  zd
	
, (1.31)
Dd =

('; ) 2 ['; '] [; ] : zd  z < zx
	
, (1.32)
Dx =

('; ) 2 ['; '] [; ] : z  zx
	
, (1.33)
where D is the set of all active rms in equilibrium and Dl, with l 2 d; x, denotes
regions of non-exporters and exporters respectively. Ex-ante probabilities of being
active in one particular region l, as well as the probability of success s, are dened
as follows:
l =
Z Z
(';)2Dl
h('; )d'd; s =
Z Z
(';)2D
h('; )d'd, (1.34)
and the corresponding conditional probabilities are given by s('; ) =
h(';)
s
, and
l('; ) =
h(';)
l
. For aggregation purposes we dene the average eciency within
18See the pricing rule (1.14) and Footnote 12.
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the group of non-exporters and exporters:
ez  1l = Z Z
(';)2Dl
z
 1
 ('; )l('; )d'd: (1.35)
Average revenues and expected prots by group can be written as:
esl = Z Z
(';)2Dl
sl('; )s('; )d'd, (1.36)
El =
Z Z
(';)2Dl
l('; )s('; )d'd. (1.37)
Analogous to Melitz (2003), revenues of a particular rm with eciency z can be
expressed relative to the marginal domestic seller or exporter, characterized by the
cuto level zl:
sl(z) =

z
zl
 1

sl(zl): (1.38)
As discussed in subsection 1.3.4, sales of marginal rms depend only on xed pa-
rameters of the model. By taking into account expression (1.20) and the denition
of average eciency (1.35), we write expected sales and prots by group as follows:
esl = fl
(   1) v
ezl
zl
 1

; El =
(   1) v

esl   fl. (1.39)
The equilibrium is determined by equation (1.39) and a free entry condition to
ensure that xed entry costs fe are equal to expected prots before rms know their
capability draws:
E =
fe
s
; (1.40)
whereas  is the exogenous probability of a death shock. Total expected prots are
the weighted sum of prots by group: E =
P
l  lEl, and the share of producers in
one group is dened as  l =
l
s
. Equations (1.39) and (1.40) determine the minimum
eciency of marginal rms zd that are just able to produce for the domestic market.
The general equilibrium is characterized by two additional conditions. Labor market
clearing pins down the number of active rms M in one country and capital market
clearing determines the interest rate r. The labor demand of a rm consists of
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variable and xed production costs and can be written as a function of sales:
mcl('; )

xl ('; ) + 1fxx>0gx

x ('; )

+ fl =
   1

sl(z) + fl: (1.41)
Producers with higher eciency z employ more labor due to increased investment
expenditures and larger sales. In equilibrium, the inelastic labor supply L has to be
equal to labor demands in the entry sector (Le = Mefe) and of the two groups of
active producers: L = Le+
P
l Ll. Analogous to Melitz (2003), aggregation of single
labor requirements pins down the mass of active rms M in one country:
M =
L
es h1   1


1

+ 1 

i ; (1.42)
where es =Pl  lesl denotes average revenues in the total economy. This relationship is
obtained by imposing aggregate stability such that the mass of successful entrants is
equal to the mass of rms that are forced to exit due to the exogenous death shock:
sMe = M . The aggregate demand for capital by group consists of investment
expenditures for process and quality innovations:
Ml
Z Z
(';)2Dl
1
'
el (; ')l('; )d'd =
   1
r
Mesl; (1.43)
Ml
Z Z
(';)2Dl
1

qal ('; )l('; )d'd =
(   1) (1  )
r
Mesl: (1.44)
More convex investment costs (higher  and ), as well as a higher borrowing rate
r, scale down process and quality innovations which leads to lower capital demand.
Aggregate investment expenditures for processes and quality upgrades are functions
of average revenues and the number of rms in the market. The ratio of aggregate
investment expenditures leads to the sectoral scope for vertical product dieren-
tiation (1.26) that is independent of rm capabilities, as discussed in section 1.4.
Capital market clearing ensures that aggregate capital demand for both innovation
types equals capital supply K:
K =
   1
r

1  

+
1


Mes. (1.45)
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Combining the market clearing conditions for labor (1.42) and capital (1.45) uniquely
determines the equilibrium interest rate:
r =
 1


1

+ 1 


1   1


1

+ 1 

 L
K
: (1.46)
The interest rate decreases in the investment cost parameters ;  and , as well as
in capital supply K, and increases with product market competition captured by the
elasticity of substitution . In the following two sections, we exploit general equilib-
rium properties of the model to derive aggregate eects and welfare implications of
credit tightening.
1.6 Credit tightening in general equilibrium
In general equilibrium, we take into account that credit frictions change the number
of active producers in the sector. To derive explicit solutions of aggregate variables,
we assume that capabilities ' and  are independently Pareto distributed with pos-
itive support over [1; '] [1;1] and ' > 1. The probability of drawing a particular
combination of ' and  is given by: h ('; ) = h'(')h() with h() = 
  1 and
h'(') = #
' # 1
1 ' # , where  and # are the shape parameters of the Pareto distribu-
tions.19 As we consider two symmetric countries, our general equilibrium analysis
neglects implications of bilateral dierences in nancial development or in credit con-
ditions. In contrast, another strand of literature examines how national dierences
in nancial characteristics inuence cross-border trade and capital ows (see Antras
and Caballero, 2009; Furusawa and Yanagawa, 2010, among others). The next sub-
section shows how nancial shocks aect optimal investment and pricing behavior
in general equilibrium and compares the results to the partial equilibrium analysis
in section 1.4. Subsection 1.6.2 discusses the welfare eects of credit tightening.
19For technical reasons, we assume that  > (1 )( 1) and # >

(1 ) : Appendix A.3 explicitly
derives the cuto eciency zd under the assumption of Pareto distributed capabilities.
CHAPTER 1. CREDIT CONSTRAINTS, INNOVATIONS, AND PRICES 35
Table 1.1: Eects of nancial shocks in partial and general equilibrium
Partial equilibrium General equilibrium
Financial shock r " =  # b " r "  # = b "
Vertical dierentiation low high low high low high low high
Process e / quality q - 0 - +
Relative investment e
q
- + 0 - + + -
Price p + - 0 + - - +
1.6.1 Eects on investment and price setting
Table 1.1 summarizes the optimal responses to nancial shocks in partial and general
equilibrium. The main result of this section is that stronger credit frictions (an
increase in b or a decrease in ) reduce the competitive pressure in general equilibrium
and change or even reverse within-rm adjustments. In contrast, an increase in the
interest rate does not reect stronger credit frictions, but could be caused by a
decrease in aggregate capital supply K, and has no eect on the extensive margin:20
@M
@r
r
M
= 0;
@zd
@r
r
zd
= 0. (1.47)
This result depends on the assumption that only endogenous investment costs have
to be nanced by external capital, whereas labor input is used for xed production
costs. As Table 1.1 shows, optimal rm responses to an increase in the borrowing
rate r go into the same direction in partial and general equilibrium. If xed costs
have to be nanced by external capital, exit of low eciency rms would raise the
cuto eciency. Consequently, increased competitive pressure would even amplify
the responses in general equilibrium without changing the direction of the eects.21
Proposition 1.4 An increase in the borrowing rate r has no eect on the extensive
margin, whereas within-rm adjustments go into the same direction in partial and
general equilibrium.
In contrast to an increase in borrowing costs r, stronger credit frictions change the
direction of optimal rm responses in general equilibrium. The private benet b
can be interpreted as an inverse measure of nancial development which might be
20Compare the capital market clearing condition in general equilibrium (1:46).
21See Appendix A.5 for an extension of the model by external nancing of xed costs.
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aected by countries' nancial policies. Following Tirole (2006) and Antras et al.
(2009), this managerial benet of shirking might be reduced by improved investor
protection or stronger enforceability of nancial contracts. An increase in the private
benet b enhances incentives of borrowers to misbehave such that external investors
demand more pledgeable income to provide loans for investment. A decrease in the
success probability of investment projects  increases the rate of return required for
investors to break even and aggravates moral hazard. Consequently, both shocks
impose stronger restrictions on incentive compatibility (1.10), resulting in exit of
low eciency rms:22
@M
@b
b
M
=   b
+ b
< 0;
@zd
@b
b
zd
> 0, (1.48)
@M
@

M
=
b
+ b
b

> 0;
@zd
@

zd
< 0. (1.49)
whereas  =    b. Compared to partial equilibrium, the exit of low eciency
producers leads to additional rm adjustments in case of an increase in b and reverses
the responses to a decrease in  (see Table 1.1). This general equilibrium eect
reduces the competitive pressure in the sector and induces still active suppliers to
increase innovation activity. Intuitively, the negative eect of credit frictions on
the extensive margin enhances the benets of investments for existing rms. Thus,
stronger credit frictions lead to an equilibrium with a lower number of producers
that are larger on average. This eect is counteracted by an increase in the cuto
eciency which reduces, but does not outweigh the positive response of innovation.
Proposition 1.5 In general equilibrium, a higher private benet b or a lower success
probability  reduces the number of active producers, raises the cuto eciency zd,
and increases innovation activity as well as rm size of existing suppliers.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
In contrast to partial equilibrium, stronger nancial frictions lead to a reduction of
prices in sectors with low quality dierentiation. Thus, credit tightening intensies
quality-based sorting if the scope for vertical dierentiation is high, and vice versa.
The next subsection discusses the welfare consequences of nancial shocks.
22See Appendix A.3 for an explicit derivation of the number of rms in one country.
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1.6.2 Welfare analysis
Analogous to Melitz (2003), we derive welfare as a positive function of the cuto
eciency level zd:
23
W =
   1


1

 1


1  

 1 


1
r
+(1 )


v
fd
 
( 1)

L
1 + v
 1
 1
z
1

d :
(1.50)
An increase in the borrowing rate r leads to negative eects on process and quality
innovations (see section 1.4), resulting in welfare losses along the intensive margin:
@W
@r
r
W
=  +  (1  )

< 0: (1.51)
Elasticity (1.51) shows that negative welfare eects become more pronounced with
increasing quality dierentiation (1.24) and process intensity (1.25), when technol-
ogy parameters ;  and  are low. Hence, an increase in credit costs leads to greater
adjustments of innovation activity in sectors with high investment intensity. Con-
sequently, consumers face a stronger decrease in price-adjusted quality resulting in
larger welfare losses. As discussed in the previous subsection, stronger credit frictions
cause negative eects on the extensive margin. The exit of least ecient rms leads
to two opposing eects on welfare (1.50). On the one hand, welfare decreases due to
a lower number of varieties. On the other hand, the average eciency, and thus the
average price-adjusted quality oered in the economy, increases (@zd
@b
> 0,@zd
@
< 0).
The eects of credit tightening on welfare are given by:
@W
@b
b
W
=   1



   1
b
+ b
  @zd
@b
b
zd

; (1.52)
@W
@

W
=
1


b
 (   1)
b
+ b
+
@zd
@

zd

: (1.53)
Proposition 1.6 An increase in the borrowing rate r leads to negative eects on the
intensive margin and welfare losses that are stronger in sectors with high investment
intensity. A higher private benet b or a lower success probability  reduces welfare if
the private benet b is suciently high, whereas welfare losses are more pronounced
in sectors with low investment intensity.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
23See Appendix A.2 for a derivation of the welfare function.
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If nancial development is low (captured by a high private benet b), stronger credit
frictions will lead to a large reduction in product variety that outweighs eciency
gains. Proposition 1.6 shows that the extent of welfare losses after credit tightening
depends on the sectoral investment intensity. An increase in the borrowing rate
leads to a larger reduction in welfare in sectors with high investment intensity due
to stronger within-rm adjustments. In contrast, changes in the private benet b
and the success probability  lead to a negative impact along the extensive margin,
which aects sectors with low investment intensity more severely. The reason is
that consumers in those sectors put more weight on the loss of variety compared to
eciency gains due to the exit of rms.
Figure 1.4 illustrates the welfare responses to an increase in the private benet b,
whereas Table 1.2 shows the chosen parameter values. Following Davis and Harrigan
(2011), we set the elasticity of substitution  equal to 2. Furthermore, we assume
quadratic investment cost functions both for processes and quality, and choose a
value of  = 0:5 for the sensitivity of marginal production costs with respect to qual-
ity. This parameter choice implies that the scope for vertical product dierentiation
in equation (1.24) is 0.125, which is very close to the R&D and advertising intensity
in the most dierentiated sectors as reported by Kugler and Verhoogen (2012).24
The relative scope for vertical dierentiation in equation (1.26) is 0.5. In Figure
1.4, we show the welfare response according to equation (1.52) for dierent values of
investment cost parameters. If  or  increases, the scope for innovation is reduced
and approaches 0.03, which is the mean of R&D and advertising intensity across all
4-digit U.S. industries reported by Kugler and Verhoogen (2012).
Furthermore, we set iceberg-transportation costs to  = 1:9, which is consistent with
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Bernard et al. (2007), whereas the domestic
production costs fd are normalized to one. To choose a value for xed export costs fx,
we exploit that the share of exporters is determined by equation (A.11). Figure 1.4
shows welfare responses for high and low nancial development (see upper part) and
dierent values of the Pareto shape parameter  (lower part). A change in nancial
development, captured by the private benet b, does not aect the share of exporters
nor the scope for vertical dierentiation. However, a larger Pareto shape parameter,
and hence a higher dispersion of rm capabilities, reduces the fraction of exporters.
24See Table A3 in the Online Appendix of Kugler and Verhoogen (2012). R&D and advertising
intensity is dened as ratio of R&D and advertising expenditures to total industry sales from the
U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 1975 Line of Business Survey. Highest values for this ratio
are reported for drugs and medicines (0.166), cosmetics (0.124), and spirits (0.121).
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Table 1.2: Parameter values
Parameter Description Value
 Elasticity of substitution 2
;  Investment cost parameter 2
 Marginal cost parameter 0.5
; # Pareto shape parameters 3 / 6
 Iceberg-transportation costs 1.9
fx Fixed trade costs 7
fd Fixed production costs 1
 Success probability diligent behavior 0.7
b Success probability shirking 0
b Private benet 5 / 10
In the rst case, with  = 3, 46% of rms export. This fraction is reduced to 21% if
 = 6, which is equal to the value found by Bernard et al. (2007) for U.S. rms.25
As shown in Proposition 1.6, Figure 1.4 depicts that negative responses of welfare to
credit tightening are larger in sectors with low investment intensity. Further, the neg-
ative variety eect and welfare losses are more pronounced, if nancial development
is low (high private benet), and if the Pareto shape parameter is large. Whenever
the distribution of rms in the capability space is more dispersed, eciency gains
after rm exit will be lower, which results in stronger reactions of welfare.
Thus, the comparative static analysis shows that the eects of nancial shocks within
a sector depend on the investment intensity and the role of quality dierentiation.
Both in partial and general equilibrium, the relative scope for vertical dierentiation
(1.26) determines how optimal investment and pricing behavior are aected by credit
conditions. Furthermore, aggregate eects of credit tightening depend on the sectoral
investment intensity for quality (1.24) and processes (1.25). Interest rate shocks
lead to adjustments along the intensive margin and especially hurt sectors with
high investment intensity. Stronger credit frictions aect the extensive margin of
international trade, whereas sectors with low investment intensity face larger welfare
losses. Hence, this model contributes to the discussion how credit frictions aect the
dierent margins of international trade (Berman and Hericourt, 2010; Minetti and
Zhu, 2011; Muu^ls, 2015), by showing that the aggregate eects of nancial shocks
depend on the sectoral investment intensity.
25Note that the chosen values for the Pareto shape parameters have to satisfy the restrictions
described in Appendix A3. Compare Footnote 19.
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Figure 1.4: Welfare responses to credit tightening
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed the eects of credit frictions on within-rm adjustments
and selection into exporting in a two-dimensional heterogeneous rm model with en-
dogenous innovation choices. Whereas existing trade models with nancial frictions
are mainly based on Melitz (2003), three elements are crucial for our theoretical
analysis. First, we allow both for Melitz-type cost sorting and vertical product dif-
ferentiation. As in single-attribute models, rms' competitiveness and hence prots
are determined by a one-dimensional productivity measure. The latter can be sep-
arated along two dimensions: the cost-based and the quality-based capability of a
producer. Second, we consider innovations in quality and processes associated with
endogenous sunk costs that decrease in capabilities. Third, we assume that invest-
ment costs have to be nanced by external capital and introduce credit constraints.
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We show that the scope for vertical product dierentiation in a sector determines
how nancial shocks aect investment and price setting. Consistent with empirical
evidence, we rationalize positive as well as negative correlations of fob prices with
credit frictions and variable trade costs. In addition, we distinguish the eects of
nancial frictions in partial and general equilibrium. In partial equilibrium, which
could be interpreted as a short-term scenario, the number of suppliers is xed and
credit tightening leads to negative eects on investment. In general equilibrium,
stronger credit frictions intensify quality-based sorting of rms, if the scope for ver-
tical product dierentiation is high. Credit tightening leads to rm exit, increased
innovation activity among existing suppliers and welfare losses that are larger in
sectors with low investment intensity.
Our theoretical analysis could be extended in several directions. First, we do not
allow for market-specic investments. Both process innovations and quality upgrades
are spread across domestic and foreign markets, whereas empirical evidence points
to quality-based market segmentation of exporters (Bastos and Silva, 2010; Manova
and Zhang, 2012; Flach, 2014). Second, we concentrate on moral hazard to introduce
credit rationing. Empirical and theoretical literature suggests alternative channels
through which nancial market imperfections may inuence export behavior, such as
higher default risk, information asymmetries regarding rm attributes or imperfect
nancial contractibility (see Manova, 2013; Feenstra et al., 2014, among others).
Third, suppliers rely on one source of external capital to nance total investment
costs. This allows us to focus on within-rm adjustments, whereas selection eects
between dierent sources of external nance might play an important role as well.
Chapter 2 of this thesis introduces market-based and bank nance in a trade model
with heterogeneous rms and shows how trade and nancial shocks induce rms to
switch the type of external debt. Lastly, whereas our analysis focuses on a CES
demand structure, credit frictions may inuence price-cost markups. Chapter 3
introduces credit frictions in a new trade model with linear demand.
Appendix A
Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Maximization problem of rm
This section derives the optimal investment and pricing behavior of a rm with
export status l 2 d; x, whereas 1fxx>0g takes a value of one if the rm is an exporter
and is zero otherwise. Firms maximize expected prots (1.6) which can be written
as follows:
l = XP
q 1l

p1 l + 1fxx>0g (p

x)
1    q

l
el
 
p l + 1fxx>0g (p

x)
   kl   fl,
(A.1)
subject to the constraints (1.7), (1.8) and (1.10). The rst order conditions for
optimal domestic prices pl and export prices p

x, as well as investment levels el and
ql, are given by:
(+ 3)XP
q 1l

(1  )p l + p  1l
ql
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
= 0, (A.2)
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Optimality conditions with respect to credit amount dl and loan repayment kl are:
1   r2 = 0, (A.6)
 + 2  3 = 0, (A.7)
whereas 1, 2 and 3 are the Lagrange multipliers of the constraints (1.7), (1.8) and
(1.10) respectively. Combining equations (A.6) and (A.7) leads to +3
1
= 2
1
= 
r
,
whereas 3 = 0 if incentive compatibility is not binding. The optimal prices (1.14)
follow immediately from equations (A.2) and (A.3). Combining the optimal pricing
rules with the rst-order conditions for quality (A.4) and process innovations (A.5),
leads to:
el =

'Al
r
 1
+1 
q
( 1)(1 )
+1 
l ; (A.8)
ql =

 (1  )Al
r
 1
+(1 )(1 )
e
 1
+(1 )(1 )
l ; (A.9)
whereas the market size for domestic producers and exporters is dened as: Ad =
XP 
 
 1


, Ax = (1 + 
1 )Ad: Equations (A.8) and (A.9) show the comple-
mentary structure of process and quality innovations, as discussed in subsection
1.3.3. Combining the two expressions leads to the optimal investment choices de-
scribed by equations (1.11) and (1.12). By inserting the optimal investment lev-
els into the rst order conditions (A.2) and (A.3), one obtains the optimal price
(1.14). Total sales of a rm with export status l 2 d; x are dened by sl('; ) =
XP 

ql
pl
 1
+1fxx>0gXP


qx
px
 1
, whereas px = px: Inserting the optimal choices
of quality innovation (1.12) and price setting (1.14) immediately leads to expression
(1.15). The optimal loan repayment kl follows from the constraints (1.7), as well as
(1.8), and can be written as function of revenues:
kl =
   1

sl(z)

1

+
1  


: (A.10)
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A.2 Derivation of welfare
To derive the welfare function (1.50), we aggregate the price index (1.2) as follows:
P 1  = Md
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 1
d('; )d'd
+
 
1 +  1 

Mx
Z Z
(';)2Dx

qx
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 1
x('; )d'd:
By using the expression for rm-specic quality-price ratios (1.22) and exploiting
the labor market clearing condition (1.42), welfare can be written as:
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Analogous to Melitz (2003), we substitute for average eciency ezl using the relation-
ship sl(ezl)
sl(zl)
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 1

= Sl
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, and exploit that zx
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 1 )
 
 1 :
After some modications, this allows to write welfare per worker as a function of the
cuto eciency zd, as specied in equation (1.50).
A.3 Solution with Pareto distributed capabilities
To obtain an explicit solution for the cuto eciency zd, we assume that rm-specic
capabilities ' and  are independently Pareto distributed with positive support over
[1; ']  [1;1], and ' > 1. The probability of drawing a particular combination
of ' and  is then given by: h ('; ) = h'(')h(), with h() = 
  1 and
h'(') = #
' # 1
1 ' # , where  and # are the shape parameters of the Pareto distributions.
Probabilities of success s and of belonging to the groups of non-exporters and
exporters respectively l, as dened by equation (1.34), can be expressed as functions
of cuto eciency levels zl; for l 2 d; x:
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whereby 	 = 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with zd
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 1 . The components of expected pro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(1.39) can be expressed as:
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where 
 = 
 (1 )( 1) . The free entry condition (1.40) is an increasing function
of the cuto eciency zd:
E = fE	z

(1 )
d :
For technical reasons, we assume that the Pareto shape parameters are suciently
large,  > (1 )( 1)

and # > 
(1 ) , such that 
;	 > 0. For the following analysis,
we dene a measure for average eciency z, and the average xed costs ef in the
economy:
z = 1 +  x
fx
fd
(1 +  1 )

   1
(1 +  1 )


; ef =  dfd +  xfx.
Combining expected prots and the free entry condition, leads to an explicit solution
for the cuto eciency level zd:
zd =

E
fE	
(1 )

; (A.14)
whereas expected prots can be written as: E = 
zfd   ef .
Number of active rms As shown by equation (1.42), the number of active
rms in one country is a function of labor supply L and average revenues (1.39).
To solve for the number of rms explicitly, we use the expressions for expected e-
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ciencies of non-exporters and exporters (A.12) and (A.13). With Pareto distributed
capabilities, average revenues can be expressed as:
es = 
sfd
(   1) v ;
with s = 1 +  x
fx
fd
(1+1 )
1
  1
(1+1 )
1

. The number of active rms in one country is:
M =
(   1) vL

sfd
h
1   1


1

+ 1 

i , (A.15)
and the number of total varieties in one economy is dened as: Mx = (1 +  x)M:
A.4 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.5. The change of the number of rms with respect to
the private benet b and the success probability , as shown in equations (1.48) and
(1.49) respectively, follows immediately from the derivative of equation (A.15). The
derivatives of the cuto eciency zd (A.14) are given by:
@zd
@b
b
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=
(1  )


bfdz
E
> 0; (A.16)
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@

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=  (1  )
2

bbfdz
E
< 0: (A.17)
The general equilibrium eects of credit tightening on investment and price setting
can be derived from equations (1.11)-(1.14), by taking into account incentive com-
patibility (1.17) and the changes in the cuto eciency (A.16) and (A.17). The
responses of process and quality innovations to an increase in the private benet b
are given by:
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The investment responses are positive as long as (1 )( 1)

E+ ~f
E
< 1. Note that
(1 )( 1)

< 1 and E+
~f
E
> 1, whereas
@

E+ ~f
E

@b
< 0. Hence, the general equilibrium
response of innovations is positive whenever private benets are suciently high.
The derivatives of the relative investment and the optimal price are given by:
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The responses of investment and price setting to a change in the success probability
 can be derived analogously.
Proof of Proposition 1.6. The welfare reaction in equation (1.52) is negative if

 1
b
+b
> @zd
@b
b
zd
, which leads to the following condition:
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W
< 0 if
 (1  ) (   1)

E + ~f
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< 1.
Note that this condition is satised whenever the private benet b is suciently high,
such that the negative variety eect outweighs eciency gains after credit tightening.
Analogously, the welfare reaction in equation (1.53) is positive if b
( 1)
b
+b
>
 @zd
@

zd
, which leads to the following condition:
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@
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

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Thus, the welfare reaction is positive if nancial frictions in terms of the private
benet b are suciently high. To show that the welfare loss of credit tightening is
more pronounced in sectors with low investment intensity, the derivative (1.52) can
be written as:
@W
@b
b
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:
Both the variety eect and the eciency eect increase in investment cost parameter
:
@( ( 1) )
@
= (1 )
2
> 0; and
@

E+ ~f
E

@
> 0. Hence, we consider the limit case if
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 approaches innity. Note that lim
!1
ef = fd and lim
!1
E = fd (  1) > 0. In
the limit case, the variety eect converges to: lim
!1


= +1 

> 0, whereas the
eciency eect disappears: lim
!1
(1 )

E+ ef
E
= 0. Thus, welfare losses become larger
in sectors with low quality dierentiation due to the dominating variety eect. A
similar argument holds for the investment cost parameter  as:
@( 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> 0. In the limit case, for the variety eect it holds that: lim
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=
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> 0. Note, however, that the eciency eect does not disappear, but
converges to a positive limit: lim
!1
(1 )

E+ ef
E
> 0:
A.5 Extension: external nancing of xed costs
If xed costs have to be nanced by external capital, the budget constraint (1.7)
changes to dl  fl + 1ql + 1'el , and the agency cost parameter can be written as
 = r + b
 b (compare subsection 1.3.4). In this case, an increase in the borrowing
rate leads to an additional eect on the extensive margin without changing the
direction of rm responses in general equilibrium. Compared to the results in the
main text, there is still a negative response of process and quality innovations to an
increase in the borrowing rate:
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whereas the eciency eect is given by:
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ts are de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Chapter 2
The Role of Financial Inter-
mediation in International Trade
This chapter highlights that substitution between two types of nance represents an
additional channel of adjustment to credit shocks and trade liberalization. Combin-
ing rm heterogeneity a la Melitz (2003) with credit frictions based on Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997), there is selection of the largest rms into exporting and unmoni-
tored nance, such as public debt or corporate bonds. Smaller producers serve only
the domestic market and have to rely on more expensive nancial intermediation.
The model is consistent with empirical evidence that documents the important role
of substitution eects between dierent sources of external credit. Producers re-
spond to nancial shocks by switching the type of nance. These selection eects
lead to reallocations of market shares across rms and additional adjustments on the
margins of international trade. Furthermore, the model highlights a new source of
gains from trade liberalization: average productivity increases as falling trade costs
allow some exporters to select into cheaper unmonitored nance.
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seminar", of the 2nd MGSE Colloquium in Munich, and of the 17th Workshop \Internationale
Wirtschaftsbeziehungen" in Goettingen for helpful comments and suggestions.
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2.1 Introduction
Firms rely on outside investors to nance trade related production costs and up-front
investments. Empirical evidence shows that credit constraints negatively aect both
intensive and extensive margins of international trade (Berman and Hericourt, 2010;
Minetti and Zhu, 2011; Manova, 2013; Muu^ls, 2015). To explain these eects, the-
oretical models combine rm-level heterogeneity a la Melitz (2003) with nancial
frictions (Chaney, 2013; Manova, 2013; Feenstra et al., 2014). These papers stress
that credit constraints prevent smaller rms from exporting and restrict foreign sales
below the optimal level. Trade models with rm heterogeneity and nancial frictions
typically rely on one source of external debt. The corporate nance literature, how-
ever, shows that rm size is an important determinant of access to dierent types
of external credit. Large rms are more likely to use cheap nance provided with
low-intensity monitoring, such as the issuance of public debt or corporate bonds.1
Smaller producers suer more from credit-rationing (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Beck
et al., 2006), and rely heavily on bank nance with intensive monitoring and higher
borrowing rates (Cantillo and Wright, 2000; Denis and Mihov, 2003).2
This chapter develops an international trade model that accounts for the selection of
producers into exporting and two types of nance. Combining productivity sorting
a la Melitz (2003) with credit frictions based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), the
largest rms export and use unmonitored nance. Smaller producers serve only the
domestic market and have to rely on more expensive bank nance. Selection eects
depend on trade costs, borrowing rates and access barriers to external funds due to
credit frictions. This model highlights that producers respond to nancial shocks and
trade liberalization by switching the type of nance. Accounting for these selection
eects is important for any assessment of welfare implications.
The main message of this chapter is that substitution between the two types of -
nance leads to a reallocation of market shares across producers and new eects on the
margins of international trade. The model is consistent with empirical evidence that
documents the important role of substitution eects. Credit tightening leads to large
1In the U.S., the percentage of long-term debt held in publicly traded instruments is 32% among
larger rms and 14% for smaller producers (Cantillo and Wright, 2000). In Spanish non-nancial
companies, public debt amounts to 10% (de Miguel and Pindado, 2001), and among publicly traded
U.S. rms, it represents almost 50% of new debt issues (Denis and Mihov, 2003).
2Empirical studies suggest additional rm characteristics that are positively related to direct
lending with limited monitoring, such as project quality, protability, collateral, age and credit
reputation (see Cantillo and Wright, 2000; Denis and Mihov, 2003; Becker and Ivashina, 2014).
CHAPTER 2. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND TRADE 51
adverse impacts on small, bank-dependent rms, and induces selection into other
types of external debt (Kashyap et al., 1993; Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Leary,
2009). During the nancial crisis of 2008-2009, producers responded to contraction
in credit supply by switching to public bonds and trade credit.3 Furthermore, the
model highlights a new source of gains from trade: average productivity increases as
falling trade costs allow some exporters to select into cheaper unmonitored nance.
To analyze the role of these selection eects, this chapter extends a Melitz (2003)-
type model by endogenous investments and credit frictions. Heterogeneous rms
decide on innovations that reduce marginal production costs, but have to be -
nanced externally. This assumption is based on a large literature that shows the
important role of external nance for innovation activity (Hall and Lerner, 2010;
Maskus et al., 2012; Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer, 2013). Credit frictions emerge
from moral hazard based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Following this, the suc-
cess of investments depends on a managerial project choice which is non-veriable
for external lenders and thus prone to moral hazard. This agency problem reduces
the pledgeability of rm prots and introduces access barriers to credit.
The key feature of the model is to allow for two types of external nance that dier
in credit costs and accessibility. Passive lenders provide funds without monitoring,
whereas nancial intermediaries are able to imperfectly control the project choice
within rms. On the one hand, access barriers to monitored funds are lower as -
nancial intermediation alleviates moral hazard. On the other hand, monitoring is
associated with additional costs, resulting in higher borrowing rates relative to un-
monitored nance. This approach is consistent with empirical evidence that shows
the important role of banks in reducing agency costs.4 The selection mechanism
stressed in this chapter is dierent from models with technology choice, in which the
payment of additional xed costs reduces marginal production costs (Lileeva and
Treer, 2010; Bustos, 2011). Unmonitored nance is associated with a lower bor-
rowing rate, both for xed and endogenous investments, but credit frictions impose
an access barrier for smaller rms with low pledgeable income.5
The framework nests a model with one type of nance as a special case, which
allows to disentangle direct eects of shocks from substitution eects. Thus, the
3See Adrian et al. (2012), Becker and Ivashina (2014), and Barraza et al. (2014) for evidence
on substitution into public bonds among U.S. rms, as well as Iyer et al. (2014) for Portugal.
Carbo-Valverde et al. (2012) and Coulibaly et al. (2013) document substitution into trade credit.
4See Gorton and Winton (2003) and Tirole (2006), chapter 2 for a review of related literature.
5See also the following discussion of related literature.
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model features intra-industry reallocation and common gains from trade liberaliza-
tion (Melitz, 2003), as well as negative eects of credit frictions as stressed in the
existing literature (Manova, 2013; Muu^ls, 2015). However, new welfare implications
arise because rms switch the type of nance. These additional selection eects
change the degree of competition in general equilibrium and thus inuence the mar-
gins of international trade. Compared to a model with only one type of credit, lower
nancial development leads to additional welfare losses because rms select into
more expensive nancial intermediation. While this shock aggravates moral hazard
and increases access barriers to both types of nance, monitoring of intermediaries
reduces the negative impact compared to unmonitored funds. Consequently, there
is selection into nancial intermediation and a reallocation of market shares away
from rms that rely on passive investors. As now a larger fraction of producers faces
higher borrowing rates, the competitive pressure in general equilibrium is reduced.
This selection eect mitigates the negative reaction at the extensive margin, but
amplies welfare losses due to lower average productivity.
Likewise, additional gains from trade liberalization arise because of selection eects.
Falling trade costs increase the pledgeable income of exporters and facilitate access to
cheaper unmonitored funds. This leads to two new adjustments that further increase
average productivity compared to a model with only one type of credit. First, some
exporters gain access to cheaper unmonitored nance and reduce prices. Second,
increased competitive pressure leads to even stronger exit of low productivity rms
that rely on relatively expensive nancial intermediation.
Related literature This chapter is related to three distinct strands of literature.
First, the notion of capital market imperfections with two sources of external nance
builds on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), whereas nancial intermediation alleviates
credit frictions emerging from moral hazard. Alternative theories of banking stress
advantages of nancial intermediaries compared to direct lenders in presence of in-
formation asymmetries. Accordingly, banks may act as screeners regarding project
choice ex ante (Diamond, 1991; Besanko and Kanatas, 1993), conduct costly moni-
toring in case of unknown output realizations ex-post (Diamond, 1984), or take the
role of reorganizers with respect to ex-post bargaining (Rajan, 1992; Bolton and
Scharfstein, 1996).
A second strand of literature analyzes the selection of heterogeneous rms in seg-
mented capital markets. Russ and Valderrama (2012) introduce bond and bank
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nance in a closed-economy version of Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and suggest a se-
lection pattern that is consistent with this model. Large and more productive rms
select into bond nance with higher xed costs, but lower variable costs, whereas
smaller producers rely on nancial intermediation. Russ and Valderrama (2010) ex-
tend this framework to a small open economy. In both papers, nancial choice is
analogous to technology adoption in Bustos (2011). In contrast, the selection pattern
of rms in this model is not only driven by protability, but rather moral hazard
introduces access barriers to external funds. Unmonitored nance is associated with
lower borrowing costs, but smaller rms fail to overcome agency problems in presence
of credit frictions. Financial intermediaries reduce access barriers to nance for low
productivity rms, but charge higher interest rates both for xed and endogenous
investments. Egger and Keuschnigg (2015) analyze external nancing of xed R&D
spending by venture capital and bank credit in a multicountry model of trade. The
authors show the important role of venture capitalists in nancing early-stage invest-
ments, especially for rms with little pledgeable earnings and high risk. A common
feature to this chapter is that moral hazard based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)
leads to credit frictions and monitoring facilitates access to nance. However, the
focus of this model is quite dierent. Egger and Keuschnigg (2015) analyze the
eects of nancial frictions on a two-stage investment decision with heterogeneity
in project quality and additional production risk. This chapter considers external
nancing of endogenous sunk costs for process innovations in a Melitz-type model
with productivity dierences, and shows how substitution eects between two types
of nance change aggregate responses to nancial shocks and trade liberalization.
Furthermore, Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) develops a model of payment contract choice
in international trade and dierentiates between exporter and importer nance, as
well as bank nance, but abstracts from rm heterogeneity. Related papers are
Eck et al. (2015), as well as Engemann et al. (2014), who show both theoretically
and empirically the positive impact of trade credit on the probability to export,
especially for lower productivity rms. The authors stress that supplier credits
alleviate nancial constraints due to information asymmetry and reduce uncertainty
related to international transactions.
Third, this chapter is related to a growing literature that incorporates nancial
frictions in international trade models, but neglects dierent sources of external -
nance. Manova (2013) shows that credit constraints intensify the selection of the
most productive rms into export markets. Feenstra et al. (2014) introduce nancial
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frictions, caused by information asymmetry between rms and a monopolistic bank,
whereas the latter cannot observe the productivity of the former. Instead, I assume
symmetric information regarding rm-specic productivity, but moral hazard intro-
duces credit market imperfections. Felbermayr and Spiegel (2014) analyze the role
of credit frictions in a dynamic model of trade and nance. Other papers extend the
model of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) with varying markups by credit constraints
(Mayneris, 2011; Egger and Seidel, 2012; Peters and Schnitzer, 2015). Building on
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) as well, theoretical work analyzes the eects of credit
frictions on industry agglomeration in a Krugman (1991) model (Ehrlich and Seidel,
2015) and on foreign direct investment (Antras et al., 2009; Buch et al., 2010, 2014).
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model setup and dis-
cusses the selection of producers into external nance and exporting. The following
two sections analyze the eects of nancial shocks in partial and general equilibrium.
Section 2.5 presents eects of trade liberalization. Section 2.6 discusses assumptions
and extensions of the theoretical framework, and nally, section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Firm heterogeneity and access to credit
This section introduces credit frictions and endogenous innovations in a heteroge-
neous rm model a la Melitz (2003). Firms dier in marginal production costs,
decide on the optimal level of productivity enhancing investments, and require ex-
ternal funds to cover xed and endogenous sunk costs for innovation activity. This
assumption can be motivated by a time lag between investment outlays and the real-
ization of sales. Based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), credit frictions emerge from
moral hazard regarding the project choice of managers within rms. The following
subsection presents the demand side of the model. Subsection 2.2.2 introduces two
types of outside lenders and discusses optimal rm behavior under credit constraints,
and subsection 2.2.3 shows how producers select into external nance and exporting.
2.2.1 Demand side
There are two symmetric countries with population of size L, trading in horizontally
dierentiated varieties. Labor is the only factor of production and is immobile
across countries.6 A representative consumer in one country derives utility from
6Section 2.6 discusses how the model can be extended to capital as a second input factor.
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the consumption of a continuum of varieties, indexed by i 2 
, according to the
following CES function:
X =
Z
i2

x
 1

i di
 
 1
; (2.1)
whereas  > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution and 
 is the set of varieties.
Demand for one particular variety i is given by:
xi = X
pi
P
 
; (2.2)
and the aggregate price index is dened as follows:
P =
Z
i2

p1 i di
 1
1 
: (2.3)
The next section describes the maximization problem of rms in the presence of
credit constraints and two sources of external nance.
2.2.2 Optimal rm behavior under credit constraints
The productivity of a rm is determined by two components. As in Melitz (2003),
each rm manufactures one horizontally dierentiated variety i and draws a produc-
tivity parameter 'i from a common probability distribution g (').
7 Additionally,
producers choose the optimal level of productivity enhancing investments ei. Hence,
marginal production costs are given by mci ('i) =
1
'iei
. Investments are associated
with endogenous sunk costs that increase in the innovation level:
f (e) =
1

ei , with  >    1; (2.4)
whereas  is a technology cost parameter that is the same across rms. Motivated by
a time lag between investment outlays and prot realization, xed and endogenous
sunk costs associated with innovation activity have to be nanced by external funds.
Based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), credit frictions emerge from moral hazard
between outside lenders and borrowing rms. There are two types of investors in the
economy: passive lenders and nancial intermediaries that are able to imperfectly
monitor rms, denoted by the indices u and m in what follows. Each producer signs
7Section 2.4 presents the general equilibrium and assumes that productivity follows a Pareto
distribution.
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a credit contract with an outside lender, which denes the loan size djl > 0, at a
gross interest rate rj > 1, and the credit repayment kjl, whereas j 2 m;u denotes
the source of external nance and l 2 d; x is an index for the export status. The
maximization problem of a producer can be described as follows, where asterisks
stand for variables of export activity:8
max
pjl;p

jl;ejl
jl = 

sjl   1
'ejl
 
xjl + 1fx>0gxjx
  kjl (2.5)
s:t xjl = X
pjl
P
 
; xjl = X

pjl
P
 
; (2.6)
djl  fl + 1

ejl , (2.7)
kjl  rjdjl , (2.8)
jl  0: (2.9)
Depending on the source of external nance j and the export status l, rms maximize
revenues net of variable production costs and loan repayment kjl, whereas the vari-
able 1fx>0g takes a value of one if the rm exports and is zero otherwise. Total sales
from domestic and international activity are dened as sjl = pjlxjl + 1fx>0gpjlx

jl.
Firms realize prots with success probability . The next subsection introduces
moral hazard and shows that this success probability depends on a non-veriable
project choice of the rm. Exporting involves additional xed costs (fx > fd) and
iceberg-type transportation costs such that  > 1 units of a good have to be shipped
for one unit to arrive. According to the budget constraint (2.7), the received credit
amount has to cover xed costs of production, as well as endogenous sunk costs for
innovation. Internationally active rms have to raise additional external funds for
xed export costs. Investors only participate in a contract if expected loan repay-
ments at least compensate for credit provision (2.8). Additionally, the rm will be
active in the market if expected prots are non-negative (2.9). The solution to the
rm's maximization problem provides the optimal investment level:9
ejl (') =

   1

 
 +1

Al'
 1
rj
 1
 +1
. (2.10)
8For notational simplicity I drop the rm's index i in what follows.
9See Appendix B.1 for a detailed derivation of the rm's maximization problem.
CHAPTER 2. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND TRADE 57
Equation (2.10) shows that process innovations decrease in probability-weighted bor-
rowing costs
rj

, but increase in productivity ' and the market size, denoted by
Ad = XP
 and Ax = XP
 (1 +  1 ) for domestic sellers and exporters respectively.
Optimal prices are set as a constant markup over marginal production costs which
decrease in exogenous productivity and endogenous innovation activity, whereas pjx
denotes the export price:
pjl (') =

   1
1
'ejl
; pjx (') = pjx (') : (2.11)
Firms that face higher borrowing costs choose lower investment levels and hence set
higher prices resulting in lower expected prots:
jl(') =
   + 1

sjl (')  flrj , (2.12)
whereas sales can be expressed as follows:
sjl(') = A

 +1
l
 
   1

1+
'
rj
!  1
 +1
. (2.13)
The borrowing rate will be higher for rms that rely on nancial intermediation
(rm > ru). The next subsection introduces moral hazard which motivates credit
frictions and the dierence in nancing costs for unmonitored and monitored funds.
2.2.3 Moral hazard and selection of rms
Based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), nancial imperfections originate from moral
hazard within the rm. This leads to credit frictions and the selection of producers
into two dierent types of external nance. Consider rst the problem of rms that
use unmonitored nance (j = u). After the credit contract has been signed and the
loan has been provided to the rm, the success of investments depends on a project
choice of the rm manager. This action is by assumption non-veriable for external
investors and thus prone to moral hazard. Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997),
the manager can decide to behave diligently or to misbehave resulting in high or low
success probabilities:  > b. In case of shirking, the manager reaps a non-veriable
private benet that is proportional to the xed investment bfl > 0. Thus, agents
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only behave diligently if the following incentive compatibility constraint is satised:
ul (')  bul (') + bfl: (2.14)
As prots increase in ', high productivity rms have no incentive to shirk. However,
managers of lower productivity rms might prefer to choose the bad project and reap
private benets if the expected prots of diligent behavior are not suciently high.
The assumption that private benets b are proportional to xed costs introduces
access barriers to external nance beyond protability requirements.10 Hence, ex-
porters face a trade-o between additional prots from international activity in case
of diligent behavior and the prospect of higher perks in case of misbehavior. Fur-
thermore, I assume that the net present value of the marginal rm that just meets
incentive compatibility (2.14) is negative in case of shirking. This assumption is sat-
ised whenever the success probability b is suciently low.
11 In this case, investors
have to ensure that a credit contract satises condition (2.14) to avoid losses from
lending. As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), I introduce a second investor type that
is able to imperfectly monitor rms, which reduces the private benet to mb, where
0 < m < 1. Thus, monitoring eort mitigates the problem of moral hazard, but
comes at additional costs, cm > 1; leading to a higher borrowing rate of nancial in-
termediation: rm = cmru > ru: Incentive compatibility in case of monitored nance
is given by:
ml (')  bml (') +mbfl: (2.15)
Incentive compatibility conditions (2.14) and (2.15) are more restrictive than zero-
prot requirements (2.9) as long as private benets are positive, even after monitor-
ing: mb > 0: Hence, the incentive constraints impose access barriers to unmonitored
and monitored funds respectively, and describe the selection of rms into external
nance. Since prots (2.12) are a function of productivity ', the binding equations
(2.14) and (2.15) determine minimum productivity levels that are necessary to obtain
outside nance. Some low productivity rms meet the zero-prot condition (2.9) and
hence would nd it protable to be active in the market. However, moral hazard
prevents access to nance and a range of protable projects is not conducted in the
presence of credit frictions. Depending on export status and the type of nance,
10See Section 2.6 for a further discussion of the moral hazard approach and possible extensions.
11See Ehrlich and Seidel (2015) as well as Egger and Keuschnigg (2015) for a similar discussion
of moral hazard with heterogeneous rms.
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incentive compatibility (2.14) or (2.15) leads to the following cuto productivities
for access to external funds:
'jl =


   1
 1+
 rj

 1


 jfj
   + 1
 +1
( 1)
A
 1
 1
l , (2.16)
where  m =
bm

+ rm

and  u =
b

+ ru

, with  =    b, are measures of
access barriers to external nance that consist of probability-weighted borrowing
costs and agency costs due to moral hazard. Consider rst how exporters select into
unmonitored and monitored nance (l = x). Comparing cuto productivities for
both types of funds (2.16) shows that the entry barrier to unmonitored lending is
relatively higher if the following condition holds:
Condition 2.1 'ux > 'mx if c
 1
 +1
m
 m
 u
< 1:
Condition 2.1 compares the two sources of nance and is independent of export
status. On the one hand, monitored lending reduces moral hazard and facilitates
access to nance. The lower private benet (mb) eases the restriction imposed by
incentive compatibility (2.15). On the other hand, monitoring activity is associated
with additional costs which reduces prots (2.12) and makes it more dicult to
satisfy incentive compatibility compared to unmonitored nance. Condition 2.1
states that access to monitored nance is relatively easier if the benet of nancial
intermediation (reduced moral hazard) outweighs additional borrowing costs.
Lemma 2.1 If Condition 2.1 holds, the most productive exporters with '  'ux
use unmonitored nance. International rms in the middle range of the distribution
('mx  ' < 'ux) have to rely on more expensive nancial intermediation, while
lower productivity rms (' < 'mx) cannot raise external nance for export activity
and sell only domestically.
Figure 2.1 depicts the selection pattern of exporters if Condition 2.1 holds, whereas
productivity ' is measured on the horizontal axis and prots are shown on the
vertical axis. As nancial intermediation is associated with higher interest rate
payments for xed costs and endogenous investments, the intercept as well as the
slope of the prot line mx is lower compared to the use of unmonitored nance.
Thus, in the absence of credit frictions, unmonitored nance is always preferred to
the more expensive type of credit. However, moral hazard leads to credit rationing
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Figure 2.1: Selection of exporters into external nance
and the selection of rms into both types of nance. The access barriers to external
funds are depicted as horizontal lines in Figure 2.1. Passive investors are only willing
to provide loans to the most productive exporters with '  'ux. Producers in the
intermediate range of the distribution are not able to overcome moral hazard and
rely on more costly nancial intermediation with lower entry barrier.
Condition 2.1 is violated if monitoring eectiveness is very low or monitoring costs
are prohibitively high. Lower monitoring eectiveness corresponds to an upward
shift of the horizontal access line (see Figure 2.2), whereas higher monitoring costs
are reected by a lower intercept and a smaller slope of the prot line mx (see Figure
2.3). In both cases, nancial intermediaries fail to facilitate access to external nance
compared to passive lenders and no rm will choose the more expensive type of credit.
In the following, I assume that Condition 2.1 is satised and hence both types of
nance occur in equilibrium, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Compared to previous
international trade models with nancial imperfections, credit tightening induces
exporters to substitute between the two sources of external nance. The following
section shows how exporters react to nancial shocks in partial equilibrium.
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Figure 2.2: Selection pattern with low monitoring eectiveness
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Figure 2.3: Selection pattern with high monitoring costs
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Figure 2.4: Increase in private benet b
2.3 Credit tightening in partial equilibrium
This section analyzes how nancial conditions aect optimal rm behavior and the
selection pattern of producers. An increase in the private benet b can be interpreted
as a worsening of nancial development. In this case, a larger incentive to misbehave
weakens the enforcement of credit contracts and reduces the pledgeability of prots in
conditions (2.14) and (2.15). Consequently, this shock raises the cuto productivities
for access to both types of external nance (2.16), and is illustrated by an upward
shift of marginal-access lines in Figure 2.4. A decrease in monitoring eectiveness
(larger m) aggravates access to nancial intermediation. Hence, both shocks aect
access barriers to external nance without changing innovation activity (2.10) and
rm prots (2.12) in partial equilibrium.12 Instead, if the borrowing rate ru increases,
prot lines in Figure 2.5 shift downwards and become atter, as rms face higher
costs for xed and endogenous investments, and thus reduce innovation activity.
Comparable to increases in b and m, this results in higher cuto productivities.
Producers are aected very dierently by worsening credit conditions, depending
on their location along the productivity distribution. Firms in region A of Figures
12In general equilibrium, nancial shocks change the competitive pressure and rm prots
through the impact on the aggregate price. See section 2.4 for a discussion of general equilib-
rium eects.
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Figure 2.5: Increase in unmonitored interest rate ru
2.4 and 2.5 stop exporting as they are not able to raise any funds for international
activity after credit tightening. Firms in regions B and D change neither the export
status nor the source of external nance, though face prot losses in case of higher
borrowing costs. Exporters in region C, however, lose access to unmonitored nance
and have to rely on more expensive monitored lending to cover xed export and
endogenous innovation costs. This substitution behavior leads to a direct negative
eect on revenues and prots since switchers face larger interest rates and thus set
higher prices. The following proposition summarizes the dierential rm responses
to credit tightening.
Proposition 2.1 Increases in b and ru lead to higher cuto eciencies 'jx, such
that least productive exporters quit international activity. Exporters in the middle
range of the productivity distribution have to switch from unmonitored to monitored
nance resulting in prot losses.
So far, the discussion has focused on responses of exporters to credit tightening in
partial equilibrium. In the open economy, rms select into the two types of external
nance and choose their export status. Note that Condition 2.1 is independent
of trade costs and has to hold for domestic sellers as well. Comparing the cuto
productivity for monitored nance and exporting 'mx with the access barrier for
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non-exporters that use unmonitored nance 'ud, leads to a second condition which
determines the selection of rms:
Condition 2.2 'mx > 'ud if c
 1
 +1
m
 m
 u
fx
fd
(1 +  1 )
 
 +1 > 1:
Depending on whether Condition 2.2 holds, I distinguish two selection cases that are
summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2.2 If Conditions 2.1 and 2.2 hold, the selection of rms is described by
the following sorting of cuto productivities: 'md < 'ud < 'mx < 'ux: If Condition
2.2 does not hold, thresholds are ranked in the order: 'md < 'mx < 'ud < 'ux:
In both cases, Condition 2.1 ensures that access to unmonitored nance is relatively
more dicult both for international rms and domestic sellers. Hence, the most pro-
ductive exporters have access to unmonitored nance, whereas the least productive
rms sell only domestically and rely on nancial intermediation. For given access
barriers to external nance, Condition 2.2 is satised whenever trade costs are su-
ciently high.13 In this case, non-exporters select into both types of nance as well (see
upper part of Figure 2.6). Lower trade costs decrease the cuto productivities for
international activity resulting in a larger fraction of exporters, whereas higher com-
petitive pressure increases the minimum productivities required for domestic activity
'jd. This reduces the share of non-exporters that use unmonitored nance. If trade
costs are suciently low, Condition 2.2 is violated, such that access to unmonitored
nance becomes more dicult for domestic sellers compared to exporting with the
aid of nancial intermediation. Under conditions derived below, this scenario with
low trade costs implies that domestic rms lose access to unmonitored nance (see
lower part of Figure 2.6). Lemma 2.2 describes only the feasible selection patterns
based on the comparison of cuto productivities (2.16). The next subsections derive
conditions under which the selection cases with low and high trade costs, as depicted
in Figure 2.6, are also optimal when taking into account protability considerations
of rms. Intuitively, these conditions ensure (i) that trade costs are suciently high
and only the most productive rms are able to export, and (ii) that credit frictions
are suciently strong, such that the selection of rms into exporting and external
nance is inuenced by moral hazard. Otherwise, protability requirements might
impose higher access barriers than nancial frictions.
13Note that Condition 2.1 implies that: c
 1
 +1
m
 m
 u
< 1.
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Figure 2.6: Selection into external nance and exporting
2.3.1 Selection case 1: high trade costs
If trade costs are relatively high such that Condition 2.2 is satised, rms can be
divided into four groups. The most productive ones become exporters, whereas
low productivity producers sell only in the domestic market. Among both groups,
only the most productive rms obtain unmonitored nance. To ensure protability,
active rms located in one of the four regions compare the available nancing and
production choices. Firms with 'md  ' < 'ud have only the possibility to sell in the
domestic market by relying on nancial intermediation. Protability considerations
of active producers in the remaining three groups are summarized by the following
two Lemmas:
Lemma 2.3 ul (') > ml (') for l 2 d; x, since rm = cmru > ru, with cm > 1:
Lemma 2.4 mx (') > ud (') if sud (') >
ru


 +1
cmfx fd
(1+1 )

 +1 c
1 
 +1
m  1
:
According to Lemma 2.3, it is always optimal for producers with 'ud  ' < 'mx
and '  'ux to use unmonitored nance which implies lower interest rate payments.
Firms with 'mx  ' < 'ux face a trade-o between exporting by using monitored
nance or selling only in the domestic market and obtaining unmonitored nance. On
the one hand, exporting leads to additional prots. On the other hand, international
activity is only possible with more costly nancial intermediation. Productivities of
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rms within that group are not sucient to satisfy incentive compatibility (2.14)
and directly raise external funds for exports from passive investors. Lemma 2.4
determines a cuto productivity at which additional export prots exactly oset
higher nancing costs. Comparing this protability requirement with the cuto
productivity 'mx, dened by equation (2.16), leads to the following condition:
14
Condition 2.3 Access to nancial intermediation for exporters is more restrictive
compared to protability requirements, as described in Lemma 2.4, if
 m  ru cmfx fdfx
(1+1 )

 +1 c
1 
 +1
m
(1+1 )

 +1 c
1 
 +1
m  1
:
Condition 2.3 compares the access barrier to monitored nance  m with protability
requirements for marginal exporters. Larger xed and variable trade costs, fx and
 , as well as higher monitoring costs cm, increase the right-hand side of Condition
2.3, as it becomes more dicult for lower productivity rms to earn positive prots
in the foreign market. Condition 2.3 is satised whenever the remaining private
benet after monitoring mb, and thus the entry barrier to exporting with the aid of
monitored nance  m, is suciently high compared to protability requirements. If
Conditions 2.1-2.3 hold, the selection pattern depicted in the upper part of Figure
2.6 describes optimal rm behavior. In this case, moral hazard imposes stronger re-
strictions on rms than protability. Hence, nancial frictions hinder some marginal
producers with productivity ' < 'mx to engage in international markets and con-
duct protable investment projects. Conversely, all rms with productivity levels
'  'mx nd it optimal to become exporters, since protability is ensured whenever
external nance is accessible.
2.3.2 Selection case 2: low trade costs
If Condition 2.2 is not satised, the entry barrier to export markets under nancial
intermediation is relatively lower compared to the domestic sellers' access to un-
monitored nance: 'mx < 'ud (compare Lemma 2.2). As Condition 2.2 shows, this
selection pattern becomes more likely if trade costs are low for given nancial con-
ditions. Analogous to Melitz (2003), Condition 2.4 ensures that xed and variable
trade costs are still suciently high such that only the most productive rms are
able to export.15
14See Appendix B.4 for a derivation of Condition 2.3.
15Note that Condition 2.4 is always satised in selection case 1 due to Conditions 2.1 and 2.2.
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Condition 2.4 'jx > 'jd if t =
fx
fd
(1 +  1 )
 
 +1 > 1 :
As in selection case 1, I still assume that Condition 2.3 is satised which implies
that all rms with '  'mx nd it optimal to become exporters and use funds from
intermediaries. This condition is now less restrictive as trade costs are lower and thus
protability of export activity is easier to achieve compared to the access barrier  m.
Because of 'mx < 'ud, an important implication of this second selection pattern with
low trade costs is that non-exporters will never use unmonitored nance. Firms with
productivity '  'ud could decide to forego prots from foreign markets and use the
cheaper type of nance. However, in case of low trade costs, this is never optimal for
any rm that has access to external funds for international activity. This reasoning
leads to the following selection pattern in equilibrium: 'md < 'mx < 'ux, as depicted
in the lower part of Figure 2.6. Compared to selection case 1, not only export status
but also access to unmonitored nance is a monotone function of productivity and
thus rm size. The following proposition summarizes the two selection cases.
Proposition 2.2 If Conditions 2.1-2.3 hold, rms optimally select into exporting
and external nance according to the following order: 'md < 'ud < 'mx < 'ux:
If Conditions 2.1 and 2.3-2.4 are satised, the selection pattern is described by the
following ranking: 'md < 'mx < 'ux:
In case of low trade costs, domestic sellers have no access to external funds with-
out the aid of nancial intermediaries and hence cannot react to credit tightening
by switching the source of nance. In contrast, a scenario with high trade costs
implies that substitution eects, as described above for exporters, occur among non-
exporters as well. Based on this partial equilibrium analysis, the following section
considers the eects of credit tightening in general equilibrium.
2.4 Credit tightening in general equilibrium
Compared to previous theoretical work, the partial equilibrium analysis in section 2.3
suggests substitution eects between two sources of nance as an additional channel
through which credit tightening inuences export behavior. The general equilibrium
analysis in this section shows that nancial shocks induce reallocations of market
shares across groups of rms that use dierent types of external nance (subsection
2.4.2). These substitution eects change reactions along the extensive margin and
welfare responses to credit tightening (subsection 2.4.3).
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2.4.1 General equilibrium in the open economy
Free entry ensures that expected prots equal xed entry costs, before potential
producers know their productivity draw ':
Ek =
P
j
P
lEjlk =
fe
s
, (2.17)
whereas k 2 1; 2 denotes the selection case and expected prots for each group with
type of external nance j and export status l are given by:
Ejlk =
R
'2Djlkjlk(')s(')d'. (2.18)
After entry, rms draw productivity ' from a Pareto distribution with density func-
tion g(') = '  1 and positive support over [1;1], whereby  is the shape pa-
rameter of the Pareto distribution.16 Probabilities of belonging to one of the four
possible groups jl, as well as the probability of survival s, are dened as:
jlk =
R
'2Djlkg(')d' ; sk =
R
'2Dkg(')d', (2.19)
where Djlk denotes the set of active rms with type of external nance j and export
status l; andDk is the set of all active producers in the economy.
17 The corresponding
conditional probabilities are given by sk(') =
g(')
sk
and jlk(') =
g(')
jlk
: Combining
equations (2.17) and (2.18) determines the cuto productivity 'md, at which rms
are just able to produce for the domestic market by relying on monitored nance.
Using the marginal-access condition (2.16), the remaining cuto productivities can
be expressed as functions of 'md and exogenous parameters of the model:
18
'ud
'md
=

1
cm
 1


 u
 m
 +1
( 1)
;
'mx
'md
= t
 +1
( 1) ;
'ux
'md
=

1
cm
 1


t
 u
 m
 +1
( 1)
.
(2.20)
According to equation (2.20), the selection of rms depends on relative costs for ex-
ternal nance  u
 m
and trade costs t = fx
fd
(1 +  1 )
 
 +1 . To analyze the importance
of substitution eects in response to credit tightening, I dene the share of rms
with type of external nance j and export status l as jl. For both selection cases,
16For technical reasons, I assume that  > ( 1) +1 : Appendix B.3 characterizes the equilibrium
with Pareto distributed productivity.
17Appendix B.2 denes the regions of active rms for both selection cases.
18Note that in selection case 2, the cuto 'ud does not occur. See the discussion in section 2.3.2.
CHAPTER 2. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND TRADE 69
the fractions of exporters are given by:
mx =

'mx
'md
 
 

'ux
'md
 
; ux =

'ux
'md
 
. (2.21)
Like in standard trade models with heterogeneous rms, the share of exporters is
solely determined by trade costs: x =

'mx
'md
 
. Additionally, relative credit costs
inuence the selection of exporters into the two sources of external nance. In
selection case 1, when trade costs are high, domestic sellers select into both types of
external nance as well, such that
P
j
P
l jl = 1, with:
md = 1 

'ud
'md
 
; ud =

'ud
'md
 
 

'mx
'md
 
, (2.22)
whereas in case 2 domestic rms have only access to monitored nance:
md = 1 

'mx
'md
 
; ud = 0: (2.23)
Furthermore, market shares are dened as the ratio of average revenues in one
group relative to average revenues in the total economy: jlk =
jlkesjlkesk , such thatP
j
P
l
jlkesjlkesk = 1.19 Each rm uses labor as single input factor for variable produc-
tion costs as well as xed and endogenous innovation costs. Total labor demand of
one producer can be written as follows:
1
'ejl
 
xjl + 1fx>0gxjx

+ kjl =
(   1) (1 + )

sjl (') +
rj

fl: (2.24)
In equilibrium, the inelastic labor supply L has to be equal to labor demands in
the entry sector (Le = Mefe) and in the four groups of active producers: L =
Le+
P
j
P
l Ljlk.
20 Additionally, the mass of successful entrants is equal to the mass
of rms that are forced to exit due to an exogenous death shock: sMe = Mk.
Analogous to Melitz (2003), labor market clearing pins down the mass of active
rms M in the economy:
Mk =
L
esk . (2.25)
19The market shares jl are dened in Appendix B.3.
20In selection case 1, all four groups of rms are active. In case 2, domestic rms have no access
to unmonitored nance and Lud = 0: See section 2.3 for a detailed discussion of the two cases.
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The borrowing rate is treated as exogenous. Section 2.6 introduces a capital market
equilibrium which leads to an explicit solution for ru. Average sales in equation
(2.25) are dened as follows:
esk =  mfd k
 (   + 1)   (   1) : (2.26)
The term  k is a function of trade costs as well as nancial conditions and captures
the average productivity in the economy, dependent on the selection case:
 1 = +

'md
'mx
 
fx
fd
  tc
 1
 +1
m

;  2 = 1 +

'md
'mx
 
fx
fd
  t

, (2.27)
whereas  is a measure for relative costs of external funds:
 = 1 +
 u
 m

'md
'ud
 
1  c
1 
 +1
m

; (2.28)
which increases in eective costs for monitored nance, including borrowing rates
and access barriers due to moral hazard. If there are no dierences between the
two sources of external nance, such that m = cm = 1; the measure  equals
one. Hence, this framework nests a model with nancial frictions and one source of
external nance as a special case, which will be discussed in more detail below.
2.4.2 Reallocation eects of credit tightening
The partial equilibrium analysis in section 2.3 has stressed two eects of credit
tightening. Consistent with theoretical and empirical work on credit frictions and
export behavior, worsening nancial conditions increase access barriers to interna-
tional markets. Furthermore, credit shocks change the ratio of access barriers  u
 m
,
and thus trigger substitution eects between the two sources of external nance, as
shown by the following proposition.21
Proposition 2.3 A higher private benet b increases the fraction of rms that use
monitored nance and raises their market share. In case 1, this selection eect is
stronger for non-exporters: @md
@b
> @mx
@b
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
21Compare Proposition 2.1 for a summary of partial equilibrium eects of credit tightening. See
Foley and Manova (2015) for a review of related theoretical and empirical literature.
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A higher private benet b increases the relative access barrier to unmonitored funds
 u
 m
, as it becomes relatively more dicult for rms using this type of nance to satisfy
incentive compatibility. Producers that rely on nancial intermediation are hit less,
since monitoring attenuates aggravated moral hazard. In contrast, an increase in
the borrowing rate ru decreases the relative cost for unmonitored nance, as rms
that rely on intermediaries are hurt relatively more due to additional monitoring
costs. Consequently, relative access to unmonitored funds becomes easier and the
share of rms using this type of nance increases (see Appendix B.4 for a formal
proof). Proposition 2.3 shows that substitution eects are stronger for non-exporters
if selection case 1 applies. Deteriorating nancial conditions increase access barriers
to nance and thus hurt low productivity rms most. In selection case 2, if trade
costs are low, non-exporters have to rely on nancial intermediation and cannot
react to nancial shocks by switching the source of external nance.
The model's predictions are consistent with empirical evidence documenting large
adverse eects of credit tightening on small and bank-dependent rms, as well as
substitution into alternative sources of external debt during the nancial crisis of
2008-2009.22 Credit tightening does not only aect the selection of rms into external
funds and exporting, but induces reallocations of revenue-based market shares among
producers that use dierent sources of nance. If the private benet goes up, market
shares of exporters that rely on nancial intermediation increase.
Comparable to an increase in the borrowing rate ru, a decrease in monitoring eec-
tiveness (higher m) leads to a larger fraction of rms that use unmonitored nance
and a reallocation of markets shares away from producers that rely on nancial in-
termediation.23 These reallocation eects change the degree of price competition
in general equilibrium, which has important implications for reactions of aggregate
variables to nancial shocks. This will be discussed in the following subsection.
2.4.3 Aggregate eects of credit tightening
As shown in section 2.3, an increase in the private benet aggravates moral hazard
and leads to stronger credit frictions. Consequently, this shock reduces the number
22Compare the discussion in section 2.1.
23See the proof of Proposition 2.3 in Appendix B.4 for details.
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of active rms (2.25), whereas k 2 1; 2 indicates the selection case:
@Mk
@b
b
Mk
=   mb
 m| {z }
Direct eect
  @ k
@b
b
 k| {z }
Selection eect
< 0: (2.29)
Reactions along the extensive margin can be separated into two eects. The rst
term in equation (2.29) is independent of the selection case and captures the exit of
lowest productivity rms that lose access to external nance after credit tightening
(compare Proposition 2.1). The second term is a substitution eect that would not
be present in a model with one source of external nance. Substitution eects lead
to an additional channel of adjustment along the extensive margin. If the private
benet b increases, a larger fraction of rms has to rely on more expensive nancial
intermediation, which reduces the degree of price competition and attenuates exit
of low productivity rms (@ k
@b
< 0). In contrast, substitution eects work in the
opposite direction if the monitoring eectiveness decreases (higher m). An increase
inm raises the share of rms that use unmonitored nance and leads to a reallocation
of market shares away from producers relying on nancial intermediation. This
selection eect increases competition in general equilibrium, as a larger fraction of
producers raises cheaper nance without monitoring, resulting in a lower average
price and thus stronger rm exit. The same reasoning applies to an increase in the
interest rate ru.
24 To analyze the welfare eects of credit tightening, welfare can
be expressed as a function of nancial conditions and the cuto productivity of the
least productive domestic seller using nancial intermediation 'mdk:
Wk = P
 1 =

   1

 1+


   + 1
 mfd
 +1
( 1)

L

 1
 1 rm

 1

'mdk . (2.30)
The derivative of equation (2.30) with respect to the private benet b shows that
credit tightening aects welfare through two channels:
@Wk
@b
b
Wk
=     + 1
 (   1)
mb
 m| {z }
Variety loss
+
@'mdk
@b
b
'mdk| {z }
Productivity gain
. (2.31)
As rms with lowest productivity and highest borrowing costs exit the market, con-
sumers face a loss of product variety which is counteracted by a productivity gain.
24Compare Proposition 2.3 and see Appendix B.4 for details.
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Compared to a model with one source of external nance, selection eects amplify
negative welfare responses to credit tightening.
Proposition 2.4 A higher private benet reduces the number of active rms if the
private benet is suciently high, and leads to lower welfare if the eectiveness of
monitoring is suciently low:  m >
ru
fd
efk
 k
. Substitution into bank nance attenuates
the negative eect on the extensive margin, but amplies welfare losses.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
Selection into more expensive nancial intermediation reduces average productivity
and increases average xed costs in the industry. This results in a lower productivity
gain in equation (2.31) and thus higher welfare losses. In contrast, an increase in m
leads to substitution into unmonitored lending, increases the exit of low productivity
rms and reduces welfare losses compared to a situation with only one source of
external nance. The same results apply to an increase in the borrowing rate ru.
The relative cost disadvantage of nancial intermediation leads to substitution into
unmonitored nance and intensies negative reactions along the extensive margin
resulting in additional productivity gains. An increase in credit costs aects welfare
through three channels:
@Wk
@ru
ru
Wk
=   1
|{z}
IM
     + 1
 (   1)
rm
 m| {z }
Variety loss
+
@'mdk
@ru
ru
'mdk| {z }
Productivity gain
: (2.32)
As producers scale down innovation activity and thus increase prices, a higher bor-
rowing rate negatively aects the intensive margin (IM). If credit frictions in the
nancial intermediation sector are suciently high, the variety loss outweighs pro-
ductivity gains and there is an additional negative reaction at the extensive margin.
Proposition 2.5 An increase in the borrowing rate ru negatively aects welfare
through the intensive margin, as well as the extensive margin if monitoring eective-
ness of nancial intermediation is suciently low.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
Special case with one source of external nance If cm = m = 1, there is no
dierence between monitored and unmonitored nance such that the relative access
barrier to external funds is equal to one (  u
 m
= 1) and from equation (2.20) follows
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that 'ul
'ml
= 1. Hence, the framework nests a heterogeneous rm model with nancial
frictions and one source of external nance. This special case allows to analyze the
eect of nancial intermediation on the number of active rms and welfare. The
relative number of rms in selection case k compared to a scenario with only one
type of external nance, denoted by the subscript o, can be expressed as follows:
Mk
Mo
=
esoesk =  u m  o k : (2.33)
The rst term reects the fact that nancial intermediaries facilitate access to nance
( m <  u), which increases the number of available varieties in the economy. The
second term captures that a higher number of producers increases the competitive
pressure ( k >  o). Expression (2.33) monotonically increases in the private benet
b. Hence, stronger credit market imperfections enhance the benet of nancial in-
termediation in terms of larger product variety. Analogously, welfare relative to the
case without nancial intermediation is given by:
Wk
Wo
=

 u
 m
 +1
( 1)
c
  1

m

Ek
Eo
 1

: (2.34)
Compared to welfare without bank nance, the positive impact on product variety
(  u
 m
) is counteracted by a negative eect along the intensive margin as well as a
productivity loss. Additional monitoring costs cm reduce investments and hence
increase prices resulting in lower welfare. As nancial intermediaries enable lower
productivity rms to enter, the average prots are reduced (Ek < Eo).
Proposition 2.6 If credit frictions are suciently strong and monitoring eective-
ness is high, nancial intermediation increases product variety and welfare.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
From a policy perspective, the analysis shows that better access to nancial inter-
mediation leads to relatively larger product variety and potentially higher welfare,
especially in industries with strong exposure to credit frictions. More eective in-
termediaries facilitate export activities of lower productivity rms. Furthermore,
changes in credit conditions aect producers very dierently depending on their pro-
ductivity and the source of external nance. Policies that aim to ease access to
external funds will induce reallocations of market shares across rms and thus gen-
erate losers and winners. These selection eects change the average productivity
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in the economy and welfare. Besides that, nancial intermediation does also aect
aggregate responses to trade liberalization.
2.5 Trade liberalization
This section shows that substitution between two types of external nance repre-
sents an additional channel how rms adjust to trade liberalization. I focus on a
change in export xed costs fx, whereas analogous results can be derived for variable
trade costs  (see Appendix B.5). A reduction in trade costs decreases the cuto
productivities 'jx and increases the share of exporters. Marginal rms with produc-
tivity slightly below 'mx before trade liberalization start exporting. Additionally,
exporters near but below the initial threshold 'ux switch from nancial interme-
diation to unmonitored nance resulting in lower borrowing costs (see Figure 2.6).
In both selection cases, trade liberalization leads to a reallocation of market shares
towards exporters:
@x1
@fx
fx
x1
=
 (   1)   (   + 1)
 (   1)

 1
< 0; (2.35)
@x2
@fx
fx
x2
=
 (   1)   (   + 1)
 (   1)  2 < 0: (2.36)
As in Melitz (2003), trade liberalization increases the cuto productivity for do-
mestic sales 'md. Whereas market shares are reallocated towards exporters, low
productivity rms have to exit:
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@M2
@fx
fx
M2
=  @x2
@fx
fx
x2
h

 
1 +  1 
 
 +1   1
i
tx > 0. (2.38)
The reaction of domestic rms depends on the selection case. If trade costs are high
(selection case 1), some non-exporters react to increased competitive pressure by
switching from unmonitored to monitored nance. This substitution eect decreases
the extent of price competition, as switchers face higher borrowing costs, which leads
to a reduced reaction at the extensive margin. If trade costs are low, non-exporters
cannot change the type of nance. Consequently, the comparison of equations (2.37)
and (2.38) shows that exit pressure is more pronounced in selection case 2.
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Higher monitoring costs cm or a lower eectiveness of monitoring (higherm) increase
the relative costs of nancial intermediation compared to direct lending as captured
by the term . In this case, non-exporters are hurt more by increased competition
after trade liberalization which leads to stronger exit. At the same time, the gain
of market shares for exporters is attenuated when nancial intermediation is less
eective. This result is driven by two eects. First, additional prots are lower
for new exporters that rely on monitored nance. Second, stronger exit of lower
productivity rms increases the cuto productivity and thus the competitive pressure
in general equilibrium. Consequently, substitution eects inuence the welfare gains
from trade liberalization:
@Wk
@fx
fx
Wk
=   1
Ek
"
(   + 1)esk

@Mk
@fx
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Mk
+ rufx
@ efk
@fx
#
: (2.39)
Proposition 2.7 Lower trade costs lead to a reallocation of market shares towards
exporters and exit of low productivity rms. If monitoring eectiveness is suciently
low, there are welfare gains from trade

@Wk
@fx
fx
Wk
< 0

, that increase in the relative
cost for nancial intermediation.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
Equation (2.39) and Proposition 2.7 show that welfare gains increase in credit fric-
tions with respect to nancial intermediation. Higher access barriers to external
nance worsen the negative consequences of trade liberalization for lower productiv-
ity rms, but increase aggregate gains in terms of average productivity and welfare.
Hence, a decrease in trade costs is more benecial in the presence of stronger credit
frictions. The comparative static analysis identies substitution into nancial inter-
mediation as an additional channel how domestic rms react to increased competitive
pressure induced by trade liberalization. A higher reliance on monitored nance re-
duces the negative responses along the extensive margin at the expense of welfare
gains. Conversely, the absence of substitution possibilities among domestic sellers
intensies product churning, but at the same time increases welfare gains after trade
liberalization. Hence, the introduction of two sources of external nance in the pres-
ence of credit frictions leads to two additional sources of gains from trade. First,
some exporters obtain access to nance provided without monitoring resulting in a
reduction of borrowing costs and prices. Second, stronger exit of lower productivity
rms that rely on more expensive nancial intermediation further increases average
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productivity in general equilibrium. The latter eect is attenuated if non-exporters
are able to select into monitored nance in case of high trade costs.
2.6 Discussion and extensions
After presenting the eects of nancial shocks and trade liberalization, this section
discusses assumptions of the theoretical framework and analyzes possible extensions.
Moral hazard and external nance. Firms have to rely on external nance to
cover xed costs and endogenous investment outlays. The reactions of the intensive
and extensive margins to an increase in the borrowing rate ru depend crucially on
this assumption. If external nance is needed for innovations only, access barriers
are independent of borrowing rates:  m =
bm

+ 1

and  u =
b

+ 1

(compare
subsection 2.2.3), and there will be no reaction along the extensive margin in equation
(2.32). Instead, if only xed costs have to be nanced by investors, the inuence
of borrowing costs on the intensive margin disappears. Empirical evidence suggests
that rms rely on external nance for xed up-front costs and investments, especially
in international trade.25 One important feature of the theoretical framework is that
borrowing costs for process innovations aect price setting and the intensive margin,
without assuming external nancing of variable production costs.
The assumption that private benets are only related to xed costs introduces credit
frictions regarding the extensive margin. Moral hazard increases the access barriers
to external nance and raises the cuto productivities for domestic sales as well as
exporting above the level of a zero-prot condition. The model does not allow that
rms use a mix of both sources of credit. Instead, dierences in private benets
as well as in borrowing costs lead to selection of rms into two types of external
nance. Alternatively, the private benet could be related to endogenous investment
costs as well.26 This assumption would lead to a negative eect of moral hazard on
innovation choices and a direct impact on the intensive margin, but considerably
complicates the analysis. The reason is that rms would additionally be divided
into nancially unconstrained and constrained ones besides the selection into two
sources of external nance. By assuming only one type of lenders, the third chapter
of this thesis introduces credit frictions and rm-specic moral hazard which leads
25See e.g. Manova (2013), Feenstra et al. (2014), as well as Muu^ls (2015), among others.
26Tirole (2006) discusses dierent specications of moral hazard in corporate nance theory.
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to an endogenous share of credit-rationed producers. This fraction is determined by
the quality of nancial institutions and industry characteristics such as the degree
of product market competition.
Borrowing costs and capital market equilibrium. The model considers labor
as single factor of production. Comparable to the general equilibrium in Melitz
(2003), all resources for entry, production and investment are expressed in terms of
labor. This implies that the borrowing rate ru is exogenous. The framework could
be easily extended by introducing capital as a second input factor for endogenous
innovations. If labor is used for xed and variable production costs, equation (2.25)
can be rewritten as:
Mk =
L
[ (  1) + 1]esk : (2.40)
Additionally, xed capital supply K has to be equal to aggregate investment outlays
which leads to a further market clearing condition:
K = Mk
   1

P
l mlkesmlk + cmPl ulkesulk
rm
: (2.41)
Combining equations (2.40) and (2.41) yields an explicit solution for the borrowing
rate ru:
ru =
L
K
   1
 (  1) + 1
P
l mlkesmlk + cmPl ulkesulk
cmesk . (2.42)
If there is only one type of external capital (cm = m = 1), borrowing costs depend
on xed parameters of the model and on relative capital supply K
L
:
ru =
L
K
   1
 (  1) + 1 : (2.43)
Equation (2.43) is closely related to the general equilibrium in Chapter 1 (compare
section 1.5). The interest rate decreases in relative capital supply and increases with
the elasticity of substitution . A larger convexity of investment costs  reduces
capital demand and thus the borrowing rate. In a CES framework with one type
of external nance, neither trade liberalization nor stronger credit frictions change
the interest rate. This result is driven by two properties of the model. First, as
in Melitz (2003), eects along the extensive margin are captured by labor market
clearing. Second, the constant elasticity of substitution implies a constant marginal
product of capital such that the eect of shocks on the intensive margin is xed.
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In contrast, Chapter 3 introduces a trade model with non-CES preferences, whereas
the borrowing rate is endogenously determined by industry characteristics, and
changes with trade liberalization. If there are two types of external nance, equa-
tion (2.42) reveals that capital costs are not merely pinned down by technology
parameters and endowments.
Proposition 2.8 The borrowing rate ru decreases in the private b as well as in
variable and xed trade costs.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
Changes of the interest rate are caused by substitution eects between the two types
of nance. If the private benet increases, there is a reallocation of market shares
away from the most successful rms with lowest borrowing costs. As producers select
into more expensive monitored nance, average capital demand and thus the interest
rate decreases (@ru
@b
< 0). Instead, a lower monitoring eectiveness (higher m) leads
to more innovation and higher capital demand due to selection into unmonitored
nance. With endogenous borrowing costs, the reaction of welfare to an increase in
the private benet is given by:
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b
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Interest rate eect
: (2.44)
Compared to equation (2.31), stronger credit frictions lead to an additional adjust-
ment along the intensive margin which counteracts substitution eects. Whereas
selection into monitored nance causes a negative eect on welfare (compare Propo-
sition 2.4), a decrease in borrowing costs enhances innovation activity of rms and
tends to attenuate losses of credit tightening.
Analogous to nancial shocks, trade liberalization changes the interest rate only
through selection eects. As shown in section 2.5, lower trade costs lead to an
additional welfare gain as marginal exporters switch from monitored to unmonitored
nance. Facing lower borrowing costs, these rms increase capital demand which
results in upward pressure on the borrowing rate. This induces a negative reaction
along the intensive margin and reduces gains from trade.
Credit frictions and trade nance. The trade and nance literature discusses
several reasons why exporters may be more exposed to credit frictions such as higher
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default risk, increased uncertainty in foreign markets or additional up-front costs.27
This model could be extended in dierent ways to capture exporters' higher exposure
to credit constraints. First, a higher uncertainty of investments in foreign markets
could be modelled by a lower success probability  for international rms. Second,
a larger private benet b would reect a more dicult access to external nance.
Third, it might be harder for nancial intermediaries to control exporters' project
choice if activity in foreign markets is associated with opaqueness of investments
or weaker enforceability of nancial contracts. This could be reected by lower
monitoring eectiveness m or higher borrowing costs cm in case of exporting. These
extensions imply that the share of exporters would not only depend on trade costs,
but is aected by dierences in nancial conditions between domestic sellers and
international rms (compare the discussion in section 2.4). Consequently, exporters
would be hurt more by worsening nancial conditions.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter highlights that substitution eects between two types of external credit
represent an additional channel how rms adjust to trade liberalization and nan-
cial shocks. Models that link rm heterogeneity a la Melitz (2003) to capital market
imperfections explain negative eects of credit frictions on international trade. How-
ever, previous work mainly focuses on partial equilibrium analysis and considers only
one type of external nance. The contribution of this chapter is to combine rm
heterogeneity a la Melitz (2003) with nancial frictions and two sources of external
funds. Based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), moral hazard reduces the pledgeabil-
ity of rm prots and aggravates access to credit. Passive lenders provide cheaper
unmonitored nance, whereas nancial intermediaries with monitoring ability reduce
moral hazard and facilitate access to credit, but charge a higher interest rate.
The model adds a new dimension to the existing theoretical literature on heteroge-
neous rms in international trade. Besides the selection into exporting, productivity
determines access to external nance. Consistent with empirical evidence, the most
productive and largest rms export and use unmonitored nance, whereas low pro-
ductivity rms sell only domestically and have to rely on more expensive nancial
intermediation. In addition to ex-ante dierences in productivity, selection into ex-
27See Foley and Manova (2015) for a discussion of the trade and nance literature.
CHAPTER 2. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND TRADE 81
ternal nance introduces another source of rm heterogeneity. Larger producers that
use unmonitored lending have a competitive advantage, compared to smaller pro-
ducers that rely on intermediaries. The selection pattern of rms depends on trade
costs, nancial development and borrowing rates. This model shows that nancial
shocks and trade liberalization lead to heterogeneous rm responses, as well as new
eects on the margins of international trade. Financial policies that aim to facilitate
access to capital, change the relative costs for nance and thus lead to reallocations
of market shares across producers with dierent source of external credit.
Besides that, the analysis highlights the importance of general equilibrium eects.
The main idea is that nancial shocks and trade liberalization induce rms to switch
the type of nance, which inuences price competition and thus aggregate responses
in general equilibrium. In particular, stronger credit frictions lead to a larger share of
producers that rely on more expensive nancial intermediation and have to set higher
prices. This selection eect reduces the competitive pressure in general equilibrium,
forces less rms with low productivity to exit, but generates additional welfare losses.
Furthermore, the model suggests a new source of gains from trade liberalization.
Some exporters obtain access to cheaper unmonitored nance and reduce prices.
Additionally, stronger exit of low productivity rms with high borrowing costs in-
creases average productivity within an industry.
Appendix B
Mathematical Appendix
B.1 Maximization problem of rm
This section presents the maximization problem of a rm with export status l 2 d; x
and external nance j 2 m;u, whereas 1fx>0g takes a value of one if the rm
is an exporter and is zero otherwise. Firms maximize prots (2.5) subject to the
constraints (2.6)-(2.9) and the corresponding incentive compatibility condition (2.14)
for j = u or (2.15) for j = m. First-order conditions for optimal prices at home pjl
and abroad pjx, as well as investment ejl, are:
XP  (+ 3)

(1  )p jl +
1
'ejl
p  1jl

= 0; (B.1)
XP  (+ 3)

(1  )  pjx  + 'ejx  pjx  1

= 0; (B.2)
+ 3
'e2jl
XP 
h
p jl + 1fx>0g
 
pjx
 i  1e 1jl = 0: (B.3)
Optimality conditions with respect to credit amount djl and loan repayment kjl are:
1   rj2 = 0; (B.4)
 + 2   3 = 0; (B.5)
where 1, 2 and 3 are the Lagrange multipliers of the constraints (2.7), (2.8)
and (2.14) or (2.15) respectively. Optimal price setting (2.11) follows immediately
from equations (B.1) and (B.2). Rearranging condition (B.3) leads to the optimal
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investment level ejl as a function of prices:
ejl =

+ 3
'1
XP 

p jl + 1fx>0g
 
pjx
  11+
:
For unconstrained rms, 3 = 0 and hence it follows from equations (B.4) and (B.5)
that 1 = rj > 1 and 2 = 1. If 3 > 0, then
+3
1
= 
ru
, such that optimal
investment of constrained and unconstrained rms is expressed by equation (2.10).
Prots (2.12) follow immediately from inserting investment (2.10) and prices (2.11)
into the objective function (2.5) by taking into account constraints (2.7) and (2.8).
B.2 Regions of active rms in open economy
This section describes the regions of active rms for the two scenarios presented in
section 2.3 of the main text. In both cases, the set of all active rms in equilibrium
is characterized by:
D = f' 2 [1;1] : '  'mdg :
The regions of exporters using monitored and unmonitored nance are dened as:
Dmx = f' 2 [1;1] : 'mx  ' < 'uxg ;
Dux = f' 2 [1;1] : '  'uxg :
If case 1 occurs (see subsection 2.3.1), domestic rms select into two additional
regions, depending on the type of external nance:
Dmd = f' 2 [1;1] : 'md  ' < 'udg ;
Dud = f' 2 [1;1] : 'ud  ' < 'mxg :
In case 2 (see subsection 2.3.2), non-exporters have only access to monitored nance:
Dmd = f' 2 [1;1] : 'md  ' < 'mxg :
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B.3 Solution with Pareto distribution
As described in section 2.4, I assume that productivity ' is Pareto distributed to
solve the model explicitly. Expected prots in equation (2.17) can be expressed as:
Ek =  mfd
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whereas the index k 2 1; 2 denotes the selection case, e'jlk is the average productivity
among producers with source of nance j and export status l, and average xed costs
are given by: efk = (cmmdk + udk) fd + (cmmx + ux) fx:
For both selection cases, the components of exporters' expected prots in equation
(B.6) are:
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:
For technical reasons, it is assumed that the Pareto shape parameter is suciently
high:  > ( 1)
 +1 , and hence
 ( +1)
( 1) ( +1) > 0: In selection case 1, the components
for domestic rms are:
md
e'md
'md
( 1)
 +1
=
  (   + 1)
 (   1)   (   + 1)
"
1  c
1 
 +1
m
 u
 m

'ud
'md
 #
;
ud
 e'ud
'md
( 1)
 +1
=
  (   + 1)
 (   1)   (   + 1)'

md

c
1 
 +1
m
 u
 m
' ud   t' mx

;
and in case 2, when trade costs are relatively low:
md
e'md
'md
( 1)
 +1
=
  (   + 1)
 (   1)   (   + 1)'

md

' md   t' mx

:
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The free entry condition (2.17) is an increasing function of the cuto productivity
level 'mdk:
Ek = fE'

mdk:
Combining the free entry condition (2.17) and expected prots (2.18) leads to the
following solution for the cuto productivity 'md:
'mdk =

1
fE
 1


   + 1

esk   ru efk 1 :
Market shares. Revenue-based market shares for exporters are dened as follows:
mxk =
mxesmxkesk = fxfd

'md
'mx
 1  c 1  +1m  u m 'md'ud 
 k
;
uxk =
uxesuxkesk = 1 k fxfd  u m

'md
'ux

:
If trade costs are high (case 1), market shares for non-exporters can be expressed as:
md1 =
md1esmd1es1 =
1  c
1 
 +1
m
 u
 m

'md
'ud

 1
;
ud1 =
ud1esud1es1 =
 u
 m

'md
'ud

  tc
 1
 +1
m

'md
'mx

 1
;
and in case of low trade costs (selection pattern 2):
md2 =
md2esmd2es2 =
1  t

'md
'mx

 2
;
whereas the measures  k and  are dened in equations (2.27) and (2.28).
B.4 Proofs
Proof of Condition 2.3. The protability condition for exporting with nancial
intermediation in Lemma 2.4 can be written as cuto productivity:
' 


   1
 1+
 ru

 1
 1
0@ 
   + 1
cmfx   fd
(1 + 1 )

 +1 c
1 
 +1
m   1
1A
 +1
( 1)
A
 1
 1
d : (B.7)
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Comparing condition (B.7) with the cuto productivity 'mx in equation (2.16):
'mx =


   1
 1+
 rm

 1


 mfx
   + 1
 +1
( 1)
A
 1
 1
x ; (B.8)
immediately leads to Condition 2.3.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. (i) A higher private benet increases the relative cost
for unmonitored nance:
@

 u
 m

@b
=
ru

cm  m
 2m
> 0 as cm > 1 > m:
For both selection cases, dierentiating equation (2.21) with respect to b yields:
@mx
@b
=
 (   + 1)
 (   1)

'md
'ux

 m
 u
@

 u
 m

@b
> 0;
@ux
@b
=  @mx
@b
< 0 as
@

 u
 m

@b
> 0:
For domestic rms, substitution eects are: @md
@b
=

'mx
'md

@mx
@b
> @mx
@b
in selection
case 1, and @md
@b
= 0 in selection case 2. (ii) A lower monitoring eectiveness (an
increase in m) and higher borrowing costs ru reduce the relative access barrier to
unmonitored nance:
@

 u
 m

@m
=    u
 2m
b

< 0;
@

 u
 m

@ru
=
b

m  cm
 2m
< 0 as cm > 1 > m:
For both selection cases, the shares of exporters (2.21) react as follows:
@mx
@m
=
 (   + 1)
 (   1)

'md
'ux

 m
 u
@

 u
 m

@m
< 0;
@ux
@m
=  @mx
@m
> 0 as
@

 u
 m

@m
< 0;
@mx
@ru
=
 (   + 1)
 (   1)

'md
'ux

 m
 u
@

 u
 m

@ru
< 0;
@ux
@ru
=  @mx
@ru
> 0 as
@

 u
 m

@ru
< 0:
In selection case 1, changes in shares of domestic sellers are given by:
@md
@m
=

'mx
'md

@mx
@m
< 0;
@md
@ru
=

'mx
'md

@mx
@ru
< 0;
whereas in selection case 2, there are no substitution eects among non-exporters:
@md
@m
=
@md
@ru
= 0:
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For selection case 1, changes in b, m and ru lead to reallocations of market shares
according to the following derivatives:
@md
@b
=
( +1) ( 1)
( 1) c
1 
 +1
m

'md
'ud
 @  u m 
@b   md @ 1@b
 1
> 0;
@mx
@b
=
( +1) ( 1)
( 1) c
1 
 +1
m
fx
fd

'md
'ux
 @  u m 
@b   mx @ 1@b
 1
> 0;
@md
@ru
=
( +1) ( 1)
( 1) c
1 
 +1
m

'md
'ud
 @  u m 
@ru
  md @ 1@ru
 1
< 0;
@mx
@ru
=
( +1) ( 1)
( 1) c
1 
 +1
m
fx
fd

'md
'ux
 @  u m 
@ru
  mx @ 1@ru
 1
< 0;
@md
@m
=
( +1) ( 1)
( 1) c
1 
 +1
m

'md
'ud
 @  u m 
@m   md @ 1@m
 1
< 0;
@mx
@m
=
( +1) ( 1)
( 1) c
1 
 +1
m
fx
fd

'md
'ux
 @  u m 
@m   mx @ 1@m
 1
< 0;
whereas
@

 u
 m

@b
> 0,
@

 u
 m

@ru
;
@

 u
 m

@m
< 0 and @ 1
@b
< 0, @ 1
@ru
; @ 1
@m
> 0. Analogous
reactions of market shares can be derived for selection case 2.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. The derivative (2.29) follows immediately from equa-
tion (2.25) by taking into account equation (2.26). Substitution eects subject to a
change in the private benet b, as stated in equation (2.29), are given by:
@ 1
@b
=
@
@b
"
1 +

'md
'mx

fx
fd
#
< 0;
@ 2
@b
=
@
@b

'md
'mx

fx
fd
< 0;
whereas
@
@b
=   (   + 1)   (   1)
 (   1)

1  c
1 
 +1
m

'md
'ud
 @   u m
@b
< 0 as
@

 u
 m

@b
> 0:
The overall eect of an increase in b on the number of rms is negative as long as
  mb
 m
  @ k
@b
b
 k
< 0, which leads to the following conditions in selection case 1:
 u >
 (   + 1)   (   1)
 (   1)

1  c
1 
 +1
m

ru

cm  m
m

fd
fx
+ x

ux1;
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and in selection case 2:
 u >
 (   + 1)   (   1)
 (   1)

1  c
1 
 +1
m

ru

cm  m
m
ux2:
Both conditions impose minimum requirements on the private benet b, since the
left-hand-side ( u) increases in b, whereas the market shares uxk decrease in b. The
productivity eect in equation (2.31) is given by:
@'mdk
@b
b
'mdk
=   1
Ek
 
   + 1

esk @Mk
@b
b
Mk
+ bru
@ efk
@b
!
; (B.9)
whereas average xed costs increase in the private benet b: @
efk
@b
> 0. Inserting
derivatives (B.9) and (2.29) into equation (2.31), and rearranging leads to:
@Wk
@b
b
Wk
=     + 1
Ek
24  ( +1) ( 1)( 1) mb m   @ k@b b kesk
+ru efk   1 mb m +  +1 @ efk@b befk
35 ; (B.10)
whereby the denition of average prots is exploited: Ek = esk  +1   ru efk.
Substitution eects decrease average productivity (@ k
@b
< 0) and increase average
xed costs (@
efk
@b
> 0), and thus, clearly amplify welfare losses of credit tightening.
From the derivative (B.10) follows that a sucient condition for a negative welfare
response is given by:  m >
ru
fd
efk
 k
.
A change in monitoring eectiveness m and an increase in borrowing costs ru both
lead to a clearly negative reaction along the extensive margin:
@M
@m
m
M
=   bm
 m
  @ k
@m
m
 k
< 0;
@Mk
@ru
ru
Mk
=   rm
 m
  @ k
@ru
ru
 k
< 0: (B.11)
as selection eects aggravate rm exit: @ k
@m
; @ k
@ru
> 0. Comparable to equation (2.31),
the eect of a change in monitoring eectiveness m on welfare can be written as:
@W
@m
m
W
=     + 1
(   1)
mb
 m
+
@'md
@m
m
'md
: (B.12)
Analogous to the derivation for a change in the private benet b, the welfare response
is negative if the access barrier to monitored nance is suciently high, as the
following conditions show for selection case 1:
 m >
ru
fd
fdcm + x (fxcm   fd)
1 + xt

(1 + 1 )

 +1   c
 1
 +1
m
 ;
as well as for selection case 2:
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 m >
ru
fd
fdcm + x (fx   fdcm)
1 + xt
h
(1 + 1 )

 +1   1
i :
Proof of Proposition 2.5. The eect of the interest rate ru on cuto productivity
'mdk in equation (2.32) is given by:
@'mdk
@ru
ru
'mdk
=
1
Ek
 
    + 1

esk @Mk
@ru
ru
Mk
  ru efk   r2u @ efk@r
k
!
; (B.13)
whereas the reaction along the extensive margin is given in equation (B.11). Sub-
stitution into unmonitored nance increases within-industry productivity:
@ 1
@ru
=
@
@ru
"
1 +

'md
'mx

fx
fd
#
> 0;
@ 2
@ru
=
@
@ru

'md
'mx

fx
fd
> 0;
whereas for both selection cases it holds that:
@
@ru
=   (   + 1)   (   1)
 (   1)

1  c
1 
 +1
m

'md
'ud
 @   u m
@ru
> 0;
as the relative access barrier to unmonitored nance decreases in ru:
@

 u
 m

@ru
< 0.
The eect on the extensive margin in equation (2.32) is negative if:

 (   + 1)  (   1)
(   1)
cm
 m
 k  
@ k
@ru

 (   + 1) mfd
 (   + 1)   (   1)
> efk
"
 (   + 1) rm   (   1) m
(   1) m
  @
efk
@ru
ruefk
#
;
whereas @
ef1
@ru
< 0. It can be easily shown that the left-hand side of this condition
increases in m, whereas the right-hand side decreases in m. Hence, the reaction
along the extensive margin is clearly negative as long as the monitoring eectiveness
of nancial intermediation is suciently low.
Proof of Proposition 2.6. Depending on the selection case k 2 1; 2, equa-
tion (2.33) can be rewritten by using the expressions for average revenues esk in
equation (2.26). If there is only one type of external nance,  = 1 and   =
1+

'md
'mx
 
fx
fd
  t

, as discussed in subsection 2.4.3. Exploiting this, product vari-
ety is larger (Mk
M0
> 1) if the following condition holds for selection case 1:
 u
 m
>

h
1 +
 
1 + 1 
 
 +1 tx
i
  c
 1
 +1
m tx
1 + tx
h
(1 + 1 )

 +1   1
i :
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A similar condition ensures variety gains in selection case 2:
 u
 m
>
1 + tx
h 
1 + 1 
 
 +1   1
i
1 + tx
h
(1 + 1 )

 +1   1
i :
Note that for both cases, the left-hand side of the condition increases in b and
decreases in m, whereas the opposite holds for the right-hand side. Hence, the
conditions are satised whenever the extent of credit frictions, as well as monitoring
eectiveness of nancial intermediation, is suciently high.
Proof of Proposition 2.7. The market share of exporters is given by:
xk =
 
1 + 1 
 
 +1 tx
 k
: (B.14)
Taking the derivative of equation (B.14) with respect to xed trade costs leads to:
@xk
@fx
fx
xk
=
 (   1)   (   + 1)
 (   1)
@t
@fx
fx
t
  @ k
@fx
fx
 k
;
whereas @t
@fx
=
(1+1 )
 
 +1
fd
> 0, and the eects of trade costs on the measures of
average productivity in the economy are given by:
@ 1
@fx
= x


 
1 + 1 
 
 +1   c
 1
 +1
m

 (   1)   (   + 1)
 (   1)
@t
@fx
< 0; (B.15)
@ 2
@fx
= x
h 
1 + 1 
 
 +1   1
i  (   1)   (   + 1)
 (   1)
@t
@fx
< 0: (B.16)
Inserting these expressions into the derivative of equation (B.14) and simplifying
leads to equations (2.35) and (2.36). For both selection cases, the reaction of market
shares decreases in , and thus increases in the monitoring eectiveness of nancial
intermediation as @
@m
> 0. Reactions of the extensive margin to trade costs follow
immediately from the derivation of equation (2.25). Exit of rms is stronger if
nancial intermediation is less eective as:
@

@M1
@fx
fx
M1

@
=
 (   + 1)   (   1)
 (   1)
txc
 1
 +1
m
 21
> 0;
@

@M2
@fx
fx
M2

@
=
 (   + 1)   (   1)
 (   1)
tx
 
1 + 1 
 
 +1
 22
> 0:
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The eects of xed export costs fx on average xed costs for the two selection cases
are given by:
@ ef1
@fx
=
[ (   1)   (   + 1)] (mxcm + ux) +  (   + 1) fdfx x
 (   1) ; (B.17)
@ ef2
@fx
=
[ (   1)   (   + 1)] (mxcm + ux) +  (   + 1) fdfx cmx
 (   1) : (B.18)
The welfare response in equation (2.39) is negative if the following condition holds:
   (   + 1) mfd
 (   + 1)   (   1)
@ k
@fx
>  ru @
efk
@fx
:
Exploiting equations (B.15) and (B.16), as well as the reactions of average xed costs
(B.17) and (B.18), leads to the following conditions for selection case 1:
 m >
ru

[ (   + 1)   (   1)] (mxcm + ux)   (   + 1) fdfx x
 (   + 1) x

  c
 1
 +1
m (1 + 1 )
 
 +1
 ;
and correspondingly for selection case 2:
 m >
ru

[ (   + 1)   (   1)] (mxcm + ux)   (   + 1) fdfx cmx
 (   + 1) x

  (1 + 1 )   +1
 :
Note that @ m
@m
, @
@m
> 0 and @(mxcm+ux)
@m
< 0. Hence, the conditions are satised
whenever the monitoring eectiveness is suciently low.
Proof of Proposition 2.8. By exploiting the properties of the model with a
Pareto distributed productivity, as presented in Appendix B.3, the borrowing rate
in equation (2.42) can be rewritten as follows for selection case 1:
ru1 =
L
cmK
   1
 (  1) + 1

1 + fxxfd

1 + c
1 
 +1
m
 u
 m
ux
x

c

 +1
m   1

  c

 +1
m tx
1 + fxxfd

1 + c
1 
 +1
m
 u
 m
ux
x

c
 1
 +1
m   1

  c
 1
 +1
m tx
; (B.19)
and in selection case 2:
ru2 =
L
cmK
   1
 (  1) + 1
1 + fxxfd

1 + c
1 
 +1
m
 u
 m
ux
x

c

 +1
m   1

  tx
1 + fxxfd

1 + c
1 
 +1
m
 u
 m
ux
x

c
 1
 +1
m   1

  tx
: (B.20)
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Taking the derivatives of equations (B.19) and (B.20) with respect to b leads to:
@ru1
@b
=
(cm   1)L
cmK
   1
 (  1) + 1

1 + fxxfd
 @  u m uxx 
@b

1  tx + fxxfd


1 + fxxfd

1 + c
1 
 +1
m
 u
 m
ux
x

c
 1
 +1
m   1

  c
 1
 +1
m tx
2 < 0;
@ru2
@b
=
(cm   1)L
cmK
   1
 (  1) + 1
fxx
fd
@

 u
 m
ux
x

@b

1  tx + fxxfd


1 + fxxfd

1 + c
1 
 +1
m
 u
 m
ux
x

c
 1
 +1
m   1

  tx
2 < 0;
whereas
@

 u
 m
ux
x

@b
< 0 and 1  tx > 0. Taking the derivative with respect to xed
trade costs fx and simplifying yields:
@ru1
@fx
=
(cm   1)L
cmK
   1
 (  1) + 1
c
 1
 +1
m

 u
 m
ux
x
c
1 
 +1
m   1

1 + fxxfd

@(tx)
@fx
  tx
@

fxx
fd

@fx


1 + fxxfd

1 + c
1 
 +1
m
 u
 m
ux
x

c
 1
 +1
m   1

  c
 1
 +1
m tx
2 < 0;
@ru2
@fx
=
(cm   1)L
cmK
   1
 (  1) + 1
 u
 m
ux
x
@(tx)
@fx
fxx
fd
+ (1  tx)
@

fxx
fd

@fx
1 + fxxfd

1 + c
1 
 +1
m
 u
 m
ux
x

c
 1
 +1
m   1

  tx
2 < 0;
whereas

1 + fxx
fd

@(tx)
@fx
  tx
@

fxx
fd

@fx
< 0, and  u
 m
ux
x
c
1 
 +1
m > 1 due to Condition
2.1. Changes with respect to variable trade costs  can be derived analogously.
B.5 Eects of change in variable trade costs
This section presents comparative static results for a change in variable trade costs
 (compare section 2.5 on xed trade costs). Market shares of exporters decrease in
iceberg-trade costs  :
@x1
@

x1
=   
1 
1 + 1 

 1



1  c
 1
 +1
m tx

+ txc
 1
 +1
m
 (   + 1)   (   1)
 (   + 1)

< 0;
@x2
@

x2
=   
1 
1 + 1 

 2

1  tx
 (   1)
 (   + 1)

< 0:
The reaction along the extensive margin is given by:
@M1
@

M1
=
1 
1 + 1 
tx
 1
 (   + 1)   (   1)
   + 1
"
(   + 1)  1 + 1   +1
 (   + 1)   (   1)   c
 1
 +1
m
#
> 0;
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@M2
@

M2
=
1 
1 + 1 
tx
 2
 (   + 1)   (   1)
   + 1
"
(   + 1)  1 + 1   +1
 (   + 1)   (   1)   1
#
> 0:
The eect of  on welfare can be derived as follows:
@W
@

W
=   1
Ek
"
(   + 1)esk

@Mk
@

Mk
+ ru
@ efk
@
#
;
whereas the eects on average xed costs are:
@ ef1
@
=  
  [mx (fxcm   fd) + ux (fx   fd)]
1 + 1 
< 0;
@ ef2
@
=  
  [mxcm (fx   fd) + ux (fx   fdcm)]
1 + 1 
< 0.
Analogous to a change in xed export costs fx (compare Proposition 2.7), the welfare
response is negative (@W
@

W
< 0) as long as the access barrier to monitored 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is suciently high in selection case 1:
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Chapter 3
Capital Market Imperfections
and Trade Liberalization in
General Equilibrium
This chapter develops a new international trade model with capital market imper-
fections and endogenous borrowing costs in general equilibrium. A key element of
our model is that rm heterogeneity arises from the interaction of credit constraints
at the rm level with nancial frictions at the country level. Producers dier in
pledgeability of sales which results in rm heterogeneity, if nancial institutions
are imperfect. We show that endogenous adjustments of capital costs represent a
new channel that reduces common gains from globalization. Trade liberalization
increases the borrowing rate, leads to a reallocation of market shares towards un-
constrained producers and a larger fraction of credit-rationed rms. This increases
the within-industry variance of sales and reduces welfare gains as consumers dislike
price heterogeneity. Our theory is consistent with new empirical patterns fromWorld
Bank rm-level data. We highlight that credit frictions are positively related to the
degree of product market competition, and to the variance of sales across rms.
This chapter is based on joint work with Michael Irlacher. We thank Daniel Baumgarten,
Carsten Eckel, Lisandra Flach, Monika Schnitzer, and Jens Wrona, as well as participants of the
Munich \IO and Trade seminar", of the 17th Workshop \Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen" in
Goettingen, of the 20th BGPE Research Workshop in Passau, and of the 17th Annual Conference
of the European Trade Study Group in Paris for helpful comments and suggestions. Felix Roellig
provided excellent research assistance.
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3.1 Introduction
International activity of rms usually depends on access to external capital. Credit
from outside investors is used to nance production costs, machinery, the purchase
of material inputs, and up-front investments. Empirical studies show that access
to external capital and nancial development are important determinants of trade
activity. Countries with better-developed nancial systems export relatively more
in industries with higher dependence on external nance and lower asset tangibility
(Beck, 2003; Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2005; Manova, 2008, 2013). Existing theoreti-
cal work builds on the interaction of credit constraints at the industry or country
level with ex-ante rm heterogeneity a la Melitz (2003), and shows negative eects
of credit frictions on trade ows (Manova, 2013; Chaney, 2013).1 These models
typically focus on partial equilibrium and do not consider welfare implications.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the eects of globalization on rm per-
formance and welfare, when producers dier in their exposure to nancial frictions
and borrowing costs are endogenous. A novel feature of this model is that rm
heterogeneity results from the interaction between capital market imperfections at
the country level and credit constraints at the rm level. Producers require external
capital to cover production costs and dier in their incentive to divert external funds,
while being homogenous in other respects. This rm-specic moral hazard problem
reduces the pledgeability of sales and causes credit-rationing for some producers.
Firm heterogeneity arises if nancial institutions are imperfect, as only a fraction
of rms can overcome credit frictions and behaves optimally. Producers with high
incentives to misbehave face credit-rationing and have to restrict production. Hence,
the share of nancially constrained rms is endogenous in our model.
As a second departure from previous theoretical work, we explicitly model a capital
market equilibrium which determines the interest rate.2 We analyze the eects of
globalization and show that adjustments of capital costs represent an additional
channel which reduces common gains from trade. Trade liberalization increases
the market size as well as competition through entry of foreign rms. A positive
market size eect induces output expansion of all rms, raises capital demand, and
thus leads to upward pressure on the interest rate. Higher borrowing costs, as well
as stronger foreign competition, lead to a larger fraction of nancially constrained
1See Foley and Manova (2015) for a review of the trade and nance literature.
2One exception is Foellmi and Oechslin (2010), which we discuss below.
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producers. Hence, some initially unconstrained rms face credit-rationing and have
to set higher prices. Furthermore, existing constrained producers are hurt more
by higher capital costs, leading to a reallocation of prots towards unconstrained
rms. These two adjustments increase the within-industry variance of prices in the
economy. We consider the indirect utility associated with quadratic preferences as a
welfare measure. As consumers dislike price heterogeneity, a higher within-industry
variance represents a negative welfare channel of globalization.
To motivate our theoretical model, we exploit enterprise survey data from the World
Bank and highlight three novel empirical patterns. First, we use the ratio of tangible
assets over total assets as a proxy for access to external nance, and show that the
majority of variation in this measure is across rms within industries rather than
between industries. This pattern is consistent with empirical studies showing that
nancial health and access to external nance are important determinants of export
and innovation activity, even after controlling for rm characteristics, such as size
and productivity.3 The high within-industry heterogeneity with respect to credit
constraints motivates the analysis of rm-specic nancial frictions in our theoretical
model. Second, we show that in industries with a higher degree of competition, a
larger fraction of rms is nancially constrained. Third, more nancially constrained
industries and countries with lower nancial development show a larger variance of
rm sales and a higher share of credit-rationed producers.4 All relationships hold
after controlling for rm characteristics such as productivity or size.
Our theoretical model provides a rationale for these patterns. A higher degree of
competition captures that consumers react more sensitive to price increases. This
competition eect reduces rm sales and thus the pledgeable income, such that more
producers become nancially constrained. Lower nancial development corresponds
to weaker contract enforcement which results in stronger credit frictions. Hence, a
higher fraction of producers faces nancial constraints and rm-level dierences in
pledgeability translate into larger within-industry heterogeneity in sales.
This chapter contributes to the growing literature on capital market imperfections
in international trade. Theoretical work introduces credit frictions in trade models
with heterogeneous rms.5 This strand of literature diers regarding (i) the usage of
3See Berman and Hericourt (2010), Minetti and Zhu (2011), Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer
(2013), and Muu^ls (2015), among others.
4The link between credit frictions and international trade is particularly relevant in developing
countries where the quality of nancial institutions is low (Banerjee and Duo, 2005, 2014).
5See e.g. Muu^ls (2008), Manova (2013), and Chaney (2013) for extensions of the Melitz (2003)
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external funds (e.g. trade related xed or variable costs), (ii) the theoretical motiva-
tion of nancial constraints (e.g. moral hazard, imperfect contractibility, information
asymmetry), and (iii) the underlying preference structure (e.g. CES vs. linear de-
mand). To the best of our knowledge, this model is the rst to introduce rm-specic
credit frictions based on moral hazard, which leads to heterogeneity with respect to
rm performance in the absence of ex-ante productivity or wealth dierences. A
related paper is Yeaple (2005), in which technology choice and dierent skill levels
across workers generate rm heterogeneity among initially homogenous producers.
In a dynamic model of trade and nance, Felbermayr and Spiegel (2014) introduce
heterogeneity in default probabilities which results in rm-specic borrowing rates.
Existing work analyzes the eects of credit frictions on product markets in general
equilibrium without explicitly modelling capital markets. One exception is Foellmi
and Oechslin (2010), who also consider an endogenous interest rate determined by
capital market clearing. However, the focus of their approach is a dierent one.
In a model with CES preferences and heterogeneity in wealth, they analyze the
distributive impact of trade liberalization in less-developed countries. The authors
show that globalization impedes access to external nance, especially for poor en-
trepreneurs, resulting in an increase of income inequality in the economy. In our
setting with linear demand, we can disentangle the market size from the competi-
tion eect and separately analyze their impacts on equilibrium outcomes. In contrast
to a model with CES preferences, markups are endogenous and thus aected by pro-
competitive eects of globalization. The advantage of our framework is its high
tractability, which allows us to explicitly solve for all endogenous variables, and to
conduct comparative static analysis with respect to nancial development and glob-
alization. Furthermore, we derive welfare and show how capital market adjustments
alter the gains from trade. Another paper that analyzes the welfare implications
of credit frictions is Formai (2013). In a general equilibrium framework based on
Melitz (2003), she shows how credit frictions distort the entry decision of producers,
whereas trade liberalization can lead to negative welfare eects.
In our framework, the crucial mechanism in general equilibrium is the endogenous
adjustment of the interest rate after globalization. Therefore, our analysis is related
to models that study how credit frictions aect international capital and trade ows.
In a Heckscher-Ohlin model with heterogeneous nancial frictions across countries
model by nancial frictions. Peters and Schnitzer (2015) introduce borrowing constraints in the
framework of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
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and sectors, Antras and Caballero (2009) show that trade integration increases the
interest rate in nancially underdeveloped countries. Whereas this result is driven
by specialization and across-sector reallocation of inputs, in our model interest rate
adjustments after globalization lead to within-sector reallocation of market shares
between constrained and unconstrained rms.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides empirical motivation
for our theoretical setup. Section 3.3 presents the theoretical model and discusses
comparative statics in partial equilibrium. The following section introduces the
capital market and discusses general equilibrium eects of globalization. Section 3.5
shows simulation results of the gains from globalization in both partial and general
equilibrium. In section 3.6, we extend the model by free entry and show that the
eects of globalization remain robust, and nally, section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Empirical motivation
In this section, we present new empirical patterns by exploiting rm-level data from
the World Bank. The empirical analysis is entirely descriptive and aims to motivate
our theoretical framework. First, we show that a substantial fraction of the total
variation in the exposure to nancial constraints is across rms within industries
rather than between industries. This pattern implies that credit frictions at the rm
level are important, and that producers within the same industry face very dierent
degrees of credit rationing. Second, a higher degree of product market competition
is associated with a larger fraction of nancially constrained rms. Third, more
nancially constrained industries and countries with lower nancial development
show a larger variance of rm sales and a higher share of credit-rationed producers.
The rst subsection describes the data set and the variables of interest. The second
subsection presents empirical patterns that motivate our theoretical model.
3.2.1 Data description
We use cross-sectional rm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys
(WBES).6 Following existing empirical studies, the rst part of the analysis uses
the ratio of tangible assets over total assets (TOA) as a proxy for access to external
nance. We measure tangible assets as land and buildings which reects the avail-
6The database is available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
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ability of collateral and thus better access to credit.7 We use this continuous proxy
for credit access to investigate the variation in the exposure to nancial constraints
across rms within industries and between industries. Additionally, we are inter-
ested in the degree of product competition at the rm as well as the industry level.
Therefore, we exploit a survey question which asks rms to assess the impact of a
hypothetical price increase by 10% on demand for their main product. The answers
are captured by a categorical variable, whereas a value of 1 reects that consumers
are insensitive to the price increase (low competition), and a value of 4 means that
customers would stop buying (high competition). We use variation of this variable
at the rm level and compute the industry mean. Furthermore, we compute the
mean of tangible over total assets by industry and country, and relate it to the vari-
ance in log sales across rms. Variables are reported in local currency units, which
we convert to 2005 U.S. dollars. For the rst part of the empirical motivation, we
exploit a cross-section of the period 2002-2005. As information on competition and
tangible assets is not available for all countries, we restrict our analysis to a sub-
sample. Table D.1 in the Data Appendix provides a description of all variables and
Table D.2 shows summary statistics.
The second part of the empirical analysis further investigates the relationship be-
tween nancial constraints and the variance of rm sales at the country level. There-
fore, we exploit cross-section data for the years 2009 and 2013, which is available for
a larger set of countries.8 We use domestic credit to the private sector in percentage
of GDP as a proxy for nancial development and relate it to the within-country
variance of rm sales, as well as to the share of nancially constrained producers
by country.9 To obtain the latter measure, we consider a survey question which
asks rms to state whether access to nancing (including availability and costs) is
an obstacle to the current operations of the establishment. The categorical variable
ranges from 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle).10 We introduce a dummy
7Other studies that use similar proxies for access to external nance are Greenaway et al.
(2007), Berman and Hericourt (2010), and Goerg and Spaliara (2013), among others. For a survey
of empirical studies using rm-level data, see Wagner (2014). Results remain signicant and robust
if we include machinery and equipment in our proxy for tangible assets.
8See Table D.2 in the Empirical Appendix for summary statistics, as well as Tables D.4 and
D.5 for summary statistics by country.
9The data on nancial development is taken from the World Development Indicators of the
World Bank.
10Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2013) use this self-reported information from the 2002 and 2005
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) for 27 transition countries to
analyze the eect of credit constraints on innovation activity.
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Figure 3.1: Within- and between-industry variation of tangible assets
variable for nancially constrained producers which takes the value of 1 if rms per-
ceive access to nancing as a major or very severe obstacle (values 3 and 4 of the
categorical variable). We take means by country as a measure for credit constraints.
3.2.2 Empirical results
The rst pattern decomposes the total variation in the measure for credit access
(tangible over total assets) into within- and between-industry variation. The litera-
ture on international trade stresses the importance of rm heterogeneity. Hence, one
concern could be that the within-industry variation is mainly driven by dierences in
rm characteristics such as size or productivity. To address this, we include a set of
rm-level controls related to productivity, size, legal status and ownership structure.
Figure 3.1 shows results for ve countries at three levels of industry aggregation and
reveals that a substantial part of the variation is within industries. The observed
pattern suggests that producers within the same industry are aected very dierently
by credit constraints, even after controlling for other rm characteristics.11
11The pattern holds for all countries with available data in our sample. Table D.3 in Data
Appendix D.1 shows results for the full set of countries. See Table D.1 for a description of variables.
CHAPTER 3. CAPITAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND TRADE 101
Figure 3.2: TOA and sales variance within-industry (left), within-country (right)
Empirical pattern 1 The majority of variation in nancial constraints is across
rms within industries rather than between industries.
In the following, we relate measures of credit constraints at the industry as well as the
country level to the degree of competition and to the variance of sales. To motivate
the main features of our theoretical model, we focus on simple pairwise correlations
in the main text. Empirical studies show that larger and more productive rms are
less credit-constrained. Hence, a major concern is that the correlations are driven
by rm characteristics. We conduct a regression analysis in Appendix D.2 and show
that our results are robust when we include rm- and industry controls.
Furthermore, we relate the degree of competition to credit constraints. Table 3.1
shows the correlations both at the rm and the industry level. Firms that report
more price-sensitive consumers face stronger credit-rationing. The positive relation-
ship holds at the industry level as well, whereas in industries with a higher degree
of competition a larger fraction of producers is nancially constrained.12
Empirical pattern 2 Industries with a higher degree of product competition show
a larger fraction of nancially constrained rms.
As a next step, we use the mean of the rm-level tangible assets over total assets ratio
to compute a measure for credit access at the industry level. We relate this proxy
to the within-industry variation of rm sales. The left panel of Figure 3.2 depicts
within-industry variances of rm sales, whereas the right panel shows results at the
12Table D.6 in Appendix D.2 shows that the positive relationship between competition and
credit constraints remains robust after controlling for rm characteristics, as well as year and
country xed eects.
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Table 3.1: Correlation credit constraints and competition
Degree of competition Access to nance Share constrained rms
Firm level 0.0832***
Industry level 0.0586**
Obs. 27,474 1,590
Notes: *** indicates 1%, and ** 5% signicance.
country level. To compute the within-industry variances, we restrict our analysis to
sectors with more than 25 rm observations. Figure 3.2 shows that industries with a
higher ratio of tangible over total assets are characterized by a lower within-industry
variance of sales. This relationship is signicantly negative after controlling for year
and country xed eects, and rm characteristics (see Table D.7 in Appendix D.2).
Figure 3.3: Financial development and within-country heterogeneity
We use more recent cross-section data of the WBES for the years 2009 and 2013,
which is available for a larger set of countries, to investigate the relationship between
nancial development and rm heterogeneity at the country level. For the year
2009, the left panel of Figure 3.3 shows a signicantly negative relationship between
domestic credit provided to the private sector (in % of GDP) and the within-country
variance of rm sales. Furthermore, the right panel depicts that higher nancial
development is associated with a lower share of nancially constrained rms within a
country. Table 3.2 summarizes the correlation coecients for both years and further
shows that the share of nancially constrained producers is positively related to the
variance of rm sales in a country.13
13Tables D.7 and D.8 in Appendix D.2 show that empirical pattern 3 still holds after controlling
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Table 3.2: Correlation credit constraints and variance of rm sales
Within-country variance sales Share constrained rms
2009 2013 2009 2013
Private credit / GDP -0.3884*** -0.4312*** -0.4683*** -0.2692*
Obs. 51 39 54 40
Share constrained rms 0.4539*** 0.4051***
Obs. 54 44
Notes: *** indicates 1% signicance, * 10% signicance.
Empirical pattern 3 More nancially constrained industries and countries with
lower nancial development are characterized by a larger variance of rm sales, as
well as a higher share of credit-rationed producers.
Motivated by the rst empirical pattern, the next section introduces a new inter-
national trade model with heterogeneity in credit frictions at the rm level. Our
theoretical framework provides a rationale for empirical patterns 2 and 3. Further-
more, we analyze how globalization induces dierential eects across rms within
industries in the presence of credit frictions. The next section presents the setup of
the theoretical model.
3.3 The model
This section develops a model of international trade with heterogeneity in credit
frictions at the rm level. The world economy consists of k identical countries, each
of which is populated by a number of L consumers and an exogenous mass of m
producers. We motivate nancial frictions by a simple moral hazard problem be-
tween borrowing rms and external investors. The following subsection presents the
demand side of the model, whereas we assume a quadratic specication of prefer-
ences. Subsection 3.3.2 shows how rms behave in the presence of capital market
imperfections depending on their exposure to nancial frictions. The industry equi-
librium, outlined in subsection 3.3.3, is determined by total industry output and an
endogenous share of credit-rationed producers. In subsection 3.3.4, we analyze the
eects of globalization and of an interest rate shock in partial equilibrium.
for rm characteristics and industry eects. For the year 2013, Figure D.1 in Data Appendix D.1
shows the relationship between nancial development and within-country heterogeneity, whereas
Figure D.2 relates the share of nancially constrained rms to the within-country variance of sales.
CHAPTER 3. CAPITAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND TRADE 104
3.3.1 Consumer side
The representative consumer's utility is dened over per variety consumption q(i)
and total consumption Q  R
i2
 q(i)di, where the index i represents one variety and

 is the set of horizontally dierentiated products:
U = aQ  1
2
b

(1  e)
Z
i2

q(i)2di+ eQ2

. (3.1)
The quadratic utility function depends on the non-negative preference parameters
a, b and on an inverse measure of product dierentiation e which lies between 0
and 1. Lower values of e imply that products are more dierentiated and hence
less substitutable. If e = 1, consumers have no taste for diversity in products and
demand depends on aggregate output Q only. Thus, the parameter e determines
the degree of product market competition and is closely related to the competition
variable in our empirical motivation. Consumers maximize utility in equation (3.1)
subject to the budget constraint
R
i2
 p(i)q(i)di  I, where p (i) denotes the price for
variety i and I is individual income.14 The maximization problem yields the linear
inverse demand function:
p(i) = a  b [(1  e)q(i) + eQ] , (3.2)
where  is the marginal utility of income, the Lagrange multiplier attached to the
budget constraint. As rms are innitesimally small in the economy, they take  as
given. In the following, we set the marginal utility of income as the numeraire equal
to one.15 To ensure market-clearing, total output of each rm equals the aggregate
demand of all consumers in the world economy: x(i) = kLq(i). Hence, the inverse
world market demand is given by:
p(i) = a  b0 [(1  e)x(i) + eX] , (3.3)
where a is the consumers' maximum willingness to pay and b0  b
kL
is an inverse
measure for the market size. Finally, X  R
i2
 x (i) di represents the total volume
of varieties produced and consumed in the world economy.
14In general equilibrium, aggregate income consists of rm prots and factor income. We assume
that capital is the only factor of production. Section 3.4 discusses the general equilibrium.
15Using the marginal utility of income as a numeraire ( = 1) is standard in the literature of
oligopoly in general equilibrium (GOLE). See Neary (2003) for further discussion.
CHAPTER 3. CAPITAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND TRADE 105
3.3.2 Firm's maximization problem
The industry consists of an exogenous mass of m rms, each producing a horizon-
tally dierentiated variety i.16 Firms receive revenues p(i)x(i) and have to nance
total variable production costs cx(i) by external capital. There are no xed costs
of production. Motivated by empirical pattern 1, we assume that rms dier in
their exposure to credit constraints. While producers are homogenous in marginal
production costs c, the interaction of rm-level credit frictions and capital market
imperfections creates rm heterogeneity. If nancial institutions are imperfect, only
a fraction of producers can overcome credit frictions, receives the required capital
amount and is able to produce the optimal output. In contrast, rms with high ex-
posure to credit constraints suer from underprovision of external capital and cannot
behave optimally. In equilibrium, the share of nancially unconstrained rms is en-
dogenously determined and aected by trade shocks. As we are interested in the
eects of globalization on producers with dierent exposure to credit constraints, we
do not consider endogenous entry and exit decisions. In the following, we describe
the rm's maximization problem and introduce credit frictions at the rm as well as
the country level.
The decision problem of a producer consists of two stages. At date t = 0, the rm
borrows the credit amount d(i) from an outside investor at the interest rate r. In
partial equilibrium, the interest rate is treated as exogenous, whereas we endogenize
it in general equilibrium as discussed in section 3.4. To motivate credit frictions at
the rm level, we introduce a managerial action which is non-veriable for outside
investors and hence prone to moral hazard.17 After credit provision, the manager
of the rm can choose whether to use the external funds for production or divert
the credit amount and invest it for own purposes. At date t = 1, production yields
prots which consist of revenues net of loan repayment:
(i) = p(i)x(i)  rd(i), (3.4)
16In section 3.6, we endogenize the number of rms by allowing for free entry and show that the
qualitative implications of our model remain robust.
17See Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) as well as Tirole (2006) for moral hazard in corporate nance.
Related papers that introduce credit constraints motivated by moral hazard in a trade context are
Ehrlich and Seidel (2015) and Egger and Keuschnigg (2015).
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whereas the rm faces the following budget constraint:
d(i)  cx(i). (3.5)
Alternatively, the manager can choose to divert the loan without using the provided
capital in the production process. In this case, no revenues are realized and the
loan cannot be repaid. Instead, the manager reaps a share (i) (1  ) of the credit
amount d(i) and invests it on the capital market at interest rate r. Hence, the
non-veriable private benet from managerial misbehavior at date t = 1 is equal to
rd(i)(i) (1  ). This private benet consists of a country-specic and a rm-level
component. We follow Antras et al. (2009) and assume that private benets are
negatively related to the quality of nancial institutions captured by the parameter
 2 [0; 1] : Countries with better nancial institutions (larger ) tend to enforce laws
that limit the ability of managers to divert funds or enjoy private benets.18
In contrast to standard moral hazard approaches, we assume that producers are uni-
formly distributed at the unit interval and are heterogeneous in (i) 2 [0; 1], which
we denote the agency costs of a rm i. A higher (i) increases the private bene-
t and thus the incentive for managerial misbehavior. This assumption introduces
heterogeneity in credit constraints at the rm level. The agency costs (i) can be
interpreted in two ways. First, the parameter may capture dierences in managerial
incentives to divert external funds. This could be the case if managers attach dier-
ent values to the misuse of loans. Second, a high (i) might reect a larger scope
for managerial misbehavior as investment projects are opaque or corporate control
is weak. To prevent misbehavior of agents and thus losses from lending, investors
have to ensure that the following incentive constraint holds:
(i)  (i) (1  ) rd(i): (3.6)
At period t = 1, prots in case of production and loan repayment have to be (weakly)
higher than private benets in case of misbehavior. Rearranging equation (3.6) shows
that moral hazard restricts the pledgeability of sales and thus the borrowing capacity:
d(i)  p(i)x(i)
r [1 + (i) (1  )] : (3.7)
18See Tirole (2006) as well as Antras et al. (2009) for a similar notion of nancial contract
enforcement in models with moral hazard.
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Firms with high agency costs (i) derive large private benets from diverting the
loan. Hence, investors restrict credit provision to prevent managerial misbehavior. If
nancial institutions are perfect ( = 1), managers have no incentives to misbehave
and equation (3.6) collapses to a zero-prot condition. In this case, dierences in
agency costs (i) play no role and rms are homogenous. In contrast, if nancial
institutions are imperfect ( < 1), rm-specic moral hazard divides agents into two
groups. First, producers with relatively low (i) choose the optimal output level as
the nancial constraint is not binding. Second, rms with higher agency costs face
credit rationing and have to restrict production. To solve for outputs and prices,
rms maximize prots (3.4), subject to the budget constraint (3.5) and the nancial
constraint (3.7).
Constrained rms For rms with high agency costs (i), the nancial constraint
is binding such that the constrained price equals eective marginal production costs:
pC () = cr [1 + (i) (1  )] : (3.8)
Producing one unit of the good yields the price pC () which has to compensate
for the marginal production costs cr and the opportunity costs of diligent behavior
cr(i) (1  ). The quantity oered by credit-rationed producers is given by:
xC () =
a  b0eX   cr [1 + (i) (1  )]
b0 (1  e) : (3.9)
More nancially constrained rms with a higher value of (i) face larger opportunity
costs of production and have to set higher prices, which results in lower outputs.
Unconstrained rms For unconstrained rms, the nancial constraint is not
binding such that optimal output is independent of (i):
xU =
a  b0eX   cr
b0 (2  e) : (3.10)
By inserting equation (3.10) into the inverse demand function (3.3), we derive the
optimal price of unconstrained rms:
pU =
a  b0eX + (1  e) cr
2  e : (3.11)
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In our model, the only source of rm heterogeneity occurs in . As optimal output
(3.10) and prices (3.11) do not depend on , all unconstrained producers behave in
the same way. It can be shown that unconstrained rms charge lower prices and
oer larger quantities compared to credit-rationed producers.
)(, bCU xx
bb
~ 1
)1( =bCx
0
Ux
)(bCx
Figure 3.4: Output prole of constrained and unconstrained rms
3.3.3 Industry equilibrium
In equilibrium, we derive a critical value of agency costs e above which rms are
nancially constrained. We exploit that for the marginal unconstrained producer the
nancial constraint (3.6) is just binding and insert the optimal output from equation
(3.10), which leads to: e = a  b0eX   cr
(2  e) (1  ) cr : (3.12)
The share of nancially constrained rms is given by 1 e, which corresponds to the
fraction in empirical patterns 2 and 3. In a particular industry, a fraction e of rms
is unconstrained and chooses the identical optimal output as shown in Figure 3.4.
Following equation (3.9), output of constrained rms decreases in agency costs .
Consistent with our empirical motivation, the share of nancially constrained pro-
ducers depends negatively on nancial development and positively on the degree of
product market competition. We show that stronger competition (larger e) reduces
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the critical value e, conditional on industry characteristics:
@e
@e
=
a  cr   2b0X
(1  ) (2  e)2 cr < 0: (3.13)
Proposition 3.1 The share of nancially unconstrained rms e decreases in the
degree of product market competition e.
Proof. Equation (3.13) is negative if X > a cr
2b0 . Exploiting expression (3.10) and
rearranging yields X > xU , which is always satised.
The negative relationship between e and e corresponds to our empirical motivation.
The survey question exploited in empirical pattern 2 reects the price sensitivity
that a producer faces within an industry, which is captured by the parameter e in
our model. A larger substitutability (higher e) increases the degree of competition
as consumers react more sensitive to an increase in prices. This competition eect
reduces rm sales and thus the pledgeable income, such that more producers be-
come nancially constrained. Consistent with empirical pattern 3, a higher quality
of nancial institutions  reduces the fraction of credit-rationed producers. Further-
more, conditional on industry output X, the share of constrained rms increases in
credit costs cr.
To arrive at an output prole as depicted in Figure 3.4, we impose two conditions.
First, to ensure that both groups of rms occur, the threshold value e has to be
smaller than one.
Condition 3.1 e < 1 if a b0eX
cr
< 1 + (1  ) (2  e)
Second, the output of the rm with the highest agency costs,  (i) = 1, has to be
positive. Otherwise it would not be active in the market.
Condition 3.2 xC ( = 1) > 0 if
a b0eX
cr
> 2  
Inserting Condition 3.2 in equation (3.12) leads to a lower limit value for the share
of unconstrained rms el = 12 e . To determine the industry equilibrium, average
output ex in the economy can be expressed as:
ex = Z e
0
xUdi +
Z 1
e xC () di: (3.14)
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Figure 3.5: Industry equilibrium and trade liberalization
Inserting the outputs (3.9) and (3.10) in equation (3.14), and aggregating leads to:
ex =

2  e  e a  h2  e  e + (2  e)1  e0c (1  )i cr
b0

(2  e) (1  e) +

2  e  e ekm ; (3.15)
with 0c  11 e
R 1e  (i) di being the average agency costs within the group of con-
strained producers. Figure 3.5 depicts the industry equilibrium. As the world
economy consists of m producers in k countries, the aggregate output is given by
X = kmex. Equations (3.12) and (3.15) represent two relationships between the
endogenous variables e and ex. The curve Cutoff : e (ex) illustrates equation (3.12)
and determines the fraction of nancially constrained rms dependent on average in-
dustry output. Intuitively, the negative slope captures the fact that higher industry
scale increases competition and forces more rms into the constrained status. The
curve Scale: ex(e) is derived from equation (3.15) and reects that with a higher
critical value e more rms are unconstrained and thus choose optimal output levels.
Hence, average industry scale increases. The intersection of the two curves in Figure
3.5 characterizes the industry equilibrium.
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3.3.4 Comparative statics in partial equilibrium
The previous section has characterized the partial equilibrium in the economy. In a
next step, we investigate how globalization and an exogenous change in the interest
rate aect the industry. All results are derived by total dierentiation of the two
equilibrium conditions (3.12) and (3.15).19 Furthermore, section 3.6 extends the
model by free entry and endogenizes the number of producers.
Globalization Following Eckel and Neary (2010), we interpret globalization as an
increase in the number of countries k in the integrated world economy. This shock
aects optimal rm behavior through two channels. On the one hand, producers face
a market size eect which corresponds to an increase in the number of consumers
L. On the other hand, globalization is associated with stronger competition from
foreign rms. This competition eect works like a rise in the number of producers
m. To gain intuition for the eects of globalization, we analyze the two channels
separately. From equation (3.3), we observe that a larger market rotates the inverse
world demand outwards without aecting the intercept. Thus, rms face a larger
demand and raise output levels resulting in a one-to-one increase in industry scale.
This market size eect is counteracted but not outweighed by tougher competition.
Consequently, globalization increases average industry scale:
d ln ex
d ln k
= 1|{z}
Market size eect
 

2  e  e ekm
(2  e) (1  e) +

2  e  e ekm| {z }
Competition eect
> 0: (3.16)
The positive market size eect shifts the curve Scale: ex(e) upwards and the curve
Cutoff : e (ex) outwards in Figure 3.5. A larger market increases the pledgeable in-
come and thus relaxes the nancial constraint (3.7). As Figure 3.5 shows, the change
in market size does not aect the share of credit-rationed producers in equilibrium.
However, the competition eect leads to a partial backward shift of the two curves.
A greater number of competitors producing at a larger average scale ex aggravates
19See Appendix C.1 for a detailed derivation.
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nancial constraints and increases the share of credit-rationed rms:
d ln e
d ln k
=   (1  e) b
0eX
(1  ) cre h(2  e) (1  e) + 2  e  e ekmi| {z }
Competition eect
< 0: (3.17)
Tougher competition reduces rm revenues and therefore pledgeable income as shown
by equation (3.7). If goods are perfectly dierentiated (e = 0), the competition
eect disappears and globalization leads to a one-to-one increase in output without
aecting the share of nancially constrained producers.
Proposition 3.2 In partial equilibrium, globalization increases industry scale as the
positive market size eect dominates the counteracting competition eect. The latter
raises the share of nancially constrained producers (lower e).
Borrowing costs In this section, we analyze the eects of an exogenous change
in the interest rate r. An increase in the borrowing costs reduces average industry
scale ex and forces more producers into the constrained status:
d ln ex
d ln r
< 0 ;
d ln e
d ln r
< 0: (3.18)
Proposition 3.3 In partial equilibrium, an exogenous increase in the borrowing rate
leads to a higher share of nancially constrained rms and reduces industry scale.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
For both groups, an increase in the borrowing rate has a direct negative impact on
rm outputs, whereby the eect is stronger for credit-rationed rms. By comparing
equations (3.9) and (3.10), this can be explained by the agency problem, which leads
to higher eective marginal production costs for nancially constrained producers.
Whereas credit-rationed agents experience strong contraction, total dierentiation of
equation (3.10) shows a counteracting competition eect for unconstrained rms:20
d lnxU
d ln r
=   cr
b0 (2  e)xU
0BB@1 + eb0Xcr d ln exd ln r| {z }
( )
1CCA 7 0: (3.19)
20See Appendix C.1 for an explicit derivation of the expression d ln exd ln r < 0.
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Besides the direct negative impact of a higher interest rate, unconstrained producers
optimally react to the reduction in industry scale by an increase of output. If varieties
are perfectly dierentiated (e = 0), the latter eect vanishes and unconstrained rms
clearly reduce sales. However, the larger is the substitutability of goods, the more
unconstrained rms benet from reductions of rival rms' outputs.
3.4 General equilibrium
The partial equilibrium analysis is based on the assumption that the interest rate is
exogenously given. This implies that capital supply is completely elastic. In the next
subsection, we endogenize the interest rate by introducing a simple capital market
with xed supply. Our results can be interpreted as a short-run equilibrium as we
abstract from endogenous entry and exit decisions of rms (see section 3.6 for an
extension with free entry). Furthermore, we do not allow for adjustments of capital
supply. After trade liberalization, the borrowing rate increases caused by higher
capital demand. In the long-run, this eect might be counteracted by an increase
in capital supply or capital market liberalization. In the following, we analyze how
endogenous adjustments of borrowing costs aect the implications of globalization.
Furthermore, we show the impact of nancial development in general equilibrium.
3.4.1 Capital market clearing
Each rm has to cover variable production costs by external nance and hence
demands cxj (i) units of capital, with j 2 C;U . We assume that the economy is
endowed with a xed amount of capital KS. In equilibrium, the inelastic supply of
capital has to be equal to total capital demand KD of m rms in a country:
KS = KD = cm
 Z e
0
xUdi+
Z 1
e xC () di
!
= cmex: (3.20)
By evaluating equilibrium condition (3.20), we explicitly solve for the interest rate:
r =

2  e  e a  b0 (2  e) (1  e) + 2  e  e ekm KS
cmh
2  e  e + (2  e)1  e0c (1  )i c : (3.21)
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Figure 3.6: Globalization in general equilibrium
We add equation (3.20) to the system of equations from the partial equilibrium anal-
ysis (3.12) and (3.15). In general equilibrium, prots and capital income determine
the aggregate income of consumers I. A rise in the interest rate r has no eect on
aggregate income as the resulting increase in capital earnings is exactly oset by a
decrease in rm prots.
3.4.2 Comparative statics in general equilibrium
We analyze the eects of globalization and changes in nancial development in gen-
eral equilibrium. As capital market clearing pins down average industry scale ex,
we express our equilibrium by two equations in the endogenous variables r and e.
The curve CUT : e (r) in Figure 3.6 combines capital market clearing (3.20) with
the nancial condition (3.12). Intuitively, the curve is downward sloping as a higher
interest rate increases the share of nancially constrained rms and thus reduces the
cuto value e. The curve CME: r(e) is derived by inserting equation (3.20) into
(3.15), and illustrates the relationship between r and e, such that the capital market
is in equilibrium. A higher share of unconstrained producers leads to an increase of
average output and to higher capital demand. To ensure capital market clearing,
the interest rate has to rise.21
21In section 3.6, we show that capital demand still increases after globalization with free entry.
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Globalization In general equilibrium, the xed capital amount determines average
industry output. Therefore, in contrast to section 3.4, globalization (an increase in
k) has no eect on industry scale:
d ln ex
d ln k
= 0: (3.22)
Globalization leads to an upward shift of the curve CME: r(e) in Figure 3.6. For
a given share of nancially constrained rms, the dominating market size eect
increases capital demand resulting in a higher interest rate:
d ln r
d ln k
> 0: (3.23)
This result is based on the assumption of xed capital supply. An increase in the
interest rate occurs as long as capital supply KS is not completely elastic and trade
liberalization is not accompanied by large capital inows. The curve CUT : e (r) is
unaected, such that the new equilibrium is characterized by the intersection point
with the new capital market clearing condition. Consequently, the share of nan-
cially constrained producers increases, as higher borrowing costs impose stronger
restrictions on the nancial constraint:
d ln e
d ln k
< 0: (3.24)
Proposition 3.4 In general equilibrium, globalization increases the interest rate and
the share of nancially constrained rms, but has no eect on industry scale.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Comparing equations (3.17) and (3.24) shows that globalization leads to a stronger
increase in the share of nancially constrained producers in general equilibrium (see
Appendix C.2 for a formal proof). This result is driven by the endogenous increase
in borrowing costs which forces more rms into the constrained status. In contrast to
partial equilibrium, the increase in the interest rate leads to dierent rm responses
after globalization:
d lnxU
d ln k
= 1  cr
a  b0eX   cr
d ln r
d ln k
> 0; (3.25)
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d lnxC ()
d ln k
= 1  [1 + (i) (1  )] cr
a  b0eX   cr [1 + (i) (1  )]
d ln r
d ln k
< 0: (3.26)
The increase in the number of countries k aects optimal rm behavior in two
opposing ways. As shown in partial equilibrium, the market size eect dominates
the competition eect which induces rms to increase outputs. The endogenous
adjustment of the interest rate in general equilibrium counteracts the positive impact
of globalization. The latter eect especially hurts nancially constrained producers
with high agency costs (i), shown by the larger weight of the interest rate in
equation (3.26) compared to unconstrained rms (3.25).
Proposition 3.5 In general equilibrium, globalization leads to an output expansion
among unconstrained rms, whereas nancially constrained producers have to reduce
output due to increased capital costs.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
The expansion among unconstrained rms is illustrated in Figure 3.7 by an upward
shift of the output prole. In contrast, credit-rationed producers suer from in-
creased capital costs and decrease output depending on their agency costs. As the
most constrained rm with  = 1 faces the strongest output reduction, the con-
strained output prole rotates clockwise. The slope is given by   cr(1 )
b0(1 e) (compare
equation (3.9)), and increases in the interest rate and the market size. The dieren-
tial responses across the two groups of producers increase the variance of output and
prices within the industry. This result will be crucial for the welfare consequences
which we discuss in more detail in section 3.5. As average industry scale is unaf-
fected due to xed capital supply, the output gain of unconstrained rms (region A
in Figure 3.7) osets the contraction of credit-rationed producers (region B).
Financial development An increase in  reduces the incentives to reap private
benets and enhances the pledgeability of revenues. This shock can be interpreted
as an improvement of nancial contract enforcement. Comparable to trade liberal-
ization, there is no eect on aggregate output due to xed capital supply. However,
an increase in  relaxes the nancial constraint (3.7) and increases the share of
unconstrained producers in the economy:
d ln e
d ln
> 0: (3.27)
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Figure 3.7: Output proles and globalization
Furthermore, the increase in pledgeable income translates into higher capital demand
and thus a higher borrowing rate:
d ln r
d ln
> 0: (3.28)
Note that this result holds under the assumption of xed capital supply. Hence, a
higher quality of nancial institutions only aects capital demand.22
Proposition 3.6 In general equilibrium, higher nancial development decreases the
share of nancially constrained rms.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
An improvement in the quality of nancial institutions increases the borrowing ca-
pacity of credit-rationed rms. This direct positive eect is counteracted by an
increase in capital costs. Whereas nancially constrained rms expand output, un-
constrained producers do not benet from better nancial development, but face a
higher interest rate:
d lnxU
d ln
=   cr
(2  e) b0xU
d ln r
d ln
< 0; (3.29)
d lnxC
d ln
=
cr
(1  e) b0xC

 (i)  [1 + (1  ) (i)] d ln r
d ln

> 0: (3.30)
22Appendix C.1 provides the eects of nancial development in partial equilibrium which are
not discussed in the main text.
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Figure 3.8: Output pro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nancial development
Consequently, an increase in nancial development induces a reallocation of market
shares towards credit-rationed producers. This eect can be seen graphically by a
downward shift of the unconstrained output prole, as well as an outward rotation
of the output line for constrained rms in Figure 3.8. Hence, higher nancial devel-
opment reduces the within-industry variance of sales, which provides a rationale for
empirical pattern 3.
Proposition 3.7 In general equilibrium, higher nancial development reduces the
variance of sales within an industry as nancially constrained rms expand outputs
at the expense of unconstrained producers.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
3.5 Welfare
This section analyzes how globalization aects welfare. In a rst step, we derive a
welfare measure for a representative consumer. We use the latter for a numerical
simulation of the eects of trade liberalization on welfare.
3.5.1 Indirect utility
As an appropriate measure for welfare, we derive the indirect utility function for a
representative consumer associated with the preference structure in equation (3.1).
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As we choose the marginal utility of income as numeraire ( = 1), indirect utility
can be expressed as follows:
U = km
a2(1  e) + ekm  pU + pC2   [1 + e (km  1)] (2c + 2u)
2b(1  e) [1 + e (km  1)] : (3.31)
The welfare measure increases in the rst moments of prices for unconstrained and
constrained rms respectively, pU =
R e
0
pUdi, pC =
R 1e pC()di, and decreases in the
second moments of prices for both groups, 2U =
R e
0
(pU)
2 di and 2C =
R 1e (pC())2 di.
The structure of the utility function is comparable to welfare measures in general
oligopolistic equilibrium models.23 In these papers, welfare decreases in the variance
of prices, which in our case would be dened as 2j = 
2
j  
 
pj
2
for j 2 C;U .
Two important properties of the welfare function will be crucial for the subsequent
analysis. Following from the preference structure in equation (3.1), consumers love
variety and dislike heterogeneity in consumption levels and prices.
3.5.2 Welfare eects of trade liberalization
The aim of this section is to analyze the welfare implications of globalization. We
simulate the responses of welfare (3.31) to globalization and compare results in par-
tial and general equilibrium.24 Similar to our previous analysis, we rst consider
only the market size eect of globalization (change in the number of consumers L).
Subsequently, we take into account that trade liberalization increases competition
and the number of varieties available to consumers (change in k).
Market size eect The market size eect reects increased export opportunities
after globalization. The left panel of Figure 3.9 shows that a larger market has no
eect on welfare in partial equilibrium (PE), but leads to welfare losses in general
equilibrium (GE). This dierence is driven by the endogenous adjustment of the
borrowing rate when the capital market equilibrium is taken into account.
As equation (3.31) shows, welfare depends on the rst and second moments of prices
for both groups. In partial equilibrium, an increase in the market size L leads
to a proportional expansion of output among all rms without aecting optimal
price setting and the share of unconstrained rms e (compare subsection 3.3.4).
23Compare e.g. Neary (2009), among others.
24We simulate the model in general equilibrium with MATLAB. The simulation code is available
from the authors upon request.
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Figure 3.9: Welfare eects of market size (L) and globalization (k)
Thus, welfare does not respond to changes in the market size as the rst and second
moments of prices remain constant. In contrast, increased capital demand raises
the interest rate in general equilibrium which leads to a higher variance of prices
and thus to welfare losses. As discussed in subsection 3.4.2, higher borrowing costs
increase the within-industry variance of prices in two ways. First, a larger fraction
of rms becomes nancially constrained (lower e). Second, unconstrained producers
expand output at the expense of credit-rationed rms.
Globalization By considering the eect of an increase in the number of countries
k; we introduce two additional channels how globalization inuences welfare (3.31).
In contrast to the left graph, the right panel of Figure 3.9 shows that globaliza-
tion leads to welfare gains both in partial and general equilibrium, resulting from
(i) lower prices due to increased competition, and (ii) larger consumption variety.
Importantly, the positive welfare eects are considerably lower in general equilib-
rium. The partial equilibrium analysis reects well-known gains from trade through
competition and larger variety. However, our model stresses an additional negative
welfare channel of globalization driven by an increase in capital costs. Whereas un-
constrained rms benet from trade liberalization due to the positive market size
eect, the higher interest rate especially hurts the most constrained producers (with
high values of ). Compared to existing work, the negative welfare channel of a
larger market is driven by two components of our model. First, the introduction
of heterogeneity in nancial frictions at the rm level induces endogenous selection
of producers into unconstrained and constrained groups. Second, capital market
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clearing in general equilibrium determines the interest rate which increases with
globalization. In the presence of rm-specic credit frictions and endogenous capital
costs, trade liberalization leads to a larger variance of prices and reduces positive
welfare eects. Table 3.3 shows outcomes of endogenous variables for dierent values
of market size L and the number of countries k.
Table 3.3: Numerical simulation of trade liberalization
L UPE UGE XPE XGE ePE eGE rPE rGE
1 4185:43 4185:44 25:00 25:00 0:83 0:83 1:38 1:38
1:05 4185:43 4020:04 26:25 25:00 0:83 0:77 1:38 1:44
1:10 4185:43 3865:51 27:50 25:00 0:83 0:73 1:38 1:49
1:15 4185:43 3721:02 28:75 25:00 0:83 0:70 1:38 1:54
1:20 4185:43 3585:79 30:00 25:00 0:83 0:67 1:38 1:58
1:25 4185:43 3471:36 31:12 25:00 0:83 0:64 1:38 1:61
k UPE UGE XPE XGE ePE eGE rPE rGE
1 4185:43 4185:44 25:00 25:00 0:83 0:83 1:38 1:38
1:05 4321:50 4203:75 25:85 25:00 0:82 0:78 1:38 1:42
1:10 4452:66 4219:42 26:68 25:00 0:81 0:74 1:38 1:46
1:15 4579:11 4232:84 27:48 25:00 0:80 0:71 1:38 1:49
1:20 4701:08 4244:33 28:25 25:00 0:79 0:68 1:38 1:51
1:25 4807:18 4253:25 28:92 25:00 0:78 0:66 1:38 1:54
Notes: The table presents outcomes of endogenous variables for dif-
ferent values of L and k. The following parameter values are chosen:
a = 100, b = 1, m = 2; e = 0:3; c = 30,  = 0:25; KS = 1500:
Policy implications The negative welfare channel of globalization is especially
relevant if nancial development is low and credit frictions are signicant. From
a policy perspective, our model implies that trade liberalization should be accom-
panied by nancial reforms that aim to mitigate negative eects. To do so, our
theoretical framework suggests two potential policy measures: an improvement in
the quality of nancial institutions  or an increase in capital supply KS. Both mea-
sures reduce price heterogeneity and hence dampen potential welfare losses, but work
through dierent channels. An increase in  alleviates credit frictions and induces a
reallocation of market shares towards nancially constrained producers (subsection
3.4.2). As a second measure, globalization should be accompanied by an increase in
capital supply KS to weaken the increase in borrowing costs which benets all rms.
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3.6 Model extension with free entry
Our model abstracts from endogenous entry and exit decisions of rms. In this
section, we allow for free entry, which endogenizes the number of rms m, and show
that the implications of the model are robust to this extension. We introduce an
entry stage, at which each rm pays a xed cost fE and draws a value for , which
is uniformly distributed along the unit interval. Hence, before producers know their
agency costs, expected prots E have to be equal to the entry costs:
E =
Z e
0
Udi+
Z b
e C()di = fE; (3.32)
whereas b is the agency cost parameter of the most credit-rationed rm in the
market. This marginal producer is determined by xC(b) = 0. Evaluating equation
(3.9) at b yields: b = a  b0ekmex  cr
(1  ) cr : (3.33)
Conditions (3.32) and (3.33) determine the cuto value b and the number of rmsm.
Comparing equations (3.12) and (3.33) leads to the following relationship between
the share of unconstrained rms and the cuto value: e = b
2 e . By using this
property and evaluating equation (3.32), the cuto value can be expressed as follows:
b3 = 6b0fE (2  e)3 (1  e)
[(1  ) cr]2 [e2 (6  e) + 5 (2  3e)] : (3.34)
We analyze how globalization aects the economy with free entry and compare re-
sults to subsection 3.3.4. Analogous to equation (3.14), industry scale is now given
by the average output of surviving rms:
ex = 1b
"Z e
0
xUdi+
Z b
e xC()di
#
; (3.35)
which can be expressed as a function of b:
ex = b (1  ) cr [e2 + 3  4e]
2b0 (2  e)2 (1  e) : (3.36)
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Hence, our equilibrium with free entry consists of three equations with the unknownsex, b; and m. As before, globalization is modelled by an increase in the number of
countries k. Allowing for free entry leads to a new channel of adjustment compared
to subsection 3.3.4. Foreign competition forces producers with high agency costs to
exit the market which is captured by a decrease in the cuto value b:
d ln b
d ln k
< 0. (3.37)
Furthermore, the number of rms reacts to globalization as follows:
d lnm
d ln k
=  1 + a  cr
3b0eX
? 0. (3.38)
The net eect depends on the degree of competition. If the substitutability of prod-
ucts is high (large e), globalization reduces the number of domestic rms.
Proposition 3.8 With free entry, globalization forces the most nancially constrained
producers to exit the market. The number of rms decreases if the degree of compe-
tition is suciently high.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
Comparable to Proposition 3.2, globalization leads to an increase in average industry
scale and a higher share of nancially constrained producers:
d ln ex
d ln k
> 0;
d ln e
d ln k
< 0. (3.39)
Hence, the eects of globalization are robust to free entry. In section 3.4, we in-
troduce a capital market equilibrium and show that globalization leads to a higher
within-industry variance of rm sales and prices. This eect is driven by an increase
in capital demand which raises the interest rate. To show that this channel of ad-
justment is still present, capital demand has to increase even with free entry. As
the number of domestic rms could fall after globalization (see Proposition 3.8), the
eect on aggregate capital demand cmex might be reversed. Solving for the number
of rms from equation (3.33) and multiplying with equation (3.36), leads to total
output of domestic producers:
mex =
h
a  cr   b (1  ) criL
be
: (3.40)
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This expression only depends on the cuto value b which decreases with globaliza-
tion. Hence, aggregate capital demand is clearly increasing with free entry. This
implies that the driving force behind the raise in the interest rate remains when the
number of rms is endogenous.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has developed a new international trade model with rm-specic credit
frictions and endogenous adjustments of capital costs in general equilibrium. A key
element of our model is that rm heterogeneity results from the interaction of credit
constraints at the rm level with capital market imperfections at the country level.
Credit frictions arise from a simple moral hazard problem, whereas rms dier in
their incentive to divert external funds. If nancial institutions are imperfect, this
agency problem reduces the pledgeability of sales and causes credit-rationing for
some producers. Our model is consistent with new empirical patterns from the En-
terprise Surveys data of the World Bank. We show that the majority of variation in
nancial constraints is across rms within an industry rather than between indus-
tries. This motivates the analysis of rm-specic nancial frictions in our theoretical
model. Furthermore, we highlight that credit frictions are positively related to the
degree of product market competition, and to the variance of sales across rms. Our
theoretical framework provides a rationale for these patterns.
We use this model to analyze the eects of globalization on rm performance and
welfare. The main idea is that endogenous adjustments of capital costs represent
an additional channel which reduces gains from trade. Trade liberalization increases
the borrowing rate, induces a within-industry reallocation of prots towards uncon-
strained rms at the expense of nancially constrained producers, and raises the
share of credit-rationed producers. We show that these adjustments increase the
variance of prices and reduce welfare.
From a policy perspective, our model implies that trade liberalization could lead to
negative welfare eects and should be accompanied by nancial reforms to coun-
teract an increase in within-industry heterogeneity across rms. This implication is
especially relevant in developing countries where credit frictions are signicant and
nancial development is low.
Appendix C
Mathematical Appendix
C.1 Comparative statics in partial equilibrium
The partial equilibrium is characterized by two endogenous variables e and ex in
equations (3.12) and (3.15). Totally dierentiating the two equilibrium conditions
and writing the results in matrix notation yields:"
(2  e) (1  e) +

2  e  e ekm 0
em (1  ) (2  e) crL
#

"
bexd ln exed ln e
#
=
+
"
(2  e) (1  e) +

2  e  e ekm
em
# exbd lnL+ "(2  e)1  e0cke (2  e)
#
crLd ln
+
"ex (2  e) (1  e) b
0
#
d ln k  
"
2  e  e kb
b
#
emexd lnm
 
"
2  e  e k + (2  e)1  e0c (1  ) k
1 + e (1  ) (2  e)
#
crLd ln r:
The determinant of the coecient matrix is given by:
 = (1  ) (2  e) crL
h
(2  e) (1  e) +

2  e  e ekmi > 0:
In the following, we prove Proposition 3.3 in subsection 3.3.4, and show partial
equilibrium results for a change in the nancial development parameter .
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Proposition 3.3 (Interest rate eect) In partial equilibrium, we analyze the
eects of an exogenous change in the interest rate r. The eect on average industry
scale ex is given by:
d ln ex
d ln r
=  
h
2  e  e+ (2  e)1  e0c (1  )i crh
(2  e) (1  e) +

2  e  e ekmi b0ex < 0. (C.1)
The eect on the cuto e is given by:
d ln e
d ln r
=  
1  e+ (1  )
h
(1  e) (2  e) e + ekm(2  e) e   1+e2
2
i
(1  )L
h
(2  e) (1  e) +

2  e  e ekmi e < 0. (C.2)
To derive the latter expression, note that

1  e0c = R 1e idi = 1 e22 .
Proof. To show that d ln
e
d ln r
< 0, it is sucient to prove that (2  e) e   1+e2
2
> 0.
As the latter expression increases in e, we insert the lowest possible cuto valueel = 12 e (see Condition 3.2 in subsection 3.3.3), which leads to (2 e)2 12(2 e)2 > 0.
Financial development For the sake of completeness, we present the results for
an exogenous change in the parameter , which are not discussed in the main body
of the chapter. The eect on average industry scale ex is given by:
d ln ex
d ln
=
(2  e)

1  e0ccrh
(2  e) (1  e) +

2  e  e ekmi b0ex > 0: (C.3)
The solution for the eect on the cuto value is:
d ln e
d ln
=

1  
(1  e) (2  e) e + ekm(2  e) e   1+e2
2

h
(2  e) (1  e) +

2  e  e ekmi e > 0; (C.4)
whereby the proof of Proposition 3.3 ensures that d ln
e
d ln
> 0.
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C.2 Comparative statics in general equilibrium
In general equilibrium, the three endogenous variables e, ex, and r are determined in
equations (3.12), (3.15), and (3.20). Totally dierentiating these expressions results
in the following matrix equation:
24b
h
(2  e) (1  e) +

2  e  e ekmi 0 h2  e  e + (2  e)1  e0c (1  )i k
bem (1  ) (2  e) crL 1 + e (1  ) (2  e)
cm 0 0
35
24 exd ln exed ln e
cLrd ln r
35 =
24exb (2  e) (1  e)0
0
35 d ln k +
24

1  e0cke
0
35 (2  e) crLd ln+
2400
1
35Ksd lnKs,
whereas the determinant of the coecient matrix is given by:
GE =   (1  ) (2  e)
h
2  e  e+ (2  e)1  e0c (1  )i rc3L2km < 0:
Proposition 3.4 (Globalization) In general equilibrium, a higher number of
countries k increases the interest rate:
d ln r
d ln k
=
(2  e) (1  e) b0ex
2  e  e a  h(2  e) (1  e) + 2  e  e ekmi b0ex > 0: (C.5)
The eect of globalization on the cuto level e is given by:
d ln e
d ln k
=  
(1  e)
h
1 + e (1  ) (2  e)i b0ex
(1  )
h
2  e  e+ (2  e)1  e0c (1  )i cre < 0: (C.6)
Comparing the eects on e in partial (3.17) and general equilibrium (C.6), leads to:d ln ed ln k

GE
 
d ln ed ln k

PE
=
(2  e)
h
(1  e)
h
1 + e (1  ) (2  e)i+ ekm (1  ) he (2  e)  e2   1 e22 ii
k
h
2  e  e+ (2  e)1  e0c (1  )i h(2  e) (1  e) + 2  e  e ekmi > 0;
whereas the proof in Proposition 3.3 ensures that the last term is positive.
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Proposition 3.5 (Firm-level eects of globalization) Inserting the interest
rate eect of globalization (C.5) into equations (3.25) and (3.26), leads to:
d lnxU
d ln k
= 1  ex
xU
1  e
2  e  e + (2  e)1  e0c (1  ) > 0; (C.7)
d lnxC ()
d ln k
= 1  ex
xC ()
2  e+ (i) (1  ) (2  e)
2  e  e + (2  e)1  e0c (1  ) < 0: (C.8)
As xU > ex and 1 e2 e e+(2 e)(1 e)0c(1 ) < 1, the eect of globalization on uncon-
strained output (C.7) is clearly positive. For constrained rms, note that xC () < ex.
Proof. A sucient condition for a negative eect of globalization on constrained
output is that the last fraction of expression (C.8) is larger than one. This is the
case if (i) > 1 
e2
2
. Evaluating this condition for the marginal rm with (i) = e
and inserting the lower bound el leads to   12 e2 + e2 e > 0. Thus, the eect of
globalization is negative for all rms with (i)  e.
Proposition 3.6 (Financial development) The eect of nancial development
on the cuto level e is positive, following the proof in Proposition 3.3:
d ln e
d ln
=

h
(2  e) e   1+e2
2
i
(1  )
h
2  e  e+ (2  e)1  e0c (1  )i e > 0: (C.9)
The eect of a change in  on the interest rate is given by:
d ln r
d ln
=
(2  e)

1  e0c
2  e  e+ (2  e)1  e0c (1  ) > 0: (C.10)
Proposition 3.7 (Firm-level eects of nancial development) To show that
the eect of nancial development on constrained output (3.30) is unambiguously
positive, we insert expression (C.10), resulting in:
d lnxC
d ln
=
cr
xCb0 (1  e)
24

2  e  e  (2  e)1  e0c
2  e  e+ (2  e)1  e0c (1  )
35 > 0: (C.11)
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Proof. As the numerator of the term in brackets increases in e, we insert the lower
bound el = 12 e , which leads to (2 e)2 12(2 e) > 0.
C.3 Comparative statics with free entry
This section presents comparative static results for a globalization shock (increase
in number of countries k) in the case of free entry. The three endogenous variables
m, b, and ex are determined in equations (3.33), (3.34), and (3.36). We totally
dierentiate these expressions which leads to the following system of equations:2642b
0 (2  e)2 (1  e)   (1  ) cr  e2 + 3  4e 0
0 3 [(1  ) cr]2 e2 (6  e) + 5 (2  3e) b2 0
b0emk (1  ) cr b0ekex
375

264 exd ln exbd ln b
md lnm
375 =
264 2b
0ex (2  e)2 (1  e)
 6b0fE (2  e)3 (1  e)
0
375 d ln k:
The determinant of the coecient matrix is given by:
FE = 6b
02ekex (2  e)2 (1  e) [(1  ) cr]2 e2 (6  e) + 5 (2  3e) b2 > 0:
Proposition 3.8 The eect of globalization on the cuto value b can be written
as follows:
d ln b
d ln k
=   2b
0fE (2  e)3 (1  e)
[(1  ) cr]2 [e2 (6  e) + 5 (2  3e)] b3 < 0; (C.12)
and the impact on the number of rms m is given by:
d lnm
d ln k
=
2fE (2  e)3 (1  e)
h
3b (1  ) cr   2 (a  cr)i
[(1  ) cr]2 [e2 (6  e) + 5 (2  3e)] eXb3 7 0: (C.13)
Combining expressions (3.33) and (3.34) with equation (C.13), leads to result (3.38)
in Proposition 3.8. Furthermore, the impact of globalization on average industry
scale is clearly positive:
d ln ex
d ln k
=
(2  e) (e2 + 3  4e) fE
(1  ) cr [e2 (6  e) + 5 (2  3e)] exb2 > 0: (C.14)
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Figure D.1: Financial development and within-country heterogeneity, 2013
Figure D.2: Credit constraints and sales variance, 2009 (left) and 2013 (right)
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D.1 Data Appendix
Table D.1: Description of variables
Variable Variable description
Financial variables:
TOA Firm-level tangible assets / total assets, tangible assets=land and buildings
Access to nance Access to nance is obstacle to business: 0=no obstacle, 1=minor obstacle,
2=moderate, 3=major, 4=very severe
Share constrained rms Constrained=1 if rm answered Access to nance with 3 or 4.
Financial development Domestic credit to private sector / GDP
Degree of competition Expected eect of hypothetical 10% price increase of main product on demand:
1=no eect, 2=small decrease, 3=large decrease, 4=customers stop buying.
Firm-level controls:
Size Log number of workers
Labor productivity Log sales / number of workers
Legal status 1=publicly listed, 2=private, 3=cooperative, 4=sole proprietorship, 5=partnership
Age Number of years in business
Exporter =1 if rm exports
Domestic private ownership Percentage of rm owned by domestic private sector
Foreign private ownership Percentage of rm owned by foreign private sector
Government ownership Percentage of rm owned by government / state
Product innovation =1 if rm developed a major new product line in last three years
Process innovation =1 if rm introduced new production technology in last three years
Data source: WBES 2002-2005, 2009, 2013. Financial development: WDI World Bank. Variables reported in
local currency units are converted to 2005 U.S. dollars. Database available at: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
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Table D.2: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Cross-section 2002-2005
Tangible over total assets 13,267 0.21 0.14 0.22 0 1
Share of constrained rms 69,377 0.21 0.18 0.19 0 1
Degree of competition 28,620 2.63 3.00 1.08 1 4
Log sales 13,175 14.05 13.77 2.89 -2.16 28.79
Cross-section 2009
Constrained 18,911 0.30 0 0.46 0 1
Log sales 16,903 12.84 12.82 2.56 0.27 22.65
Cross-section 2013
Constrained 21,067 0.24 0 0.42 0 1
Log sales 16,737 12.28 12.20 2.38 -0.81 28.35
Source: Authors' own computations from the WBES.
Table D.3: Within-industry and between-industry variation of TOA
2-digit 3-digit 4-digit
Country Obs. within between within between within between
Chile 894 89.56 10.44 88.76 11.24 84.24 15.76
El Salvador 349 95.18 4.82 88.2 11.8 79.51 20.49
Guatemala 421 95.48 4.52 92.05 7.95 77.33 22.67
Honduras 401 90.86 9.14 81.63 18.37 76.45 23.55
Madagascar 123 91.46 8.54 80.64 19.36 78.11 21.89
South Africa 495 98.48 1.52 86.74 13.26 76.75 23.25
Thailand 718 93.14 6.86 92.37 7.63 91.26 8.74
Vietnam 1,048 98.52 1.48 97.92 2.08 83.68 16.32
Source: Authors' own computations from the WBES. Due to data availability,
we restrict the analysis to a subsample of countries.
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Table D.4: Summary statistics at the country level, cross-section 2013
2013
Country Obs. FinDev Con. Var. Country Obs. FinDev Con. Var.
Albania 357 37.58 0.08 3.04 Kosovo 198 34.94 0.40 -
Armenia 359 45.18 0.28 2.83 Latvia 332 60.70 0.15 4.16
Azerbaijan 390 25.46 0.25 2.40 Lebanon 558 98.64 0.39 3.15
Bangladesh 1,437 41.79 0.25 4.85 Lithuania 263 46.22 0.15 3.52
Belarus 353 24.15 0.13 3.19 Madagascar 336 11.92 0.18 -
Bosnia and Herzegovina 360 62.01 0.16 2.11 Moldova 350 39.74 0.10 3.86
Bulgaria 287 69.64 0.18 3.60 Mongolia 359 67.28 0.22 2.39
Cambodia 467 45.33 0.17 6.08 Montenegro 145 53.61 0.16 -
Croatia 359 76.72 0.21 2.46 Nepal 482 58.11 0.35 4.55
Czech 250 55.36 0.13 3.40 Poland 534 53.93 0.17 4.26
DRC 511 5.24 0.38 8.02 Romania 532 41.41 0.31 3.99
Djibouti 263 31.09 0.11 - Serbia 358 43.56 0.17 3.17
Estonia 270 73.70 0.06 2.76 Slovenia 270 70.79 0.24 3.63
FYROM 359 49.21 0.22 2.90 Tajikistan 348 17.86 0.23 3.37
Georgia 357 39.85 0.20 3.24 Tanzania 771 17.21 0.48 5.73
Ghana 711 16.99 0.62 5.57 Turkey 1,319 70.19 0.08 -
Hungary 306 50.76 0.08 3.87 Uganda 736 15.52 0.29 6.63
Jordan 573 72.33 0.37 4.57 Ukraine 983 73.96 0.19 2.40
Kazakhstan 570 35.58 0.09 2.36 Yemen 353 6.34 0.29 6.65
Kenya 767 31.63 0.20 5.48 Zambia 704 16.54 0.35 3.60
Mean 45.51 0.22 3.90
Source: Authors' own computations from the WBES. FinDev: credit to private sector in % of GDP; Con.: share
of nancially constrained rms; Var.: within-country variance of rm sales.
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Table D.5: Summary statistics at the country level, cross-section 2009
2009
Country Obs. FinDev Con. Var. Country Obs. FinDev Con. Var.
Albania 52 36.92 0.17 2.32 Latvia 264 104.55 0.25 4.38
Armenia 371 24.86 0.32 3.69 Lesotho 146 12.84 0.24 5.69
Azerbaijan 360 19.07 0.30 2.95 Liberia 147 12.20 0.35 9.17
Benin 148 22.47 0.61 6.38 Lithuania 268 69.73 0.26 3.33
Bhutan 244 32.42 0.27 4.06 Madagascar 434 11.52 0.39 3.67
Bosnia and Herzegovina 360 65.37 0.26 2.30 Malawi 149 13.38 0.44 6.71
Brazil 1,783 48.87 0.49 6.48 Mauritius 397 82.74 0.41 4.78
Bulgaria 274 73.11 0.17 4.13 Micronesia 62 21.30 0.24 3.02
Burkina Faso 393 17.02 0.72 4.81 Moldova 346 36.00 0.38 3.56
Cameroon 361 11.48 0.52 6.23 Mongolia 345 40.30 0.37 4.64
CapeVerde 148 57.96 0.39 6.94 Montenegro 115 76.54 0.10 2.95
Chad 148 3.93 0.48 4.40 Nepal 486 59.18 0.10 4.26
Congo 122 4.92 0.43 5.23 Niger 147 12.20 0.51 4.69
Croatia 99 66.71 0.24 3.34 Philippines 1,280 29.16 0.11 5.11
Czech 244 49.86 0.23 3.72 Poland 429 49.75 0.24 4.40
Ivory Coast 512 16.43 0.70 7.41 Romania 497 46.15 0.34 3.71
Eritrea 172 16.77 0.01 1.59 Russia 976 45.26 0.42 4.09
Estonia 259 105.11 0.07 3.80 Samoa 108 39.53 0.17 3.94
FYROM 362 43.87 0.24 3.67 Serbia 382 42.55 0.30 4.01
Fiji 159 89.62 0.08 - Sierra Leone 150 8.22 0.37 3.89
Gabon 172 10.12 0.26 9.99 Slovenia 276 90.69 0.18 3.33
Hungary 285 68.04 0.10 3.95 Timor-Leste 148 12.66 0.21 6.18
Indonesia 1,314 27.66 0.13 8.06 Togo 153 19.75 0.53 7.80
Kazakhstan 532 50.27 0.32 3.78 Tonga 145 47.09 0.10 1.84
Kosovo 176 34.34 0.16 - Vanuatu 126 62.98 0.29 2.54
Laos 358 17.24 0.19 3.70 Vietnam 1,024 103.32 0.15 3.59
Mean 41.02 0.29 4.67
Source: Authors' own computations from the WBES. FinDev: credit to private sector in % of GDP; Con.: share
of nancially constrained rms; Var.: within-country variance of rm sales.
APPENDIX D. EMPIRICAL APPENDIX 135
D.2 Robustness checks for empirical patterns
This part shows that the empirical patterns presented in section 3.2 are robust to the
inclusion of controls at the rm- as well as the industry level. Table D.1 describes the
variables used in the empirical analysis. Empirical pattern 2 shows that industries
with a higher degree of product competition are characterized by a larger fraction
of nancially constrained rms. We estimate the following equation:
Constrainedic = + Compic + Xf + c + t + "fic , (D.1)
whereas Constrainedic is the share of nancially constrained rms within an industry
i in country c. The variable Compic denotes the industry mean of the degree of
competition (see Table D.1). We control for a set of rm characteristics Xf and
include country xed eects c, as well as year dummies t. Column (1) of Table
D.6 shows results for this specication and highlights that the positive relationship
between competition and the share of nancially constrained rms is robust. As a
further robustness check, we use the rm-level variable for access to external nance
instead of the industry share in regression (D.1). Column (2) shows that credit-
rationing is positively associated with competition. The advantage of the rm-level
regression is that we further control for industry-xed eects at the 4-digit level.
Empirical pattern 3 states that more nancially constrained industries show a larger
within-industry variance of sales. A major concern is that this relationship might
be driven by rm heterogeneity with respect to productivity and size, or innovation
activity. To address this issue, we run the following regression:
V arianceic = + TOAic + Xf + c + t + "fic , (D.2)
whereas V arianceic is the within-industry variance of rm sales and TOAic denotes
the industry-mean of tangible over total assets. Column (1) of Table D.7 shows
the results. In columns (2)-(3), we replace the industry-mean TOAic with nancial
development at the country level for cross-sectional data in years 2009 and 2013. This
specication allows us to include industry-xed eects at the 4-digit level. Columns
(4) and (5) show that the negative relationship between nancial development and
the variance of sales holds at the country level as well, when we use the within-
country variance of sales as dependent variable.
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In a last step, we do a similar exercise for the eect of nancial development FinDevc
on the share of credit-rationed producers, as shown by the following regression:
Constrainedic = + FinDevc + Xf + i + "fic . (D.3)
The rst two columns of Table D.8 show the estimation results. Analogous to em-
pirical pattern 2, we use the rm-level variable for access to external nance as
dependent variable and show that the signicantly negative relationship can be con-
rmed at the rm level (see columns 3 and 4).
Table D.6: Regression analysis credit constraints and degree of competition
Share constrained Access to nance
(1) (2)
Degree of competition 0.027*** 0.060***
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm-level controls:
Size 0.000 -0.023***
(0.738) (0.004)
Labor productivity -0.005*** -0.023**
(0.000) (0.026)
Legal status -0.001 0.003
(0.277) (0.779)
Age 0.000* -0.003***
(0.094) (0.000)
Exporter 0.000 -0.004
(0.912) (0.896)
Domestic private ownership 0.000 0.000
(0.235) (0.736)
Foreign private ownership 0.000** -0.005***
(0.016) (0.000)
Government ownership 0.000 -0.001
(0.473) (0.605)
Year xed eects Yes Yes
Country xed eects Yes Yes
Industry xed eects No Yes
Observations 17,792 15,350
R-squared 0.797 0.193
Note: Cross-section 2002-2005; industry xed eects at 4-digit level.
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Table D.7: Regression analysis credit constraints and variance of sales
Within-industry variance sales Within-country variance sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Industry Mean TOA -1.142***
(0.000)
Financial development -0.012*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.025***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm-level controls:
Size -0.011 0.031** 0.071*** -0.024*** 0.004
(0.346) (0.043) (0.000) (0.009) (0.699)
Labor productivity 0.006 -0.090*** 0.013 -0.121*** -0.021***
(0.502) (0.000) (0.208) (0.000) (0.001)
Legal status 0.022** 0.042** 0.261*** 0.063*** 0.341***
(0.037) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.000 0.058*** 0.067*** 0.020 0.065***
(0.339) (0.006) (0.001) (0.115) (0.000)
Exporter 0.079** -0.356*** 0.183*** -0.273*** 0.272***
(0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Domestic private ownership 0.006 -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.007***
(0.103) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign private ownership 0.007** -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.047) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Government ownership 0.006* -0.015*** -0.014** -0.017*** -0.013***
(0.096) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000)
Product innovation 0.010***
(0.000)
Process innovation 0.036
(0.197)
Year xed eects Yes No No No No
Country xed eects Yes No No No No
Industry xed eects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,108 14,703 14,481 14,942 14,634
R-squared 0.688 0.188 0.218 0.282 0.319
Column (1): 2002-05; (2) & (4): 2009; (3) & (5): 2013. Industry xed eects at 4-digit level.
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Table D.8: Regression analysis credit constraints and nancial development
Share constrained Access to nance
2009 2013 2009 2013
Financial development -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.008*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm-level controls:
Size 0.001 -0.005*** -0.032*** -0.056***
(0.368) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Labor productivity 0.004*** -0.009*** -0.034*** -0.051***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Legal status -0.005*** 0.039*** -0.028** 0.175***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000)
Age -0.006*** 0.002 -0.027** 0.003
(0.001) (0.163) (0.031) (0.814)
Exporter -0.033*** -0.006 -0.050 -0.058*
(0.000) (0.126) (0.135) (0.062)
Domestic private ownership -0.001*** 0.000** -0.003*** 0.002**
(0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.032)
Foreign private ownership -0.001 0.000*** -0.007*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.912)
Government ownership -0.001 0.000* -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.073) (0.679) (0.565)
Industry xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,935 14,630 14,555 14,474
R-squared 0.193 0.235 0.074 0.076
Note: Industry xed eects at 4-digit level.
Conclusion
The question how nancial frictions aect international trade has been analyzed at
the country or industry level for a long time. In recent years, an increasing avail-
ability of micro datasets has shifted the perspective to the rm level. Empirical
studies document the large heterogeneity of producers in terms of productivity, as
well as nancial characteristics, and nd negative eects of credit constraints on
rm-level exports and foreign market entry. This thesis is motivated by evidence
on credit constraints and exports, and aims to contribute to the theoretical liter-
ature on nancial frictions in international trade. It analyzes how rms react to
nancial shocks and trade liberalization in the presence of credit constraints, and
shows how these adjustments change aggregate variables such as product variety,
average productivity and welfare. The three chapters highlight new heterogeneous
eects of credit constraints at the rm level. Chapter 1 combines nancial frictions
with the literature on quality in international trade. Firms require external credit
for investments in processes and product quality. Consistent with empirical studies,
the model explains both positive and negative correlations of prices with credit and
trade costs, depending on the sectoral scope for vertical dierentiation. Chapter
2 introduces two types of external nance and adds a new selection mechanism to
the literature on rm heterogeneity in international trade. Besides the selection
into exporting, productivity determines access to external nance. Only the most
productive rms obtain unmonitored funds, such as corporate bonds, whereas low
productivity rms have to rely on more expensive bank nance. Producers react to
credit shocks and trade liberalization by switching the type of nance.
A common feature of the rst two chapters is the interaction of rm heterogeneity
with nancial imperfections. Producers dier ex-ante in their capability to conduct
innovations (Chapter 1) or in their productivity (Chapter 2), which both translates
into heterogeneity in performance, such as sales and prots. The interaction of
rm heterogeneity with credit frictions has two important implications. First, some
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rms with low capability or productivity face credit constraints as they cannot over-
come nancial imperfections. Second, nancial shocks and trade liberalization will
aect heterogeneous producers very dierently. A new element in Chapter 3 is that
heterogeneity arises from the interaction of credit constraints at the rm level and
nancial frictions at the country level, even in the absence of ex-ante dierences in
productivity or wealth. Producers dier in pledgeability of sales, which results in
rm heterogeneity if nancial institutions are imperfect.
Besides new heterogeneous eects on the rm level, the second common feature of all
chapters is the analysis of general equilibrium eects. Whereas existing theoretical
work mainly focuses on rm-level responses in partial equilibrium, this thesis shows
how heterogenous reactions across producers aect aggregate variables. The main
idea of the analysis is as follows: if producers respond dierently to nancial shocks,
this changes price competition and the selection of rms in general equilibrium.
To evaluate the welfare implications in the presence of credit frictions, it is crucial
to account for these selection eects. In particular, Chapter 1 shows that credit
frictions reduce the number of producers and thus the degree of competition for
existing suppliers in general equilibrium. In contrast to partial equilibrium, the
negative eect of credit frictions on the extensive margin leads to an equilibrium with
larger rms and higher investment. The welfare losses of credit tightening depend
on technology characteristics and are larger in sectors with low investment intensity.
Chapter 2 identies substitution eects as an additional channel of adjustment to
credit tightening and trade liberalization. As some producers respond to shocks by
switching the type of nance, price competition changes, which inuences product
variety and welfare. Chapter 3 shows that globalization raises the interest rate, leads
to a reallocation of prots towards unconstrained rms and increases the share of
credit-rationed producers. These eects increase the variance of prices and represent
an additional negative welfare channel that reduces common gains from trade.
The analysis throughout this thesis aims to link heterogeneous eects of credit fric-
tions at the rm level to aggregate implications for international trade. I hope that
the chapters contribute to a better understanding of how rms react to nancial
and trade shocks in the presence of credit market imperfections. This thesis sug-
gests that technological characteristics, the availability of dierent types of external
nance, and adjustments of capital costs play an important role for evaluating wel-
fare consequences. I hope that my dissertation contributes to the analysis of nancial
frictions in international trade, and motivates further research in this direction.
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